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Executive summary 
This report was prepared at the request of the Ex-Post Evaluation Unit of the European 
Parliamentary Research Service (EPRS). It examines the implementation by EU Member States 
of the Plant Protection Product Regulation (the Regulation) which governs the authorisation 
of plant protection products (PPP) in the EU. It considers first, whether Member States share 
the same approach towards the authorisation of PPPs containing active substances (and 
safeners, synergists, etc.) already approved at EU level, pursuant to Articles 4-13 of the 
Regulation. Second, it examines whether Member State competent authorities (CAs) possess 
the necessary institutional capacity to deliver independent, transparent and, hence, reliable 
‘authorization of PPPs’ using active substances (and other substances) approved at EU level. 
Finally, it assesses whether the national authorisation model(s) support or contradict the key 
principles on which the Regulation is based; specifically precaution, sustainability and 
substitution. 
Despite major changes in EU policy and regulation of PPPs in the last decade (new legislation 
was introduced in 2009), EU regulation of PPPs, as a whole, is under-researched. The scope of 
this research was broad. It generated new data in an area which is generally not well 
understood and about which there is little knowledge. Given this starting point, and the 
breadth of the research questions, this report should be regarded as a first step towards 
understanding the various matters covered. As such, the research seeks, first, to generate new 
knowledge and understanding of the implementation of the Regulation and operation of the 
zonal system (described below), secondly, to make recommendations for improvement on the 
basis of these findings and thirdly to identify areas for further research. 
The Regulation divides Member States (and Norway) into zones with comparable 
‘agricultural, plant health and environmental (including climatic) conditions’ (Northern, 
Central and Southern) in order to avoid duplication of work, reduce administrative burden on 
industry and Member States, increase harmonisation and facilitate mutual recognition of 
authorisations.1 Applications for authorisation are submitted to a Member State, acting as 
zonal rapporteur, who evaluates the application for the relevant zone. National authorisation 
decisions are made primarily on the basis of the conclusions of this evaluation.  
This research employed mixed methods, encompassing both desk-based and empirical 
strategies. The former involved review of relevant literature, policy and EU case law. The latter 
involved surveys of Member State CAs and selected stakeholders, both via self-completion 
questionnaires consisting largely of closed questions. It also involved a questionnaire of open 
questions distributed to zonal steering committees. 
The report is structured as follows. Section I introduces the research. Sections II-IV comprise 
the theoretical background to the research and include discussions of independence, 
transparency, the precautionary principle, sustainability and the substitution principle. Section 
                                                          
1 Recital 29 PPPR. 
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V sets out the method employed for the empirical element of the research. Section VI discusses 
the zonal evaluation and authorisation procedures including empirical data on Member State 
evaluation and decision-making and the operation of the zonal system. Section VII presents 
and discusses the results of the research with respect to the independence and transparency of 
the CAs and implementation of the precautionary principle, sustainability and the substitution 
principle. Findings and recommendations are summarised throughout sections VI and VII. 
Section VIII concludes and summarises the recommendations. 
Overall, the area capable of the greatest and most immediate improvement relates to the 
transparency of CAs, particularly in terms of access to information. In the medium to longer 
term, it may be appropriate to review Member State practice and/or the Regulation with a 
view to establishing opportunities for wider public, stakeholder and/or public interest groups 
(PIG) participation in decision-making, primarily for the contribution such activities can make 
to transparency. In addition, consistency in interpretation and application of the precautionary 
principle and sustainability among Member States, and the ambition with which substitution 
is implemented, could also be improved, for example through clear guidance from the 
Commission or through co-operation and agreement between Member States at a zonal or 
inter-zonal level. Finally, as ever, greater resources – financial, technical, expert, personnel – 
may improve decision-making, both in terms of its quality and speed, and boost the operation 
of the zonal system overall. More specific findings include the following: 
Zonal evaluation and national decision-making procedures are characterised by diversity. For 
example, Member States differ in terms of the institutional structure of their CAs, the type and 
extent of communications with applicants during evaluation and decision-making and the 
nature of the expert advice (binding or consultative) provided to decision-makers. Overall, 
very few trends within the zones may be identified. The zonal system is valued by Member 
States for the benefits it delivers, for example harmonisation, work-sharing and resolution of 
disagreements between CAs. However, it still faces significant challenges, especially in terms 
of improving harmonisation, sharing work fairly within the zones and further strengthening 
trust between the Member States. With respect to harmonised procedures and methods for 
evaluation, a variety of guidance documents covering certain areas of PPP evaluation is 
available on the Commission website. However, it appears that some areas are still to be agreed 
and that some guidance is unable to cover every possible scenario. The zonal system is a new 
and complex system which warrants further research and continued monitoring in order to 
understand better its development and operation. 
With respect to independence, there are varying levels of formal independence of respondent 
CAs from government. However, most respondent CAs have sole responsibility for their 
decisions. Lack of formal independence does not necessarily mean unreliable or unfair 
regulation. 
There are also varying levels of independence from industry. However, few of the respondent 
Member State report restrictions on recruiting CA heads from industry or on employment in 
industry after their appointment. This may risk undermining their independence from 
industry. Difficulties with recruitment and retention of the necessary expert staff may increase 
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information asymmetry between CAs and industry with attendant risks of regulatory capture. 
Greater remuneration to attract qualified staff and/or in-house training could reduce 
information asymmetry and perhaps also the risk of capture. 
Respondent CAs lose some formal autonomy due to their being funded wholly or partly by 
government. In addition, government control over salaries reduces autonomy further and is 
identified by some CAs as restraining their ability to recruit the required staff. However, most 
respondent CAs regard themselves as possessing sufficient resources (personnel, technical, 
financial) to fulfil their obligations under the Regulation, although several did report gaps and 
deficiencies in resources. 
Due to the lack of data concerning stakeholder and public views with respect to the fairness 
and reasonableness of CA decision-making, the extent to which it is trusted and how far the 
independence of individual CAs (or lack thereof) is regarded as a problem, it is not possible to 
determine whether strengthening the formal independence of CAs would improve the quality 
of their decision-making. 
With respect to transparency, levels of transparency among CAs are low, overall. This is so 
firstly, in terms of the availability of information about evaluation and authorisation 
procedures and secondly, in terms of access to the information on which decisions are based. 
Both of these are necessary to enable interested parties to gain an understanding of the 
procedural and informational basis of PPP authorisations. 
Wider public, stakeholder or PIG participation in decision-making is important for improving 
transparency, may improve the quality of decisions and may also counter the risk of regulatory 
capture. Currently, the Regulation does not require or provide for such participation during 
evaluation and authorisation procedures and comparative assessment. Furthermore, the zonal 
system itself acts as a barrier to participation due to the level at which zonal evaluation 
procedures are conducted; a level which is far removed from most citizens. Given this legal 
framework, it is not surprising that consultation activities in Member States are extremely 
limited, if conducted at all. 
CAs are subject to differing levels of accountability to national governments and legislatures. 
Some Member States operate robust systems of peer review and auditing of decisions which 
should operate to improve the overall reliability of their decision-making. Increasing 
transparency could also improve accountability. 
With respect to the principles of precaution, sustainability and substitution, there is evidence 
of inconsistent interpretation and application of the precautionary principle and sustainability 
amongst Member States. Member States exhibit greater consistency in conducting comparative 
assessment. This is still a relatively new exercise but eventually ambition could be improved. 
While this research has not identified any deficiencies which are likely significantly to 
undermine the reliability of CA decision-making, as summarised above, there are large parts 
of the zonal procedure and CA decision-making which could be improved. Of these, the most 
significant deficiency identified relates to the lack of transparency in evaluation and 
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authorisation procedures. In addition, the research represents a significant contribution in 
terms of describing and understanding the zonal system. However, despite the above findings, 
many questions remain unanswered and, as implementation of the Regulation progresses and 
the zonal system evolves, new questions will arise. A further significant contribution of this 
research is to identify areas in which more, and more focused, research is necessary to 
understand the current situation as well as new developments, perhaps once more experience 
has been gained with the zonal system, zonal evaluation and comparative assessment. 
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I – Introduction2 
The year 2009 saw the introduction of an ambitious new regime regulating plant protection 
products (PPPs) in the European Union. This regime consists of Directive 2009/128 
establishing a framework for Community action to achieve the sustainable use of pesticides 
(the ‘Sustainable Use Directive’ or ‘SUD’)3 and Regulation (EC) No 1107/2009 concerning the 
placing of plant protection products on the market (‘the Regulation’ or ‘PPPR’).4 The latter 
repeals the two main directives which previously governed the EU’s regulation of PPPs.5 While 
the EU has regulated the placing of PPPs on the market since 1979, the introduction of the 2009 
regime has been described as a ‘radical change in EU pesticide regulation in terms of goals, 
instruments and scope’ (Bozzini, 2017, p.58), driven by an awareness of, and desire to address, 
the failures of Council Directive 91/414/EEC6 (Bozzini, 2017, chap.3). The Regulation makes 
many significant changes to the regulation of PPPs, amongst them the provisions relating to 
the authorisation of PPPs, including the establishment of a system of co-operation between 
Member States.7 Despite these major policy and regulatory changes, the regulation of PPPs in 
the EU, and particularly the 2009 regulatory regime is generally under-researched.8  
This report was prepared at the request of the Ex-Post Evaluation Unit of the European 
Parliamentary Research Service (EPRS). It examines the implementation by EU Member States 
of the provisions governing the authorisation of PPPs in the EU. It considers first, whether 
Member States share the same approach towards the authorisation of PPPs containing active 
substances (and safeners, synergists, etc.) already approved at EU level, pursuant to Articles 
4-13 PPPR. Secondly, it examines whether Member State competent authorities (CAs) possess 
the necessary institutional capacity to deliver independent, transparent and, hence, reliable 
‘authorisation of PPPs’ using active substances (and other substances) approved at EU level. 
Finally, it assesses whether the national authorisation model(s) support or contradict the key 
principles on which the Regulation is based; specifically precaution, sustainability and 
substitution. 
                                                          
2 Thanks are due to the EPRS for their support throughout this project, to Professor Elen Stokes and Dr 
Steven Vaughan for their valuable comments on this report and aspects of the research and to Kulsum 
Patel who provided excellent research assistance. Particular thanks are due to Dr Dieter Pesendorfer, 
who peer reviewed the study at the request of EPRS, for his very helpful comments. Any mistakes are 
my own. 
3 European Parliament and Council Directive 2009/128/EC establishing a framework for Community 
action to achieve the sustainable use of pesticides [2009] OJ L309/71. 
4 European Parliament and Council Regulation (EC) No 1107/2009 concerning the placing of plant 
protection products on the market and repealing Council Directives 79/117/EEC and 91/414/EEC 
[2009] OJ L309/1. 
5 Council Directive 79/117/EEC prohibiting the placing on the market and use of plant protection 
products containing certain active substances [1979] OJ L33/36; Council Directive 91/414/EEC 
concerning the placing of plant protection products on the market [1991] OJ L230/1. 
6 Council Directive 91/414/EEC (n 5). 
7 Described further in section VI. 
8 With some exceptions, for example, (Bozzini, 2017; Hamlyn, 2015). 
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The research engages with two important principles of governance: the independence and 
transparency of CAs. ‘Reliability’, as a characteristic of regulators and their decision-making, 
is perhaps more commonly discussed in academic literature in terms of ‘trust’, ‘credibility’ or 
‘confidence’ (for example, Löfstedt, 2005). Trust is a slippery concept and subject to multiple 
definitions. Giddens offers a helpful definition which specifically links trust to reliability: 
‘[t]rust may be defined as confidence in the reliability of a person or system, regarding a given 
set of outcomes or events, where the confidence expresses a faith in… the correctness of 
abstract principles (technical knowledge)’ (Giddens, 2013, p.34). Elsewhere, trust is said to be 
‘the belief that those with whom you interact will take your interests into account’ even when 
in a position of powerlessness. Further, confidence ‘exists when the party trusted is able to 
empathize with (know of) your interests, is competent to act on that knowledge, and will go 
to considerable lengths to keep its word’. ‘Trustworthiness’ is said to be a combination of both 
(La Porte and Metlay, 1996, p.342). Specifically with respect to risk regulation, Löfstedt argues 
that the public will trust regulators on the basis either of past decisions, i.e. outcomes, or of a 
belief that the decision-making process is credible (defined as fair, competent and efficient). 
Fairness and impartiality are important procedural values. If regulators are regarded as 
lacking these qualities, for example by not demonstrating that they take everyone’s interests 
into account, they are likely to lose trust. In this context, involvement of stakeholders and 
public participation (discussed in section III.3) may be important for building trust (Löfstedt, 
2005, pp.6–7; La Porte and Metlay, 1996, p.344). A regulator’s competence (for example 
proficiency in handling cases, relevant expertise and experience) is also key to building and 
maintaining trust (Löfstedt, 2005, p.7; La Porte and Metlay, 1996, p.342). 
Thus, trust depends on multiple different factors and there may be multiple explanations for 
its loss (Löfstedt, 2005, p.xviii), including absence of the qualities discussed above or the 
inequitable distribution of costs and benefits stemming from regulatory decisions (La Porte 
and Metlay, 1996, p.342). Others look to historical factors, pointing to the number and size of, 
often food- or health-related, scandals since the 1990s (Löfstedt, 2004, pp.336–337). Research in 
the field of risk regulation has focused in particular on the role of risk communication 
(Löfstedt, 2005, 2006), the ability of experts and regulators to understand and accommodate 
public attitudes towards risks in decision-making (for example, Wynne, 2001, 1989; EGSG, 
2007; Slovic, 1997) and the model of any public engagement conducted in building (or 
diminishing) trust in regulators (Wynne, 2006; Stirling, 2008). Persistent failure to build or 
maintain trust may ultimately threaten the legitimacy of the regulator (La Porte and Metlay, 
1996, p.342). 
The legitimacy of EU policy and regulation tends to be discussed in terms of ‘output’ 
legitimacy – the quality and effectiveness of its decisions, and ‘input’ legitimacy – the fairness 
and democratic quality of its decision-making processes (Barnard and Peers, 2014, pp.4–7; 
Scharpf, 1999, chap.1). This may be particularly important for independent regulators, due to 
their lack of the traditional democratic (input) legitimacy derived from being elected and 
accountable to an electorate (Larsen et al., 2006, p.2860), discussed further in section II. In areas 
of regulation, such as pesticides, where knowledge of the impacts of pesticide use emerges 
slowly and therefore where the consequences of decisions may be impossible to evaluate for 
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many years, the importance of input legitimacy may increase (La Porte and Metlay, 1996, 
p.455). The research question defines reliability in this context as composed of independence 
and transparency, both of which relate to inputs. It is the adherence, by CAs, to these two 
principles which the report attempts to assess. They are used on the basis of an assumption 
that fulfilment of these criteria will ensure that authorisation decisions are reliable (or 
trustworthy).  
However, it is acknowledged that the link between inputs and outputs is not automatic. For 
example, formal independence may not necessarily guarantee fair regulation (Stern, 1997, 
pp.72–74). Furthermore, given the social and ecological uncertainty characterising the contexts 
of PPP use (Wynne, 1992b; Meir and Williamson, 2005; Pretty, 2005), assessment of the risks 
they pose is a highly complex task, beset with uncertainties, which present challenges for 
regulators (Baldwin, 1996, pp.87–88). Thus, the reliability of any authorisation process 
premised on a risk assessment (as well as institutional independence and transparency) is also 
contingent on the reliability of the risk assessment, which may be contested, especially in 
situations of uncertainty (for example, controversies over risk assessments of neonicotinoids, 
glyphosate and endocrine disrupting chemicals, Bozzini, 2017, chap.4). Assessing the 
reliability of risk assessment in the context of the Regulation, in terms of the quality both of the 
actual scientific evidence and its evaluation is beyond the scope of this report. However, EU 
law requires that risk assessment itself should be conducted ‘on the basis of scientific advice 
founded on the principles of excellence, transparency and independence… to ensure the 
scientific objectivity of the measures adopted’.9 These principles10 aim to raise confidence in 
the EU’s risk assessment procedures (Scott and Vos, 2002, p.283). And these are, indeed, the 
standards required of the zonal rapporteur Member State (zRMS) under the Regulation, as 
discussed in sections II and III. This is, therefore, a further justification for assessing the 
institutions conducting risks assessments under the Regulation for these qualities. 
The report is structured as follows. Sections II and III introduce a discussion of the principles 
of independence and transparency, respectively. The sections are based on a narrative (English 
language) literature review covering the principles of independence and transparency as well 
as the more general literature on IRAs. Section IV moves to brief discussions of the principles 
of precaution, sustainability and substitution. This section is a product of a narrative review of 
(English language) literature (including grey literature) and doctrinal analysis of EU case law 
on these principles. All three principles are controversial and open to competing 
interpretations. Given space constraints and the overall focus of the research, it is impossible 
to do much beyond giving a flavour of the debates. The discussion therefore concentrates on 
the interpretation of these principles in an EU context.  
                                                          
9 Case T-70/99 Alpharma v Council [2002] ECR II-3495, para.183; Case T-13/99 Pfizer Animal Health SA v 
Council [2002] ECR II-3305, para.172. 
10 Elaborated in European Parliament and Council Regulation (EC) No 178/2002 laying down the 
general principles and requirements of food law, establishing the European Food Safety Authority and 
laying down procedures in matters of food safety [2002] OJ L31/1, and Commission, White Paper on 
Food Safety COM(1999) 719 Final. 
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Sections II-IV provide an account of the theoretical basis for this research and serve to illustrate 
how theory has informed the empirical tools employed in the research, in particular the survey 
of Member State CAs, described in section V.1. Finally, they provide a framework for analysing 
the results of the empirical work, drawing findings and making recommendations in response 
to those findings, as presented and discussed in Section VII. 
Section V describes the empirical methods employed to conduct this research and sets out 
precisely which elements of the Regulation are being examined. Section VI performs several 
functions. Firstly, it summarises the zonal evaluation and authorisation procedure established 
by the Regulation. Secondly, drawing on desk-based research and responses to the Member 
State survey, it describes the various evaluation and authorisation procedures operating in the 
Member States. Thirdly, it reports and discusses perspectives on the zonal system of Member 
States, stakeholders and the zonal steering committees,11 gathered during the research. 
Section VII presents and discusses the results of the empirical work with respect to the 
independence and transparency of CAs, evaluation and authorisation procedures and the 
implementation of the principles of precaution, substitution and sustainability. 
Recommendations are made on the basis of conclusions drawn throughout sections VI and VII. 
Section VIII concludes and summarises the recommendations made on the basis of these 
conclusions. 
With respect to the scope of this research, Chapter III of the Regulation relates to PPPs and 
governs a broad range of Member State activities. The report focuses on Articles 28-39, which 
deal with authorisation requirements and procedure with respect to zonal evaluation and 
authorisation, and comparative assessment of PPPs containing active substances classified as 
candidates for substitution,12 pursuant to Article 50.13 Member States are examined in their 
capacity as ‘zonal rapporteur Member States’ (zRMS) under Article 35 PPPR,14 in which 
capacity they conduct evaluations of applications to authorise PPPs, described in more detail 
in section VI.1. PPPs may also be authorised in Member States through mutual recognition of 
an authorisation granted by another Member State pursuant to Articles 40-42 PPPR. Due to the 
specific focus on the evaluation procedure at zonal level, mutual recognition is not considered 
further in this report (for more on this procedure, see Articles 40-42 PPPR and Commission, 
2014b). Finally, as the state of Luxembourg (whose CA is the Minister of Agriculture, 
Viticulture and Consumer Protection) only accepts applications for mutual recognition due to 
a lack of capacity to conduct evaluations (DG SANTE, 2016d, pp.7–8), it is also not considered 
further. 
                                                          
11 These are explained in section VI.1. 
12 Article 24, Annex II point 4 PPPR. 
13 Described in more detail in Section III. 
14 This role is discussed in more detail in Section VI. 
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II – Independence 
Article 36(1) PPPR requires the zRMS to ‘make an independent, objective and transparent 
assessment in the light of current scientific and technical knowledge using guidance 
documents available at the time of application’. It imposes no more detailed institutional 
requirements to achieve this other than that Member States must ‘designate a competent 
authority or authorities to carry out the obligations of the Member States laid down in this 
Regulation’.15 
Since the mid-1970s, Europe has experienced a wave of regulatory reform characterised by 
increased delegation (at national and supranational levels) to expert independent regulatory 
authorities (IRAs) operating outside direct control of the central administration (Majone, 1996, 
pp.3, 10–11, 47–48). The vast majority of this reform occurred in the field of economic 
regulation, i.e. regulation of the operation of the market, and focused primarily on competition, 
financial bodies and ‘utilities’ – electricity, gas, water, telecommunications etc. – accompanying 
the privatisation of these previously state-owned industries (Thatcher, 2002a, pp.126–127; 
Stern and Holder, 1999, p.35). Similar delegation to IRAs in the field of social regulation (i.e. 
environmental, health, safety, consumer protection etc.), while much less (Gilardi, 2005, p.85), 
can still be seen as part of this larger trend across Europe (Thatcher, 2002a, p.143; Hellebø 
Rykkja, 2004, p.141). The CAs examined in this report, being concerned with risk regulation 
and protection of human health and the environment, fall into the category of social regulation. 
The literature on IRAs reflects the different extent of regulatory reform in these two areas and 
largely focuses on economic regulators. Nonetheless, this literature offers valuable insights for 
a study of IRAs in the field of social regulation and forms the basis of the brief discussion of 
independence as a quality of regulators presented in this section. The section firstly considers 
reasons for delegation to IRAs relevant to pesticide regulators, the limits of regulatory 
independence and the characteristics of an IRA. 
1. Why delegate to IRAs? 
Several, largely functionalist and often normative, explanations have been suggested for 
increased delegation to IRAs (although these are by no means the only explanations (see, for 
example Thatcher and Stone Sweet, 2002)). The first expresses a desire on behalf of central 
administrations to achieve policy credibility. The short terms of elected politicians and inability 
of current legislatures to bind subsequent legislatures may undermine the consistency, 
permanence and credibility of public policies (Gilardi, 2005, pp.87–88). Governments therefore 
delegate regulatory powers to separate agencies to demonstrate commitment ‘to regulatory 
strategies that would not be credible without such delegation’ (Majone, 1996, pp.41–44; 
Thatcher, 2002a, pp.130–131). Secondly, and relatedly, IRAs are believed to promote stability 
by enabling policy to be insulated from the electoral cycle and attendant political uncertainty 
(Majone, 1996, p.289; Gilardi, 2005, p.88) and the greater ease with which they may engage 
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with the public than the executive, for example, due to their freedom from a need to secure 
votes (Demarigny, 1996; Johannsen, 2003, p.17). 
A third reason points to the changing role of the state in the 1980s and 1990s and desires to 
shift from interventionist policies and to separate administrative tasks from party political 
influence (Majone, 1996, pp.49, 54, 56). Food and environmental safety scandals, most notably 
that surrounding bovine spongiform encephalopathy (BSE, also known as ‘mad cow disease’) 
in the mid-1990s, also precipitated the creation of IRAs. The separation of policy decisions 
(remaining with politically accountable actors) and management (executed by neutral 
institutions) aimed to restore public trust and confidence in decision-making and government 
authorities and to enhance their credibility and accountability (Thatcher, 2002a, p.132; Hellebø 
Rykkja, 2004). The BSE scandal also highlighted the dangers of situating responsibility for the 
conflicting interests of public health and industry within the same (executive) institution 
(Hellebø Rykkja, 2004, pp.128–129). This provided further incentives for establishing 
authorities intended to be separate from commercial and economic interests in order to 
minimise vulnerability to manipulation and ‘capture’ (Hellebø Rykkja, 2004, pp.135–137; Vos, 
2000, p.246), although such outcomes are by no means guaranteed, as discussed further in 
section II.2. 
Fourthly, during the 1980s and 1990s, policy problems increased in complexity and regulation 
became more technical (Majone, 1996, p.56; Thatcher, 2002a, p.131). Ministers and generalist 
civil servants were at a disadvantage in decision-making vis-à-vis the expertise and resources 
concentrated in powerful interests such as industry and NGOs who demonstrated a 
willingness to challenge government decisions (Thatcher, 2002a, p.132). The expertise of IRAs 
is often used to invoke their legitimacy (Baldwin, 1996, p.90) and indeed, in the field of risk 
regulation, their ability to employ outside experts and produce scientific information both to 
advise citizens and overcome information asymmetries (but see section II.2 for discussion and 
criticism) with industry is seen as an advantage (Vos, 2000, p.247; Thatcher, 2002a, p.131). 
Agencies with specialist expertise were deemed better equipped to engage in and implement 
evidence-based and reasoned decisions (Thatcher, 2002a, p.132) and to do so more efficiently, 
by lowering the cost of decision-making (Thatcher and Stone Sweet, 2002, p.15). 
Fifthly, breaking from previous regulatory styles based on public ownership criticised by some 
for their secrecy and opaque, ad hoc advice and intervention (Vos, 2000, p.246; Thatcher, 2002a, 
p.142; Hellebø Rykkja, 2004, p.129), separation from the state, it is argued, endows regulators 
with identity and clear responsibility (Baldwin, 1996, p.84). The explicit, focused mandates and 
objectives accompanying delegation (Thatcher and Stone Sweet, 2002, p.19) are said to enable 
governing institutions and politicians to appear ‘responsive and effective in face of crisis’ [sic] 
(Hellebø Rykkja, 2004, p.139) and can enhance openness and transparency (Vos, 2000),16 
although again, this may not necessarily be the case, as discussed in section II.2. 
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Finally, delegation to IRAs allows politicians to shift blame and avoid controversy by 
disassociating themselves from unpopular or difficult decisions (Thatcher, 2002a, pp.131, 133; 
Demarigny, 1996, p.175). Where regulatory decisions concerning health and environmental 
protection are likely to be based on contested or controversial scientific advice, an aim may be 
to depoliticise questions of risk assessment and risk management by ensuring both a strict 
division between managerial and scientific tasks and the independence of scientists (Hellebø 
Rykkja, 2004, p.127; Vos, 2000, pp.238–239). However, given the close relationship between 
risk assessment and management and the absence of objective and neutral regulatory science 
(Lee, 2008, p.42), especially in situations of scientific uncertainty and controversy, such an aim 
may be unachievable (Vos, 2000, p.248). 
2. Limits of regulatory independence 
Despite the reasons in favour of establishing IRAs, IRAs do not necessarily eliminate all the 
problems their independent status was designed to address, most notably information 
asymmetry and immunity from capture by the regulated industry. Carpenter and Moss (2014a, 
p.13) define ‘regulatory capture’ as ‘the result or process by which regulation, in law or 
application, is consistently or repeatedly directed away from the public interest and toward 
the interests of the regulated industry, by the intent and action of the industry itself’. 
Furthermore, some identify a possible fundamental tension between independence and 
accountability (Weale, 1996). 
With respect to accountability, delegation to IRAs involves the transfer of extensive powers to 
institutions which are not accountable to the electorate (Majone, 1996, p.4). Thus, while there 
are good reasons (including accountability) for establishing regulatory authorities that are 
independent of government, as discussed in section II.1, this separation could in fact weaken 
IRA accountability to the public via elected officials (Gilardi and Maggetti, 2011, p.201). 
However, it is rare for political authorities not to retain some control over IRAs and their 
activities (Demarigny, 1996, p.175) and there are mechanisms for achieving this which fall short 
of direct interference in decision-making, such as control of appointments, budget allocations, 
reporting requirements, Parliamentary oversight, procedural requirements, professional 
standards, public participation and judicial review (Thatcher, 2002a, p.127; Majone, 1996, pp.5, 
39–40; Graham, 1998). Ultimately, a balance between the two desirable qualities of 
accountability and independence is required. 
With respect to capture, public interest theories of regulation often assume that regulators 
pursue collective social objectives which enhance the general welfare of the community 
(Morgan and Yeung, 2007, p.17). This view has long been criticised (Gönenç, Maher and 
Nicoletti, 2000, p.42). For example, the economic theory of regulation suggests that regulation 
is in fact sought by, and operated for the benefit of, industry in order to create and maintain 
barriers to entry by competitors, rather than prompted by the public interest (Stigler, 1971). It 
is argued additionally, that where industry does not initially seek regulation, regulation – and 
regulatory authorities – are generally ‘captured’ subsequently (Mitnick, 1980, p.38). However, 
empirical support for this theory, and indeed for the inevitability and widespread existence of 
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regulatory capture for anti-competitive purposes, is mixed (Carpenter and Moss, 2014a; 
Christiansen, 2011). More recent literature differentiates between both different types and 
different degrees of capture and argues for its preventability. It also recognises that some 
degree of influence by industry may in fact benefit the public interest (Carpenter and Moss, 
2014b), for example where it leads to productive co-operation between regulator and industry 
or promotes care in the regulator for the welfare of regulated firms (Ayres and Braithwaite, 
1992, chap.3). 
With respect to degree, ‘strong capture’ describes a situation in which the purposes and 
rationale for the regulation are vitiated and its benefits are outweighed by the costs of capture. 
By contrast, ‘weak capture’ refers to the influence of special interests ‘compromis[ing] the 
capacity of regulation to enhance the public interest’ although overall regulation still serves 
the public interest (Carpenter and Moss, 2014a, pp.11–12). With respect to type, Carpenter and 
Moss propose ‘corrosive capture’, which describes the securing, by the regulated industry, of 
regulation which is less costly or less stringent in terms of its ‘formulation, application, or 
enforcement’ than that perhaps required by the public interest (Carpenter and Moss, 2014a, 
pp.16–18). Kwak (2014) has identified the phenomenon of ‘cultural capture’ which describes 
how the psychological nature (rather than the substance) of regulator-industry interactions 
may produce in the regulator a view of the public interest favourable to the regulated industry. 
Regulators may come to identify with the regulated industry and adopt industry positions due 
to the perceived higher status of industry or relationship pressures stemming from frequent 
social interaction or membership of the same social networks. This may represent a particular 
risk with respect to the weakening of social regulation. The communication between regulator 
and applicant promoted by the Regulation, discussed in section VI, raises the potential for 
cultural capture, in particular, in CA evaluation and authorisation of PPPs. Finally, a 
materialist perspective argues that industry control over regulators may stem from close and 
sustained contact between both parties through long-term involvement in the same field and 
the offering of regulator rewards by industry, such as lucrative subsequent employment. 
Acting against industry interests in this context could damage personal friendships and future 
prospects of rewards (Mitnick, 1980, pp.211–212). 
Much of the regulator’s vulnerability to capture is attributed to information asymmetry 
between regulator and industry which may persist despite an IRA’s endowment of expertise 
and knowledge (Majone, 1996, p.70). Enhanced independence through delegation to expert 
regulators is not straightforwardly guaranteed: for example, in some fields, it may be difficult 
to obtain the necessary training and expertise outside industry (McCarty, 2014, pp.99–103). 
Industry sources of expertise may enhance industry influence. Industry is able to exercise 
control over information relevant to regulation due to its complexity, associated uncertainty 
and the bounded rationality of the parties involved. Such control enables industry to frame or 
manipulate regulator perceptions of industry problems and solutions through the supply of 
selective or biased information (Mitnick, 1980, pp.209–211; Ferretti, 2007, p.385). Ultimately, 
regulators may become agents of the industry (Mitnick, 1980, p.207), although relationships 
between regulators and industry can also be highly conflictual (Thatcher, 1998).  
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Ensuring sufficient IRA resources may counter information asymmetry and improving 
working conditions and salaries may counter industry control of regulator rewards (Mitnick, 
1980, p.212). Post-employment restrictions may contribute to the latter, although could also 
inhibit recruitment of ‘a regulator with appropriate managerial expertise’ (Gönenç, Maher and 
Nicoletti, 2000, p.43). In addition, Kwak recommends the development by regulators of ‘career 
paths and educational opportunities… that are more autonomous from the regulated industry’ 
to narrow the expertise gap between regulator and industry, and the implementation of 
‘personnel and ethics policies’ to prevent excessive bias towards industry (Kwak, 2014, pp.119–
120). Article 75(3) PPPR requires Member States to ‘ensure that competent authorities have a 
sufficient number of suitably qualified and experienced staff so that the obligations laid down 
in this Regulation shall be carried out efficiently and effectively’. The explicit rationale behind 
these resource requirements is ensuring the efficiency and effectiveness of the authorisation 
procedure. However, an additional benefit may be a guard against information asymmetry 
and consequent risk of regulatory capture, provided sufficient attention is paid to potential 
problems associated with expert regulators, discussed above, for example the source of their 
expertise or their over-identification with industry. 
Some identify increased transparency, for example the publication of information, and 
involvement of interested parties as means to reduce the risk of capture (Gönenç, Maher and 
Nicoletti, 2000, p.44; Majone, 1996, p.26; Mitnick, 1980, p.66). Industry influence may decrease 
with the increase in participation by other interests (Yackee, 2014 and references therein). It 
has been argued that IRAs may foster public participation (Majone, 1996, p.41) due to the 
publicity afforded their activities and their potential function as a space for public debate 
(Demarigny, 1996, p.162). Some, referring largely to independent utilities regulators, identify 
increased efforts to consult consumer interests (going further than, or in the absence of, a 
statutory obligation), publish information and operate openly (Graham, 1998, p.508; Thatcher, 
1998, pp.131, 139–140). Such transparency and wider involvement, insofar as it enables public 
scrutiny of regulatory activities and the relationship between the regulator and government, 
may weaken the risk of capture by enhancing accountability.17 Furthermore, returning briefly 
to the potential tension between independence and accountability, in reality, IRAs must co-
operate with multiple actors. If the concept of accountability is broadened to encompass more 
than direct control by Parliament, independence and accountability may be reconciled 
(Johannsen, 2003, p.25). 
However, some have argued that separation from the central administration may undermine 
both the transmission of public protests directed at elected officials back to the IRA and the 
responsiveness of IRAs to direct public engagement (Mitnick, 1980, p.70). Furthermore, 
participatory processes may be vulnerable to ‘information capture’ – the costly communication 
of excessive information by (usually well-resourced) stakeholders, often to establish control 
over regulatory outcomes for strategic advantage. Less well-resourced participants may be 
excluded, reducing the pluralism of the process, and regulators may be worn down or diverted 
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from their overall regulatory objective by the overload (both in terms of volume and technical 
density) of information (Wagner, 2010). 
More generally, Ayres and Braithwaite (1992, chap.3) have proposed the involvement of one 
or more public interest groups (PIGs) as third players, alongside industry and regulator, as a 
means to prevent capture. PIGs may be empowered through, for example, the grant of access 
to all information held by the regulator, a place in negotiations between regulator and industry 
and powers equivalent to the regulator’s to challenge industry. Their ability to prevent capture 
manifests in two respects. Firstly, the need to capture two separate groups (regulator and PIGs) 
increases the costs of capture for industry, acting as a deterrent. Secondly, long-term 
involvement in the regulatory process, relationship-building and the development of trust 
between the three parties aims at socialising each into new modes of deliberation and 
behaviour and to internalising ‘a concern for the other player that is in the public interest’ 
(Ayres and Braithwaite, 1992, p.93; Schwarcz, 2014, pp.367–370). Furthermore, PIGs seek to 
enhance participatory democracy, while avoiding the burden of mass participation in all areas 
of decision-making. They would engage in dialogue with the regulator/industry and 
contribute different experience and knowledge to the regulatory process. Incentives to 
seriously consider such information exist in the potential for PIGs to apply political pressure 
to regulators through media use and public outreach (Schwarcz, 2014). Environmental, public 
health, consumer and/or occupational health and safety groups (amongst others) could fulfil 
this role in the context of PPP authorisation. PIGs may be vulnerable to capture themselves but 
should be protected by the contestability of their position which allows for the empowerment 
of alternative PIGs (Ayres and Braithwaite, 1992, chap.3; Schwarcz, 2014, pp.367–370). 
3. Features of an independent regulator 
It is impossible to offer a definitive description of an IRA. They may vary according to country, 
organisational culture, legal and political system, field of regulation and their tasks and 
activities (Thatcher, 2002a, p.127; Stern and Holder, 1999, p.34; Hellebø Rykkja, 2004, pp.132–
134). They take various institutional forms, for example, statutorily independent, a unit 
supervised by a ministry or subject to its instructions, or a non-ministerial government 
department; some may therefore be ‘semi-independent’ of government (Thatcher, 2002a, 
pp.127, 129). Furthermore, context, such as level of economic development, dictates the type 
of independence (whether from government or industry) emphasised (Stern, 1997, p.69). 
That said, two predominant forms of regulatory agency may be identified: the agency and 
commission. The former is a hierarchical organisation with a single head. It may be a separate 
organisation or an office or division of a larger government division or department. The latter 
is usually hierarchical and headed by an appointed expert board or ‘commission’. It tends to 
be a separate organisation. Both contain expert staff and heads able to process ‘large numbers 
of cases rapidly and relatively economically through specialisation of function’ (Mitnick, 1980, 
pp.30–31). While agency heads are often career civil servants, commissioners tend to be experts 
in relevant fields, for example, law, economics or science, such as academics or former staff of 
organisations in the relevant industry sector (Larsen et al., 2006, p.2862). Suggestions that 
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commissions make better decisions are arguable. The need for compromise and consensus in 
this context (as compared to a single-headed agency) may not necessarily result in better 
decisions and may risk inconsistency (Graham, 1998, p.507). 
Several definitions of independence have been suggested (for example, Thatcher, 2002b, p.956; 
Mitnick, 1980, p.69: see definitions quoted therein). The definition used in this report18 draws 
on that proffered by Smith: an arm’s-length relationship with industry; an arm’s-length 
relationship with political authorities; and the attributes of organisational autonomy, for 
example, ‘earmarked funding and exemption from restrictive civil service salary rules – 
necessary to foster the requisite expertise and to underpin those arm’s length relationships’ 
(Smith, 1997). This definition demonstrates a sensitivity towards concerns about capture by 
industry and too much control by government, discussed above. It also emphasises the 
operational elements of independence. Autonomy is seen as promoted by the following: secure 
sources of funding established by law; the absence of potential for senior officers to benefit 
from political processes; the presence of a primary law governing the IRA which sets out key 
powers and duties including when and how decisions may be overruled; protection for senior 
officers from unfair or arbitrary dismissal by politicians, e.g. through fixed terms, and a 
multiparty appointment process (e.g. involving both the executive and legislature); and the 
definition of professional standards and adequate remuneration levels (Stern and Holder, 
1999, p.43; Gönenç, Maher and Nicoletti, 2000, p.43) – restrictive civil service salary rules can 
inhibit recruitment and retention of well-qualified professional staff, technical expertise 
reduces the risk of capture and organisational autonomy helps foster and apply technical 
expertise (Smith, 1997). Article 74(1) PPPR provides that Member States may levy fees in order 
to cover costs incurred through work conducted within the scope of the Regulation. 
Implementation of this provision may enhance the operational autonomy of CAs through 
reducing reliance on central government funds by providing an external funding stream, if 
fees charged do genuinely match costs incurred. That said, dependence by a regulator on the 
regulated industry for funding may constitute another mechanism of capture (Kwak, 2014, 
p.75).19 This suggests careful structuring of regulator funding is required to promote both 
organisational autonomy and independence from the regulated industry. 
As discussed further in section V.1, the emphasis in this report is on formal independence. 
However, formally independent regulation may not automatically lead to effective regulation. 
Effective regulation is highly dependent on the reputation of the regulatory agency for acting 
fairly and reasonably and involves ‘considerable informal as well as formal accountability to 
the regulated industry, to large and small consumers, to Parliament, and to public opinion’ 
(Stern, 1997, p.73). Formal independence contributes to generating this accountability but it 
does not necessarily make the most important contribution (Stern, 1997, pp.72–74). Thus, if the 
CAs examined in this report do not display all the elements of formal independence, this 
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should not be taken to indicate that their authorisation procedures are necessarily ineffective 
or unreliable. 
III – Transparency 
As stated in section II, the zRMS is required to make a ‘transparent assessment’ of the 
application for authorisation.20 As with independence, few detailed requirements are imposed 
or suggested by the Regulation with respect to how this should be achieved. Provisions in the 
Regulation which are relevant to transparency broadly relate to access to information and are 
briefly discussed in section III.3.  
Transparency is now widely accepted as a principle of good governance and is specifically 
endorsed by the EU. Some have argued it is a general administrative law principle (Fisher, 
2010, p.312) and others that it is a general principle of EU law (Craig and De Búrca, 2015, 
pp.574–575; Lenaerts, 2004, p.321). Introduced in the Treaty of Amsterdam, it grew in 
importance through the late 1990s and subsequently (Vos, 2005, pp.129–130). A closely related 
concept, ‘openness’, interpreted as communication about EU activity and decisions in 
‘accessible and understandable’ language, was recognised by the Commission (2001b, p.10) as 
a principle of good governance. Transparency now surfaces in several provisions of the Lisbon 
Treaty and elsewhere in EU law (Craig and De Búrca, 2015, pp.568–569). Transparency, like 
independence, was also a significant part of the reform of food safety regulation, post-BSE 
(Hellebø Rykkja, 2004; Vos, 2000) in an effort to move away from previously non-transparent 
regulatory processes which had presided over past regulatory scandals (Löfstedt, 2004, p.340). 
It was central, for example, to the legal framework within which EFSA operates (Fisher, 2010, 
pp.299–300) and to the operation of the UK FSA (Krebs, 2004). 
Transparency is an exquisitely complex concept. Its meaning varies depending on context 
(Fisher, 2010, p.277) as do the reasons for and against transparency along with its implications 
(Fisher, 2010, p.283). There are, furthermore, different degrees of transparency, for example in 
terms of the amount revealed and the size and identity of the permitted audience, and on 
which its ‘capacity to facilitate knowledge’ depends (Schauer, 2011, p.1345). As such, this short 
section cannot encompass a comprehensive discussion of the concept. Instead, it offers a brief 
tour of the following areas. Firstly, it considers arguments for transparency. Secondly, it 
highlights some of the challenges and limitations of transparency. Finally, it considers various 
mechanisms for implementing or enhancing transparency. 
1. Why transparency? 
According to Fisher, the promotion of transparency is most often associated with making the 
exercise of power by institutions accessible or visible (Fisher, 2010, p.275). In the context of the 
Regulation, this would refer to the exercise of power by the zRMS in assessing an application 
for authorisation and concluding whether or not to recommend authorisation of the PPP in the 
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relevant zone, under Articles 28-39 PPPR. Several, closely related and mutually supportive 
reasons for transparency exist, discussed below. 
The most prominent argument for transparency is that it is necessary to ensure accountability; 
the public cannot hold an authority to account unless its activities are first made visible (Vos, 
2005, p.129). This argument sees transparency as a facilitator of democracy, enabling public 
control to counter corruption or regulatory capture (Schauer, 2011, pp.1348–1349).21 
Accountability is of particular concern here for two reasons. Firstly, as discussed in section II.2, 
the rise of IRAs prompted doubts over their accountability due to their separation from elected 
officials and therefore traditional methods of accountability (Thatcher, 2002a, p.141; Everson, 
1995). Doubts also concerned difficulties in identifying the responsible institution resulting 
from the increasingly complex institutional landscape and the blurring of the boundaries 
between expert advice and policy (Vos, 2005, p.121; Shapiro, 1997) (although it has also been 
argued that independence promotes visibility, facilitating control (Vos, 2005, p.125)). Secondly, 
authorisation decisions are based almost exclusively on scientific evidence, in the form of a 
risk assessment by the zRMS under Article 36(1) PPPR on the basis of the data submitted by 
the applicant in support of its application.22 Where scientific knowledge forms the basis of 
public decisions with significant implications for human health and the environment, as is the 
case with PPPs, democratic control ‘demands some ability on the part of a polity to evaluate 
the knowledge claims that justify actions taken on its behalf’ (Jasanoff, 2006, p.21). With respect 
to both, transparency appears as a prerequisite for accountability and indeed supports various 
accountability mechanisms, for example, judicial review and public participation (Majone, 
1996, p.300; Craig and De Búrca, 2015, p.548; Stern and Holder, 1999, p.43). 
Some have argued that openness, transparency and honesty increase trust or confidence in 
organisations, while secrecy destroys it (Löfstedt, 2005, p.xv; Peters, Covello and McCallum, 
1997). For example, research has discovered increased levels of trust in companies which share 
more information and which discuss both their risks and benefits (Löfstedt, 2005, p.xv and 
references therein). The EU has stated that transparency ‘strengthens the democratic nature of 
the institutions and the public's confidence in the administration’ (Declaration No 17 on the 
right of access to information, annexed to the Final Act of the Treaty on European Union [1992] 
OJ C191/101; Vos, 2005, p.129; Lenaerts, 2004, pp.318–324). The Court of Justice has elaborated, 
stating that ‘openness… contributes to conferring greater legitimacy on the institutions in the 
eyes of European citizens and increasing their confidence in them by allowing divergences 
between various points of view to be openly debated’23 (Craig and De Búrca, 2015, pp.573–
574). 
As the Court recognised, the improvement of (input (Barnard and Peers, 2014, p.5)) legitimacy 
is another argument for transparency. As a principle which facilitates citizen participation in 
decision-making, it is intended to ‘guarantee that the administration enjoys greater legitimacy 
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European Implementation Assessment 
PE 615.668 III - 25 
and is more effective and more accountable to the citizen’ (Lenaerts, 2004, pp.319–320). For 
example, where a regulatory decision relies on evidence (as here), public reporting, and 
therefore the possibility of public scrutiny, of the relevant data, models and assessment 
methods may prevent regulators adjusting that evidence to suit a policy position (Dudley and 
Wegrich, 2016, p.1143).24 Such participation may not necessarily improve decisions but it is 
regarded as having normative value (Schauer, 2011, p.1349). 
Finally, transparency may be employed as a response to involvement by private, particularly 
economic, actors in regulation (Abbot and Lee, 2015, pp.21–24; Fisher, 2010, pp.312–313). 
Under the Regulation, private, economic actors (applicants) are required to provide the vast 
majority of the information on which authorisation decisions are based.25 This is reasonable 
given the resources available to applicants and regulators respectively (Lee, 2008, p.78) and 
may increase the cost effectiveness and efficiency of regulation (Abbot and Lee, 2015, p.10). 
Relying on information provided by applicants does, however, raise concerns related to 
information asymmetry, discussed in section II.2. Transparency can ensure the public knows 
who is involved in, and what they are contributing to, the regulatory process, granting 
opportunities for scrutiny (Abbot and Lee, 2015, p.21) which again supports accountability. 
2. Limitations of transparency 
The centrality of openness and transparency to ‘better regulation’, both for risk regulation and 
regulation generally elevates these principles almost to the status of ‘all-purpose remedy for 
misgovernment’ (Hood, Rothstein and Baldwin, 2001, pp.148–149). However, transparency is 
not without its limitations, nor is its implementation free of challenges. It involves much more 
than simply ‘turning on the light’ (Fisher, 2010, p.306) and may have unintended 
consequences. There is evidence, for example, that institutional responses to pressures for 
increased transparency often involve blame shifting, avoidance or prevention, for example 
through the establishment of expert scientific committees to ‘bless’ decisions, the 
institutionalisation of ambiguity through dispersal of regulatory responsibilities or the pooling 
of information on risks from different sources (Hood, Rothstein and Baldwin, 2001, pp.128–
129, 164–169). Furthermore, public communication activities that purport to disseminate 
factual information in the interests of transparency may instead seek to effect social control 
through manipulating public opinion and influencing behaviour (Yeung, 2005). 
Contrary to the arguments in section III.1, it has been argued that transparency does not 
promote trust and may, in fact, cause harm (Fisher, 2010, p.282). For example, increased 
transparency may encourage members of public to make their own decisions about risks, 
instead of relying on the decisions of expert regulators. It may, furthermore, enable 
development of policy-vacuums often filled by more efficient communicators than the 
regulators (Löfstedt, 2005, p.xv, 2004, pp.340–341), who may not act in the public interest. 
                                                          
24 Although this presupposes that there exist those with the requisite expertise to perform the scrutiny: 
see section III.2. 
25 Article 33 PPPR. 
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Lastly, publishing unfiltered scientific findings could cause public alarm with drastic public 
health consequences (Löfstedt, 2005, p.xv). Furthermore, transparency may precipitate 
disagreement disruptive of the bases and procedures of decision-making (Fisher, 2010, p.305) 
especially so, perhaps, with respect to PPPs, where assessments of risk are already contested, 
as discussed in section I. 
These points relate to a more general argument that transparency, in terms of, for example, 
simply publishing information on a website, is not sufficient (OECD, 2016, p.38). The 
information itself must be ‘intelligible, clear and ultimately accountable’ (OECD, 2016, p.45). 
The corollary to this is the capacity of the recipient of the information to appraise and use that 
information. Transparency differs little from concealment in a society lacking ‘an active 
interpretive culture willing to criticise and able to make sense’ of the disclosed information 
(Jasanoff, 2006, pp.33–34). In the highly specialised world of plant protection, review by any 
scientific expert may not be enough; the right expert is required, and even they must be 
sufficiently detached from the subject matter to ensure unbiased review (Jasanoff, 2006, p.34). 
Finally, while transparency is not an unqualified good, so concealment is not an unqualified 
bad. As such, transparency may have to compete with other important social values which 
differ, depending on context (Jasanoff, 2006, p.22). Commercial confidentiality, national 
security and the protection of personal data are all in tension with transparency (Jasanoff, 2006, 
p.22; Fisher, 2010, p.280; Abbot and Lee, 2015, pp.23–24). Furthermore, non-disclosure may be 
valuable for promoting honesty and frankness (Fisher, 2010, p.289). Article 63 PPPR protects 
some of these values, allowing applicants to request information be treated as confidential 
where it can provide evidence that its disclosure ‘might undermine his commercial interests, 
or the protection of privacy and the integrity of the individual’.26 Applicants must physically 
separate that information. The Member State examining the application decides what 
information is to be kept confidential if access is requested.27  
The Court of Justice, in Bayer,28 strengthened this protection somewhat, finding that applicants 
are not required to request confidentiality under Article 63 at the time of application in order 
                                                          
26 The Commission has proposed revisions to this article as part of its recent proposal to revise the 
General Food Law (n 10) and eight other pieces of relevant legislation, including the Regulation, in 
order to improve the transparency of risk assessment procedures. Revisions will include greater public 
access to information and requirements to consult stakeholders and the public, 
<http://europa.eu/rapid/press-release_MEMO-18-2942_en.htm> accessed 15 April 2018. Beyond the 
amendments to Article 63, the proposed changes to the Regulation relate to confidentiality and public 
access to information submitted for the approval of active substances and not the authorisation of PPPs 
(Commission, Proposal for a Regulation of the European Parliament and of the Council on the 
transparency and sustainability of the EU risk assessment in the food chain COM(2018) 179 final). 
Article 59 PPPR also grants data protection to test and study reports submitted with an application for 
authorisation. 
27 Article 33(4) PPPR. 
28 C-442/14 Bayer CropScience and Stichting De Bijenstichting v College voor de toelating van 
gewasbeschermingsmiddelen en biociden (ECLI:EU:C:2016:890). 
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to benefit from it. Rather, interpreting Article 63 in light of Directive 2003/4/EC on public 
access to environmental information,29 it held that CAs may examine an applicant’s objection 
to the request for access and refuse it on the ground that disclosure ‘would adversely affect the 
confidentiality of commercial or industrial information’.30 On the other hand, however, the 
Court endorsed a broad interpretation of ‘emissions into the environment, affecting or likely 
to affect’ the environment, finding that it covered emissions of PPPs and the substances 
contained in them.31 This is significant: under Article 4(2) Directive 2003/4/EC, CAs may not 
refuse disclosure of ‘information on emissions into the environment’. Although the Court 
limits information disclosable to that relating to actual or foreseeable emissions under ‘normal 
and realistic conditions of use’32 and despite remaining ambiguity (Buonsante and Friel, 2017) 
this interpretation provides a significant exception to the protection of confidentiality under 
Article 63 PPPR. It may mean large amounts of data and studies are disclosable, according to 
the guidelines laid down by the Court for CAs, including importantly, information on the 
medium to long-term consequences of emissions on the environment.33  
3. Implementing transparency  
As discussed above, the meaning of transparency may vary depending on context. Narrow 
definitions would refer to ‘minimal openness of process, access to documents and, publication 
of official measures’ (Hofmann, 2014, p.207). Though perhaps minimal, public access to 
information, in contributing to democratic accountability (Peers, 2014, p.69), is still of course, 
an important element of transparency and one which has been supported by the Court of 
Justice and in EU legislation (Craig and De Búrca, 2015, pp.569–574). For example, Regulation 
(EC) 1049/2001 attributes to ‘openness’ a guarantee for the administration of greater 
legitimacy, effectiveness and accountability and a contribution ‘to strengthening the principles 
of democracy and respect for fundamental rights’.34 In an environmental context, Directive 
2003/4/EC recognises the contribution increased public access to environmental information 
makes to ‘a greater awareness of environmental matters, a free exchange of views, more 
effective participation by the public in environmental decision-making and, eventually, to a 
better environment’.35 In reality, however, these ambitious expectations may not be fully 
realised; ‘there is no necessary or automatic link between transparency and other values’ (Lee, 
2014a, p.197). 
                                                          
29 European Parliament and Council Directive 2003/4/EC on public access to environmental 
information [2003] OJ L41/26. 
30 Bayer (n 28) para. 49. 
31 Bayer (n 28) para. 76. See also, Case C-673/13 P Commission v Stichting Greenpeace Nederland and PAN 
Europe (EU:C:2016:889), para. 75. 
32 Bayer (n 28) paras 76–77, 81. See also, Stichting Greenpeace Nederland (n 31) paras 74–75. 
33 Bayer (n 28) paras 87–96. 
34 Recital 2 European Parliament and Council Regulation (EC) No 1049/2001 regarding public access to 
European Parliament, Council and Commission documents [2001] OJ L145/43.  
35 Recital 1 Directive 2003/4/EC (n 29). 
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More specifically, the Regulation contains its own requirements on access to information, 
providing some measure of transparency with respect to the PPP in question and the 
knowledge base for any decisions made about them. Article 57 imposes an obligation on 
Member States to keep certain information electronically available to the public on PPPs 
authorised or withdrawn under the Regulation. In addition, Article 60(2) requires Member 
States to compile and make available on request, lists of test and study reports concerning 
individual PPPs and the substances they contain including those for which the applicant 
claimed data protection under Article 59 PPPR. The lists shall include information on whether 
the reports were ‘certified as compliant with the principles of good laboratory practice or of 
good experimental practice’,36 enabling some scrutiny of the quality of the information used in 
decision-making. Commission guidance contains further suggestions for improving the 
transparency of the authorisation procedure. Most importantly, it recommends publication of 
the final Registration Report ‘if legal provisions in the individual MS allow’, with redaction 
and removal of confidential information (Commission, 2014b, p.14). The availability of such 
information would certainly enhance transparency but this is a limited move and, as mere 
guidance, is unable to compel or require disclosure by Member States. That said, the contents 
of registration reports37 suggest that at least part of these documents would fall within the 
scope of ‘information on emissions into the environment’ under Article 4(2) Directive 
2003/4/EC and, to that extent, should therefore be made available upon request, as discussed 
in section III.2. 
A requirement that public authorities give reasons for their decisions is perhaps the most 
straightforward means by which to enhance transparency (Majone, 1996, p.292). This activates 
accountability mechanisms, including judicial review, allowing citizens to defend their rights 
and courts to exercise their supervisory functions (Craig and De Búrca, 2015, p.548). It may 
also encourage decision-makers to balance the pros and cons of a decision more than a 
decision-maker whose reasoning will not be revealed and thereby helps control discretion 
(Shapiro, 1992, pp.180–181). The Regulation, however, imposes no such requirement on 
Member States, representing a significant omission from the transparency toolkit. The closest 
the Regulation comes to this requirement is Article 57, discussed above, which contains a 
minimal requirement to make available ‘reasons for withdrawal of an authorisation if they are 
related to safety concerns’.38 Uniform Principle A.5 second paragraph requires Member States 
to ‘come to a reasoned decision within 12 months of receiving a technically complete dossier’.39 
However, there is no requirement for its publication. 
                                                          
36 Article 60(3) PPPR. 
37 See the BVL website for examples: 
<https://www.bvl.bund.de/EN/04_PlantProtectionProducts/01_ppp_tasks/02_ppp_AuthorisationRe
viewActSub/02_ppp_RegistrationReports/psm_RegReports_node.html> accessed 25 January 2018.  
38 Article 57(1)(g) PPPR. 
39 Commission Regulation (EU) No 546/2011 implementing Regulation (EC) No 1107/2009 of the 
European Parliament and of the Council as regards uniform principles for evaluation and authorisation 
of plant protection products [2011] OJ L155/127. 
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Finally, the Regulation establishes a complex authorisation procedure which may operate 
differently in different Member States (see section VI). Transparency should extend to the 
‘rules, data and informational requirements… used to make decisions’ (OECD, 2013, pp.51–
52), essentially, the ‘rules of the game’. Such disclosure is not only necessary for the applicants 
who need to know the requirements for applications but also for interested parties wishing to 
understand in more detail the authorisation procedure, actors involved and how the 
information in the application is used and assessed. Such understanding of internal procedures 
and expectations is argued to build confidence in the regulator amongst general publics and 
the regulated industry (OECD, 2013, p.52). 
Beyond access to information, more ambitious interpretations of transparency would include 
openness in the form of public participation in decision-making. This interpretation is adopted 
here for the following reasons. Firstly, the Commission itself emphasised ‘effective and 
transparent consultation’ and a ‘reinforced culture of consultation and dialogue’, recognising 
the importance of public participation for good governance generally, (albeit, there, in the 
context of policy formation rather than regulatory decision-making) (Commission, 2001b, 
pp.15–17). Secondly, the intimate connection between transparency and public participation is 
frequently acknowledged. For example, consultation has been described as central to 
transparency (Deighton-Smith, 2004, p.67) and the improved understanding of regulatory 
decision-making enabled by transparency is argued to ensure more effective participation 
(Stern and Holder, 1999, p.43). It has been argued, furthermore, that full transparency is only 
achieved through knowledge of decision-making acquired by direct participation (Shapiro, 
1992, pp.204–205), although full transparency in this sense may not maintain or enhance trust 
in a regulator unless the public’s impression of the reliability of its internal operations also 
increases as a result (La Porte and Metlay, 1996, p.344). Recital 1, Directive 2003/4/EC states 
that ‘[i]ncreased public access to environmental information and the dissemination of such 
information contribute to… more effective participation by the public in environmental 
decision-making’. Similarly, recital 3, Directive 2003/35/EC40 states that ‘[e]ffective public 
participation in the taking of decisions enables the public to express, and the decision-maker 
to take account of, opinions and concerns which may be relevant to those decisions, thereby 
increasing the accountability and transparency of the decision-making process and 
contributing to public awareness of environmental issues and support for the decisions taken’. 
The Lisbon Treaty, too, acknowledges the link between openness, transparency and 
                                                          
40 European Parliament and Council Directive 2003/35/EC providing for public participation in respect 
of the drawing up of certain plans and programmes relating to the environment [2003] OJ L156/17. This 
Directive implements Aarhus Convention provisions on public participation and access to justice. 
Article 6(1)(b) Aarhus Convention requires Parties to provide for public participation in ‘decisions on 
proposed activities... which may have a significant effect on the environment’. Decisions authorising 
PPPs could satisfy this requirement. However, it remains for the Parties to the Convention to 
‘determine whether such a proposed activity is subject to’ this obligation. As such, the EU retains 
discretion over whether to require public participation in PPP authorisation decision-making. 
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participation41 and the General Food Law (GFL) conceives transparency as entailing openness 
and public consultation.42 While none of the above EU policy or legislative expressions of 
support for public participation in decision-making places a clear obligation on Member States 
to ensure participation in their authorisation of PPPs, they do illustrate the EU’s overall 
commitment to such participation. Finally, as discussed in section III.1, participation provides 
a link between transparency, in terms of access to information, and accountability through the 
scrutiny that participation enables. 
There are, furthermore, other good reasons for allowing public participation in decision-
making, relevant to the authorisation of PPPs and the reliability of the process. Involvement 
may instil a sense of wider ownership over decisions, promoting implementation (Bloomfield 
et al., 2001, p.510). The availability of more information and perspectives which wider 
participation grants to decision-makers may result in better decisions (Parkins and Mitchell, 
2005, pp.531–533), for example where scrutiny enables the identification of errors (Lee, 2014a, 
p.197) or where contributions are valued as resources for problem-solving (Steele, 2001). While 
risk assessment procedures tend to be closed and technocratic affairs, they need not necessarily 
be so. The reporting of expert deliberations, uncertainties, ambiguities and disagreements for 
example, may open up decision-making and enhance transparency (Stirling, 2008). A more 
instrumental rationale argues that participation can foster trust in the decision-makers 
(Stirling, 2005, pp.221–222), although it also has the potential to decrease trust (Löfstedt, 2004, 
p.340). Finally, given the often controversial nature of PPP authorisation decisions and the 
need for, and inevitability of, value judgments in the assessment and management of risk 
(Wynne, 1992c, p.116; Royal Society, 1992, p.97; Lee, 2008, pp.41–42), especially in situations of 
uncertainty, public involvement may benefit decision-making by incorporating citizens’ 
values, evaluating risks and benefits and weighing uncertain benefits against uncertain risks 
(Steele, 2001, pp.421–427). 
In light of the above, in the context of the Regulation, transparency would mean some form of 
public and stakeholder participation or consultation during the zonal authorisation procedure. 
There is, however, no provision for this in the Regulation and the achievement of transparency 
in the PPP authorisation procedure is therefore already disadvantaged.  
IV – Precaution, substitution and sustainability 
As the discussion in this section illustrates, none of these principles is monolithic, especially so 
with respect to the precautionary principle and sustainability. It is therefore almost a 
contradiction to refer to the precautionary principle or the principle of sustainability. However, 
the rest of the report does so for shorthand, while acknowledging this circumstance. 
                                                          
41 Articles 1, 10 and 11(2)-(3) TEU and Article 15(1) TFEU. 
42 Arts 9, 10, 38 Regulation (EC) No 178/2002 (n 10). 
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1. Precaution 
The precautionary principle is a key, yet still controversial and contested, part of risk 
regulation (for a discussion, see Pesendorfer, 2011). Admitting of multiple interpretations, it is 
impossible to isolate a single, widely agreed-upon definition. It is stated in the Lisbon Treaty 
to be a basis for EU environmental policy,43 and recognised as an autonomous principle of EU 
law, applying to ‘ensure a high level of protection of health, consumer safety and the 
environment in all the Community’s spheres of activity’44 (Lee, 2008, p.75) extending too, to 
the protection of animal and plant health (Commission, 2000, p.3). The Treaty offers no 
definition and the closest EU legislation comes to a definition is in Article 7 of the General Food 
Law,45 which provides ‘where, following an assessment of available information, the 
possibility of harmful effects on health is identified but scientific uncertainty persists, 
provisional risk management measures necessary to ensure the high level of health protection 
chosen in the Community may be adopted, pending further scientific information for a more 
comprehensive risk assessment’. The Court of Justice has confirmed this, stating that where 
the existence or extent of risks are uncertain, ‘protective measures may be taken without 
having to wait until the reality and seriousness of those risks become fully apparent’.46 
Furthermore, the interpretation and operation of the precautionary principle may vary widely, 
depending on context47 and legal culture (Fisher, 2002) and to such an extent that the wisdom 
of referring to a singular ‘precautionary principle’ may be open to question. For some, it makes 
more sense to talk of a ‘precautionary approach’ (Stirling, 2001). Others argue that ‘it is absurd 
to expect consistent interpretation and application of the principle’ (Fisher, 2009, p.31). The 
context is, of course, the Regulation, which provides that one of its purposes is to ‘ensure a 
high level of protection of both human and animal health and the environment’.48 It provides, 
further, that its provisions are ‘underpinned by the precautionary principle in order to ensure 
that active substances or products placed on the market do not adversely affect human or 
animal health or the environment’ and that ‘Member States shall not be prevented from 
applying the precautionary principle where there is scientific uncertainty as to the risks with 
regard to human or animal health or the environment posed by the plant protection products 
to be authorised in their territory’.49  
Article 29(1)(e) PPPR provides that a PPP ‘shall only be authorised where following the 
uniform principles… in the light of current scientific and technical knowledge, it complies with 
                                                          
43 Article 191(2) TFEU. 
44 Cases T-74/00, T-76/00 and T-141/00 Artegodan v Commission [2002] ECR II-4945, paras 183–184. 
45 Regulation (EC) No 178/2002 (n 10). 
46 Case C-236/01 Monsanto Agricoltura Italia SpA v Presidenza del Consiglio dei Ministri [2003] ECR I-8105, 
para. 111. 
47 For example, the area of law and whether EU or national institutions are applying it. 
48 Article 1(3) PPPR. 
49 Article 1(4) PPPR. 
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the requirements provided for in Article 4(3)’. Those Article 4(3) requirements include that, 
‘consequent on application consistent with good plant protection practice, and having regard 
to realistic conditions of use’, it (b) has ‘no immediate or delayed harmful effect on human 
health or animal health’ either directly or indirectly (through, for example, water, food or air) 
‘taking into account known cumulative and synergistic effects’; (c) ‘shall not have any 
unacceptable effect on plants or plant products’; (d) ‘shall not cause unnecessary suffering and 
pain to vertebrates to be controlled’; and (e) ‘shall have no unacceptable effects on the 
environment’ having regard to its fate and distribution and its impact on non-target species, 
including their behaviour. These requirements must be evaluated in light of the Uniform 
Principles.50  
The Regulation’s predecessor Directive contained wording51 very similar to Article 4(3)(b) and 
(e) PPPR which was interpreted in Sweden v Commission (Paraquat),52 in light of the 
precautionary principle. In that case, Sweden challenged the Commission’s approval of the 
active substance paraquat on the basis that, inter alia, it breached the precautionary principle. 
The General Court found that those provisions, interpreted in light of the precautionary 
principle, required ‘the existence of solid evidence which, while not resolving scientific 
uncertainty, may reasonably raise doubts as to the safety of a substance’ justifying refusal.53 It 
noted too, that the Directive’s safety requirements required compliance with the Uniform 
Principles.54 It found furthermore that, ‘it must be established beyond a reasonable doubt that 
the restrictions on the use of the substance involved… make it possible to ensure that use of 
that substance will be in accordance with the requirements of Article 5(1)’.55  
This is, therefore, an indication from the Court that the available evidence, taking into account 
restrictions on use, must show ‘beyond a reasonable doubt’ that a substance is safe. Although 
these findings related to action by the Commission rather than national CAs and approval of 
an active substance rather than a PPP, given the similarity of the wording in the Regulation, it 
may be that Article 4(3)(b) and (e) would be interpreted similarly and that the interpretation 
would apply to paragraphs (c) and (d) as well. Indeed, the wording in the Regulation has been 
strengthened slightly and expanded, so it is perhaps unlikely that the standard of proof for the 
safety of a PPP, as required for authorisation under Article 29(1) PPPR, would be lowered, if 
this approach is taken. However, it should be noted that in a case decided subsequently to 
Sweden v Commission (Paraquat) but also in the context of active substance authorisation under 
Directive 91/414/EEC, the Court followed a different approach,56 discussed below. 
                                                          
50 Article 4(4) PPPR; Commission Regulation (EU) No 546/2011 (n 39). 
51 Articles 4(1)(b) and 5(1) Council Directive 91/414/EEC (n 5). 
52 Case T-229/04 Sweden v Commission (Paraquat) [2007] ECR II-02437. 
53 52. 52para. 161. 
54 52. 52paras 163-164. 
55 52. 52paras 169-170, 227. 
56 Case C-77/09 Gowan Comércio Internacional e Serviços Lda v Ministero della Salute [2010] ECR I-13533. 
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The Court endorsed quite a high standard of protection of health and the environment with 
this judgment, reflecting the strong wording in the Directive and Regulation (for example ‘no 
unacceptable effect’57). It does require ‘solid evidence… which may reasonably raise doubts’.58 
However, as the remainder of its analysis shows, this requirement may be satisfied by the 
existence of a single study conducted in a non-European country in which some conditions of 
application were not representative of those in Europe.59 This is not an impossibly high 
standard.  
Although this case is clearly directly relevant to the regulation of PPPs, it should be noted that 
it creates an inconsistency in EU law generally as regards the interpretation of the 
precautionary principle and what its implementation requires. The Court, in Sweden v 
Commission (Paraquat), applying the precautionary principle, apparently interprets the level of 
protection established in the legislation as a legal burden of proof with which the 
administration must comply in order to authorise the relevant substance (Anderson, 2014, 
pp.444–446). This shrinks the administration’s discretion to respond to the available evidence 
in light of the circumstances of the case in question (Anderson, 2014, pp.444–446). This case is 
apparently the only example of this approach in the context of risk regulation (Anderson, 2014, 
p.446) and may perhaps be partly explained by the requirement to apply the Uniform 
Principles which provide finely detailed guidelines for assessing safety. Elsewhere, it has been 
held that precautionary action must be based on ‘the best scientific information available’60and 
‘as thorough a scientific risk assessment as possible’61 such that the regulator can ‘reasonably’ 
conclude that protective or preventative measures are necessary to prevent the potential risk.62 
In this (dominant (Anderson, 2014, p.442)) approach to the precautionary principle in risk 
regulation, risk assessment is regarded as a procedural requirement (Stokes, 2008, p.492) which 
‘informs the exercise of political discretion, without dictating outcomes’ (Anderson, 2014, 
p.440) and the administration, not being bound by the scientific evidence63 (unlike in Sweden v 
Commission (Paraquat)), retains its discretion.64 It has been forcefully argued that this line of 
case law does not require the administration to satisfy a burden of proof (Anderson, 2014, 
pp.437–439). 
The difference in judicial reasoning as to what the interpretation and application of the 
precautionary principle requires creates confusion in the law and places Member States (and 
                                                          
57 Article 4(3)(e) PPPR. 
58 Sweden v Commission (Paraquat) (n 52), para. 161. 
59 52. 52para. 172-182. 
60 Alpharma (n 9), para. 171; Pfizer (n 9), para. 158. 
61 Alpharma (n 9), para. 175; Pfizer (n 9), para. 162. Sometimes the legislative context eliminates the 
requirement to perform a risk assessment, (Lee, 2014a, p.30); Case C-343/09 Afton Chemical Limited v 
Secretary of State for Transport [2010] ECR I-7027, Opinion of AG Kokott. 
62 Pfizer (n 9), paras 160-163; Alpharma (n 9), paras 173-176; Monsanto (n 46), paras 111-113. See also, in 
the context of Directive 91/414/EEC, Gowan (n 56), paras 72–79. 
63 Alpharma (n 9), para. 239. 
64 Whether this discretion is in practice, exercised, is another question, (Lee, 2014b, p.9).  
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others, primarily applicants) in a difficult position. Do CAs, for example, follow an approach 
enunciated with respect to wording almost identical to that which binds them? Or do they 
follow what may be regarded as a different, but dominant, approach to risk regulation? Given 
this dilemma, we should not be surprised if Member State survey responses indicate differing 
interpretations of the precautionary principle. 
Finally, although the standard of protection established in Sweden v Commission (Paraquat) is 
high, it should not be taken as an endorsement by the Court of the pursuit of ‘zero risk’. As a 
matter of EU law, precautionary action cannot be based a ‘hypothetical risk’, for science can 
never provide proof of ‘zero risk’.65 However, Member States are arguably entitled to seek 
reduction of a known (as opposed to hypothetical) risk to zero, in the absence of complete 
harmonisation of the field,66 (Lee, 2008, p.46; de Sadeleer, 2006, p.164) although such measures 
would still be subject to review under Articles 34 and 36 TFEU.67 
2. Sustainability 
‘Sustainability’ is not mentioned in the Regulation. It is therefore at least arguable that the 
Regulation is not, in fact, based on the ‘principle of sustainability’. If it is, it is not explicit. 
Whether it is, is likely to be a subjective judgment and depend on the preferred interpretation 
of sustainability. Sustainability, like sustainable development, is a vague term admitting of 
multiple interpretations (Ross, 2009, p.33; Bosselmann, 2008, p.23). It may be, then, that one 
interpretation of sustainability can indeed be found in the Regulation. It is my opinion, in light 
of the interpretation I prefer (Hamlyn, 2015), that the Regulation is not based on 
sustainability.68 However, the point is contestable and worth exploring, as follows, especially 
given that EU pesticides policy expressly seeks to achieve ‘the sustainable use of pesticides’.69  
The sole references to ‘sustainable use’ in the Regulation are to the Sustainable Use Directive70 
and to the Thematic Strategy on the Sustainable Use of Pesticides.71 There are attempts to achieve 
coherence between the Regulation and these other two instruments. For example, Recital 29 
provides that Member States should be allowed to ‘impose appropriate conditions having 
regard to the objectives laid down in the[ir] National Action Plan’ (NAP).72 In addition, the 
                                                          
65 Alpharma (n 9) paras 156–158; Pfizer (n 9) paras 143–145. 
66 C-121/00 Hahn ECR I-9193, para. 34. 
67 66. paras 34-37. 
68 A note on terminology: I do not distinguish between ‘sustainability’ and ‘sustainable development’ in 
my discussion. These terms are often used interchangeably. However, for a discussion of their potential 
differences, see (Paehlke, 2002). 
69 For example, Commission, A Thematic Strategy on the Sustainable Use of Pesticides COM(2006) 372 
Final. 
70 Recital 29 PPPR; SUD (n 3). 
71 Recital 36 PPPR; Commission, Towards a Thematic Strategy on the Sustainable Use of Pesticides 
COM(2002) 349 Final. 
72 Adopted under Article 4 SUD. This is the primary instrument for implementing the SUD. 
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PPP label should indicate ‘where and under what circumstances a plant protection product 
may be used’ in order to achieve coherence.73 Finally, ‘proper use’ of PPPs (as required by 
Article 55, first paragraph PPPR) requires compliance with the SUD.74 These explicit links 
between the Regulation and other legal and policy instruments relating to PPPs are sparse and, 
on face value, fairly weak. The Regulation could, for example, require Member States to 
consider their NAPs or the goal of ‘sustainable use’ during their authorisation decision-
making. This could strengthen mutually supportive operation between the two instruments. 
However, further research may be necessary to understand fully their relationship. 
However, if we look to the rest of EU policy and legislation on sustainability in the context of 
PPPs, as I have argued elsewhere (Hamlyn, 2015), we will not necessarily be looking to an 
ambitious understanding of sustainability.75 Sustainability is a complex concept whose 
nuances, due to space constraints, cannot be considered fully here. However, it is worth 
highlighting two elements in particular. Sustainability is often characterised as consisting of 
three pillars: the environmental, social and economic (Stallworthy, 2008, p.174). It is also 
closely associated with justice for future generations (World Commission on Environment and 
Development, 1987). Both these elements are viewed, internationally, as central to sustainable 
development (United Nations, 2015). More importantly, the EU itself has long acknowledged 
both these three constitutive pillars and the principle of inter-generational equity as core parts 
of sustainability/sustainable development (Commission, 2001a; Council of the European 
Union, 2006; Pallemaerts, 2013, p.362).76 It is argued that the implications for a regulatory 
regime based on this interpretation of sustainability are that decision-makers should take 
environmental, social and economic considerations relevant to the product in question and the 
interests of future generations into account during authorisation decision-making (Hamlyn, 
2015). 
However, traditionally, ‘sustainable development’ as applied to agriculture has often simply 
meant ‘optimising (or reducing) the use of synthetic pesticides and minimising environmental 
impact’ (Carr, 2003, p.170). The interpretation of sustainable use adopted by the SUD and EU 
policy on PPPs more generally is that of ‘risk reduction’ (Hamlyn, 2015). For example, Article 1 
SUD provides that its aim is to ‘achieve a sustainable use of pesticides by reducing the risks 
and impacts of pesticide use on human health and the environment’.77 The Regulation seeks a 
similar goal. This is evident from various provisions. Firstly, the Regulation aims to ‘ensure a 
                                                          
73 Recital 36 PPPR. 
74 Article 55, second paragraph PPPR. 
75 Although I acknowledge that the 2009 plant protection products regulatory regime, as a whole, 
constitutes an ambitious and bold reform of pesticides regulation, (Bozzini, 2017, chap.3). 
76 See also Commission, Next Steps for a Sustainable European Future: European Action for 
Sustainability COM(2016) 739 Final. 
77 See also, Commission, ‘Thematic Strategy’ (n 69) p.3. NB the SUD does elsewhere also appear to 
promote reduction of dependence on the use of pesticides. See, for example, Recitals 5 and 18 and 
Article 4(1) SUD. 
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high level of protection of both human and animal health and the environment’.78 This implies 
the pursuit of safety through reducing risks. Secondly, the Regulation seeks to facilitate and 
incentivise the placing on the market of ‘low-risk’ PPPs.79 Thirdly, as discussed in section IV.3, 
the Regulation implements the ‘substitution principle’, requiring the replacement of PPPs 
containing active substances identified as particularly hazardous with safer PPPs pursuant to 
comparative assessment,80 again, in order to reduce risks.81 It is acknowledged, as discussed in 
section IV.3, that comparative assessment requires consideration of risks and benefits and 
specifically the economic disadvantages of replacement.82 This is, however, a rare 
acknowledgement of the relevance of the three pillars of sustainability in the Regulation and 
nowhere can there be found an explicit acknowledgment of inter-generational equity. 
In conclusion, the predominant goal of the Regulation is to reduce risks posed by PPPs. As 
such it reflects the interpretation of sustainability enshrined in the SUD (although it does not 
explicitly label this approach ‘sustainability’ or ‘sustainable use’ as the SUD does) and indeed 
the interpretation of sustainable development traditionally associated with agriculture. 
Whether this is the ‘true’ or best interpretation of sustainability is very much open to debate. 
Sustainability has been interpreted, including by the EU, more ambitiously to encompass 
social, economic and environmental dimensions and the interests of future generations. As 
such, and due to the lack of consensus overall around its meaning (including between different 
areas of EU policy touching on sustainability), as with the precautionary principle, we should 
not be surprised if Member States express different understandings of the ‘principle of 
sustainability’ in their responses to the survey. 
3. Substitution 
The ‘substitution principle’ is a key part of the Regulation. As applied to chemicals generally, 
this principle seeks to foster the systematic replacement of hazardous substances with safer 
alternatives. Dating from the mid-20th century in Sweden (or perhaps even earlier (Öberg, 2014, 
p.565)) it is now a core part of EU chemicals regulation (Löfstedt, 2014, pp.543–546) and a ‘key 
element of precautionary thinking’ (Hansen, Carlsen and Tickner, 2007, pp.399–400). Like 
many environmental principles, defining it is problematic, although The European Chemical 
Industry Council (CEFIC) offers a simple definition: ‘substitution is the replacement of one 
substance by another with the aim of achieving a lower level of risk’ (quoted in Löfstedt, 2014, 
p.546). Furthermore, it is labelled a ‘principle’ and should, like the precautionary principle, be 
treated as a ‘guideline’ for consideration by decision-makers alongside other risk management 
strategies rather than a ‘policy tool’ (Abelkop and Graham, 2014, pp.582–583) or a rule 
dictating a clear course of action. Some argue the need for application on a case-by-case basis 
                                                          
78 Article 1(3) PPPR. 
79 Recital 17 PPPR. 
80 Article 50 PPPR. 
81 Recital 19 PPPR. 
82 Article 50(1) PPPR. 
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(Hansson, Molander and Rudén, 2011, pp.455–456; Löfstedt, 2014, p.555). This is 
acknowledged in Commission guidance (Commission, 2014a, p.9) and indeed in the 
Regulation.83 
However, the simplicity of the principle belies the complexity of its implementation and 
application (UK Royal Society of Chemistry, 2007). Challenges relate to, inter alia, insufficient 
knowledge about substances, lack of commercial incentives to substitute (although REACH 
introduced some) (Abelkop and Graham, 2014, pp.583–584), slow processes for identifying 
candidate substances and continuing controversy over whether substitution should be hazard- 
or risk-based (Löfstedt, 2014, pp.547–551), although this may be a false dichotomy as the 
current EU approach to substitution often contains elements of both (Öberg, 2014, p.565).84 
While the former promises to accelerate substitution processes, if trade-offs between candidate 
and alternative substances are not fully considered, it may have unintended environmental, 
health, social and economic consequences. However, a risk-based approach will certainly slow 
the pace of substitution down and is under-researched (as is substitution, generally) (Löfstedt, 
2014, pp.546, 551–560; Öberg, 2014, p.567). Some guidance on comparative assessment has 
been produced (Sunley and van Opstal, 2010; UK Royal Society of Chemistry, 2007; EPPO, 
2015), including on economic and practical considerations (Sunley and van Opstal, 2010, p.103) 
but still, there is little legislative tradition of applying the substitution principle outside the 
Nordic countries (Faust et al., 2014, p.2). Furthermore, any uncertainty associated with hazard-
based approaches is not necessarily dispelled by undertaking risk assessment, a process which 
also struggles to capture uncertainty (Aven, 2014, p.570). Scientific evidence rarely speaks for 
itself and demands interpretation (Stilgoe, Irwin and Jones, 2006, pp.50, 72); likewise the 
uncertainties in the knowledge base produced by (comparative) risk assessment require value 
judgments and the weighing of competing concerns during decision-making (Aven, 2014, 
pp.570–571). A more conciliatory view argues that each approach can be appropriate, 
depending on the circumstances and substances and alternatives involved, provided decisions 
are based on the best available evidence (Hansson, Molander and Rudén, 2011, p.456). 
The Regulation establishes a procedure for implementing substitution. Active substances are 
approved as ‘candidates for substitution’ (CfS) according to a number of hazard-based cut-off 
criteria set out in the Regulation.85 This classification triggers an obligation to perform a 
comparative assessment – the mechanism which delivers substitution – on PPPs containing a 
CfS (mandatory comparative assessment).86 The comparative assessment should be done at 
                                                          
83 Annex IV.2 PPPR. 
84 For example in European Parliament and Council Regulation (EC) No 1907/2006/EC concerning the 
Registration, Evaluation, Authorisation and Restriction of Chemicals (REACH) [2006] OJ L33/1 and the 
Regulation. 
85 Article 24(1); Annex II.4 PPPR. For more detail on cut-off criteria see the study (Bozzini, 2018) 
published under Annex II to the European Implementation Assessment. 
86 Derogations are allowed under Article 50(3) PPPR only ‘where it is necessary to acquire experience 
first through using that product in practice’. 
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national, rather than zonal, level (Commission, 2014a, p.4) and requires a weighing of risks 
and benefits between the PPP containing the CfS and alternative PPPs or non-chemical control 
or prevention methods.87 Member States are required to refuse authorisation or restrict the use 
of the PPP containing the CfS where the alternative is ‘significantly safer for human or animal 
health or the environment’; substitution ‘does not present significant economic of practical 
disadvantages’ and the remaining control and prevention methods ‘are adequate to minimise 
the occurrence of resistance in the target organism’.88 The impacts of this provision are highly 
uncertain. However, one study estimates several thousand cases requiring comparative 
assessments, imposing a significant burden on CAs (Faust et al., 2014). 
In addition, Member States may during evaluation, by way of derogation to Article 36(2) PPPR, 
comparatively assess a PPP not containing a CfS or a low-risk active substance, ‘if a non-
chemical control or prevention method exists for the same use and it is in general use in that 
Member State’89 (optional comparative assessment).  
Bozzini argues that the Regulation implements a strong version of the substitution principle 
(Bozzini, 2017, chap.2). Article 36(2) PPPR illustrates the strength identified by Bozzini in 
extending substitution to encourage transition to safer control methods even in the absence of 
a CfS classification. Indeed, the Commission argues that the principles of comparative 
assessment and substitution appear throughout the PPP regulatory regime beyond the main 
regulatory tool in Article 50 PPPR (Commission, 2014a, p.3). In addition, Commission 
guidance suggests that PPPs containing candidates may be compared with alternative PPPs 
also containing candidates or even the same candidate even though interpretation of the 
Regulation may appear to prohibit the latter. Though all candidates are classified on the basis 
of the high hazards they pose to human health and the environment, comparative assessment 
may reveal they differ significantly in terms of risks posed in practice (Commission, 2014a, 
p.6). Moreover, evidence from chemicals regulation suggests the EU seeks to encourage or 
implement the substitution principle ambitiously. In Toolex, a Swedish ban on 
Trichloroethylene was found to be proportionate under Article 36 TFEU (then Article 30 EC) 
partly on the basis that the ban implemented the substitution principle.90 The lightness of the 
ECJ’s proportionality review suggested a willingness to encourage application of the 
substitution principle (Heyvaert, 2001). 
Furthermore, much of the literature examined in this section stresses the relevance of socio-
economic considerations and trade-offs to comparative risk assessment, and the need for value 
judgments. The inevitability of value judgments inheres in that fact that the concepts of ‘safer’91 
                                                          
87 Article 55(1), Annex IV PPPR. 
88 Article 50(1)(a)-(c) PPPR. 
89 Article 50(2) PPPR. 
90 Case C-473/98 Kemikalieinspektionen v Toolex Alpha AB [2000] ECR I-05681, paras 46–47. 
91 Article 50(1)(a) PPPR. 
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and ‘alternative’92 are open to interpretation (UK Royal Society of Chemistry, 2007, p.3) and 
may be deeply contested. The Regulation provides some guidance for CAs making judgments 
with respect to ‘significant difference in risk’93 and ‘significant practical or economic 
disadvantages’.94 However, placing all responsibility for the substitution decision on CAs 
ignores the likelihood of disagreement among citizens (and probably Member States too) over 
sets of values and attitudes towards risk (Dudley, 2013). There is, additionally, the problem of 
incommensurability (not comparing like with like) (Hansen, Carlsen and Tickner, 2007, p.401) 
– substances may be more or less hazardous in different respects (UK Royal Society of 
Chemistry, 2007, p.5) – making straightforward ranking or comparison of hazard profiles 
impossible. With respect to ‘alternative’, substitution may be chemical or functional (Hansson, 
Molander and Rudén, 2011). The Regulation implements functional substitution (Bozzini, 
2017, p.40) focusing on uses and effect on the target organism produced by the alternative 
control or prevention method95 rather than requiring the alternative to be a chemical control 
method per se. However, technical functional equivalence is difficult to demonstrate, often 
requiring long periods to acquire evidence (Lohse et al., 2003, pp.66–67). The Regulation 
anticipates this96 but this is again likely to slow the process down. Finally, though helpful, the 
guidance is also vague due to the use of other concepts also requiring value judgments, such 
as ‘significant’, ‘sufficient’ and ‘adequate’ in Article 50 and Annex IV. 
Article 12(1) PPPR allows public comments on draft assessment reports97 assessing active 
substances against the approval criteria set out in Article 4 and presumably therefore on CfS 
classifications considered therein. However, there is no provision for consultation during 
comparative assessment making Article 50 PPPR a very closed process. Given the likelihood 
of disagreement among citizen and stakeholders generally, the benefits of public engagement 
in decision-making, discussed in section III.3, and the fact that substitution is often driven by 
public concern (Lohse et al., 2003, p.73), greater public involvement and consideration of public 
values in comparative assessment could enhance CA decision-making under Article 50 
(Sexton, 1999, pp.214–215) and may, as discussed in section II.2, help counter the risk of 
regulatory capture. Indeed, various authors recognise the role stakeholders (including the 
public and NGOs) play in implementing substitution (Lohse et al., 2003, pp.70–71) and support 
the involvement of consumers and other stakeholders (UK Royal Society of Chemistry, 2007, 
p.6; Girling, 2014, p.595). 
 
 
                                                          
92 Article 3(8), Annex IV.1 and 3 PPPR. 
93 Annex IV.2 PPPR. 
94 Annex IV.3 PPPR. 
95 Article 50(1)(a) and Annex IV.1 PPPR. 
96 Annex IV.1(c) PPPR. 
97 Article 11 PPPR. 
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V – Method 
This report is the result of mixed methods research. It involved both desk-based and empirical 
research, the latter employing both quantitative and qualitative research strategies. Research 
commenced with a doctrinal analysis of the Regulation’s provisions on zonal authorisation 
(Articles 28-39) comparative assessment (Article 50) and textual analysis of relevant grey 
literature in order to gain an understanding of the procedures and frameworks (both formal 
(i.e. established by law) and informal (i.e. contained in guidance)) in place and their operation. 
A review of the information on CA websites concerning national authorisation models was 
also conducted.  
Secondary sources (such as academic research or EU policy documents and case law) do not 
always contain all the information required to answer research questions (Burton, 2013, p.55). 
Due to the variation in availability of information online and in English, it was also necessary 
to undertake substantial empirical research. The empirical research consisted of three strands, 
described in sub-sections V.1-3. The broad scope of the research and the number of actors 
involved made it necessary to strike a balance between depth and breadth, hence the choices 
of instrument described below. This research, as a whole, is descriptive rather than 
explanatory, although the critical analysis of Member State practice as a basis for making 
recommendations gives the work a normative streak. Descriptive work, it is acknowledged, 
has limitations (Fisher et al., 2009, pp.223–224) but also value, for example, in shaping up the 
study of pesticides regulation and providing an underpinning for further research (Pedersen, 
2014, pp.437–438). Overall, the research seeks to describe a picture of the state of 
implementation of the Regulation across EU Member States and to gather factual information 
and/or opinions (subjective perceptions) about the zonal authorisation procedure and its 
implementation from various quarters. It does not seek to explain the levels of implementation 
revealed or differences between levels of implementation in different MSs, or to develop, prove 
or generalise a theory. Furthermore, it does not claim to establish any universal truths or to 
present a full picture of the implementation of the Regulation, the operation of all CAs or the 
workings of each zone. As discussed in this section, the data do not allow for such conclusions. 
Instead, the results reported here should be regarded as a first step towards understanding 
this complex, enormous and largely under-researched field.  
The approach to analysis of the data reflects the largely descriptive nature of the research. The 
data were collated for the purposes of describing and drawing comparisons between different 
Member State practices and the experiences of Member States, stakeholders and zSC 
secretariats and for identifying any trends or similarities (for example, during zonal 
evaluation) within zones or between Member States. The data were also analysed in light of 
the theoretical discussions and norms identified in sections II-IV, which enabled interpretation 
and criticism of Member State/CA practices with respect to their independence and 
transparency and application of the principles of precaution, sustainability and substitution. 
On this basis, recommendations were made. The data gathered are presented as directly as 
possible and the conclusions drawn hold true in light of the available samples. 
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1. Member State survey 
A survey of EU Member States and Norway was conducted. The questionnaire98 contained 
questions on the zonal system and the zonal authorisation procedure established in the 
Member State, the application of the principles of precaution, substitution and sustainability 
and the independence and transparency of the CAs.  
1.1 Zonal authorisation procedure 
Questions 1-7 concerned the zonal authorisation procedure in the respondent Member State 
and covered the procedure itself, who evaluates the application, the status of expert advice 
received, frequency and reason for communication with other Member States in the same zone 
and the benefits of the zonal system for Member States. 
1.2 Precaution, sustainability and substitution 
The questions on precaution, substitution and sustainability were developed by reference to 
the provisions of the Regulation, EU case law, guidance, in particular on substitution and 
academic literature, as discussed in section IV. Guidance, policy and literature on these three 
principles is vast and entire discrete surveys could be conducted on the application by CAs of 
each. However, in order not to overload CAs (and therefore encourage responses) only a few 
questions were included on each principle, while acknowledging that it is impossible to 
capture a full understanding of national interpretations and application of such nuanced and 
complex concepts on this basis. These questions focused, therefore, on assessing the level of 
CA ambition in their application and the consistency of interpretation and application, by 
individual CAs and across Member States, of these three principles. Comparative assessment 
occurs at national level. However, consistency in its application may still be valuable in terms 
of the predictability of this procedure from an applicant’s point of view. The following 
questions were asked99:  
8. The PPPR provides that a PPP may only be authorised if, in the light of current scientific and 
technical knowledge it has no immediate or delayed harmful effect on human health, it does 
not have any unacceptable effects on plants or plant products, it does not cause unnecessary 
suffering and pain to vertebrates to be controlled and it has no unacceptable effects on the 
environment (Articles 29(1)(e) and 4(3)(b)-(e)). Taking into account all the evidence of the 
safety of the PPP and the restrictions that may be placed on its use (Article 31), please indicate 
the standard of proof the evidence must meet in order for the PPP to be authorised. 
9. Does the competent authority produce and follow any internal guidance in its application 
of the precautionary principle during the authorisation process? 
                                                          
98 The full questionnaire could be submitted upon request.  
99 For the majority of questions in the Member State survey, respondents were provided with several 
options for response, discussed in greater detail in sub-section VII.3. 
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11. Does the competent authority take the principle of sustainability into account in its 
decision-making regarding the authorisation of PPPs? 
12. On what basis does the competent authority decide whether or not to take the principle of 
sustainability into account in its decision-making regarding the authorisation of PPPs? 
13. Sustainability can be interpreted in many different ways. Which interpretation does the 
competent authority apply in its decision-making? 
14. Does the competent authority produce and follow any internal guidance, or follow any 
external guidance when applying the principle of sustainability in order to apply it 
consistently? 
15. Recital 29 PPPR provides that Member States may impose ‘appropriate conditions’ on the 
use of PPPs having regard to the objectives of their National Action Plan adopted in accordance 
with Directive 2009/128/EC establishing a framework for Community action to achieve a 
sustainable use of pesticides [2009] OJ L309/71. In practice, how often does the competent 
authority do this? 
16. Article 50(4) PPPR requires Member States to perform a comparative assessment of PPPs 
containing a candidate for substitution ‘regularly and at the latest at renewal or amendment’ 
of its authorisation. How often does the competent authority perform such a comparative 
assessment on PPPs containing a candidate for substitution? 
17. On what PPPs does the competent authority conduct comparative assessment? 
18. Does the competent authority produce and follow any internal guidance, or follow any 
external guidance (e.g. from EPPO, Commission etc.), on substitution/comparative 
assessment in order to deliver consistent results? 
1.3 Independence 
The questions concerning independence drew heavily on a survey of independent energy 
regulators in eight European countries conducted by Johannsen (2003) and her 
operationalisation of the concept of regulatory independence (Johannsen, 2003, pp.31–37). 
Johannsen’s research took, as its starting point, research into, and a previous survey of, IRAs 
in the pharmaceutical and electricity sectors in the UK and Italy conducted by Gilardi (2001) 
which, in turn, drew on research by Cukierman, Webb and Neyapti (1992) into the 
independence of central banks. Following Johannsen, the survey investigates independence in 
formal, legal/organisational terms, rather than in terms of the operation of these formal rules 
in practice.  
Johannsen’s operationalisation of the concept of regulatory independence, relies on Smith’s 
definition of regulatory independence (Smith, 1997): discussed in section II. It measures four 
key variables: 1. Formal independence from government and the legislature; 2. Independence 
from stakeholders; 3. Substantive independence (Larsen et al., 2006, p.2860; Johannsen, 2003, 
p.36) from government and the legislature (concerning competencies and independent 
decision-making); and 4. Financial and organisational autonomy. 
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These key variables were largely adhered to. Questions 22-27 concern formal independence 
from government and the legislature: 
22. What is the term of the agency head or commissioners? 
23. Is the appointment renewable? 
24. Who appoints the agency head or the commissioners? 
25. What are the provisions regarding dismissal of the agency head or commissioners? 
26. May the agency head or the commissioners hold other offices in government? 
27. Is independence a formal requirement for the appointment? 
Questions 28-30 concern independence from the regulated industry: 
28. According to your national legislation, is it possible for the commissioners/the agency head 
to have held a position in the plant protection product industry/industrial associations in the 
years preceding his or her appointment?  
29. Are there provisions (in your national legislation) restricting the commissioners’/the 
agency head’s possibilities of accepting a job in the plant protection product 
industry/industrial associations after their term? 
30. Are there any provisions (in your national legislation) forbidding the agency 
head/commissioners to have any personal or financial interest in the plant protection product 
industry? 
Questions 31, 33, 34 and 36 concern financial and organisational autonomy: 
31. What is the source of the competent authority’s budget? 
33. When the budget has been approved, who controls the budgetary spending? 
34. Who decides the competent authority’s internal organisation (internal procedures, 
allocation of responsibility, tasks etc.?) 
36. Who is in charge of the competent authority’s personnel policy (recruitment, promotion, 
salaries)? 
Question 42 concerns substantive independence: 
42. To what extent is the competent authority responsible for the authorisation of new plant 
protection products under the zonal authorisation procedure? 
While many questions were incorporated into this survey with little or no amendment, others 
were omitted or re-drafted and additional questions were included to reflect the specific 
features of regulating PPPs and the requirements of this research. Three particular changes 
may be noted. Firstly, Johannsen’s question on the permissibility of ‘discussions of pending 
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cases’ between stakeholders and the regulator was omitted as irrelevant to regulator-regulatee 
relationship in question. Pre-submission meetings between applicants and CAs are 
encouraged (Commission, 2014b, p.8) and CAs are entitled to contact applicants during the 
authorisation process for further information.100 Secondly, due to the EPRS’s particular interest 
in CA resources, Johannsen’s questions on financial and organisational autonomy are dealt 
with under the heading of ‘Capacities’ and interspersed with questions relating to the 
sufficiency of these resources. Finally, Johannsen declined to include questions on information 
asymmetry due to the difficulty of constructing an indicator about which information can be 
collected (Johannsen, 2003, p.35). Information asymmetry is connected to the matter of (expert) 
resources so an attempt is made in this survey to tap this concept by introducing three simple 
questions (Q38-40) regarding the ease (or otherwise) of recruiting and retaining staff and of 
buying in resources unavailable in-house. It is acknowledged though that these questions can 
only scratch the surface of this complex concept. 
1.4 Transparency and accountability 
The questions concerning transparency and accountability were developed on the basis of 
research into, and guidance on achieving, transparency in regulatory authorities (for example, 
OECD, 2013, 2016; Jarvis and Sovacool, 2011; Dudley and Wegrich, 2016). These questions aim 
to get a sense both of the formal, legal obligations of the CA and the CA’s practice. Three 
dimensions of the concept of transparency are assessed. Firstly, clarity with respect to the 
authorisation rules, procedures and requirements: 
43. How much information regarding the zonal authorisation procedure is publicly available 
(for example on the competent authority website) in the national language(s)? In this question, 
information includes guidance addressed to applicants on how to apply, the required 
documents, information about the authorisation procedure and how decisions are made. 
Secondly, access to, and publication of, information held by CAs:  
44. Does the competent authority publish its decisions regarding authorisation of PPPs? 
45. To what extent does the competent authority disclose/publish the information sources on 
which its decisions are based? 
46. Is there a clear basis in law or policy for public access to information held by the competent 
authority, including a clear statement of the limitations to that access (for example, due to 
commercial confidentiality)? 
Thirdly the strength of any consultation processes conducted during zonal authorisation 
procedures and access to related information: 
47. With whom, in addition to the applicant, does the competent authority consult during its 
authorisation decision-making processes (including comparative assessment)? 
                                                          
100 Article 37(1) second paragraph PPPR. 
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48. If the competent authority consults any of the actors listed in question 47, please briefly 
state how this consultation/engagement is conducted. 
49. If the competent authority consults any of the actors listed in question 47 does the 
competent authority publish or make publicly available their submissions? 
50. Is the competent authority required by law to respond formally to these submissions? 
51. If YES, are these responses published/made publicly available? 
52. Is the competent authority required by law to take into account the comments provided 
during consultation processes in its decision-making? 
The final five questions concerned accountability of the CAs and scrutiny of CA decisions: 
53. What are the formal obligations of accountability of the competent authority vis-à-vis the 
government?  
54. What are the formal obligations of accountability of the competent authority vis-à-vis the 
legislature? 
55. Where the competent authority is required to produce an annual report, is this report also 
made public? 
56. Are authorisation decisions reviewed or audited? 
57. Article 36(3) fourth sub-paragraph PPPR requires that Member States provide the 
possibility to challenge a decision refusing authorisation of a PPP ‘before national courts or 
other instances of appeal’. Who, other than a court, can overturn the competent authority’s 
decision where it has exclusive competence? 
Questions were predominantly closed, incorporating space for additional comments, with 
some open-ended questions. The questionnaire was lengthy and the aim in choice of question 
format was to strike a balance between enabling respondents to answer questions quickly and 
encouraging willing respondents to elaborate on their answers, thereby attempting a balance 
between depth and breadth. As such, respondents provided information of varying degrees of 
exhaustiveness and clarity.  
1.5 Procedure 
The survey took the form of a self-completion questionnaire contained within an MS word 
document. It was distributed to all 28 EU Member State CAs and the Norwegian CA by email 
at the end of October with the final deadline set in early December 2017. Twelve CAs 
responded within the deadline. It should be noted that the participating Member States 
represent all three zones; each zone is covered by the responses of at least two Member States, 
which, although not enough to ensure full representativeness for the EU as a whole, allows for 
some comparison.  
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Respondents were allowed to specify the level of anonymity accorded their answers. The three 
options were: consent to direct publication of information provided in the survey identifying 
the respondent CA; consent to direct publication of information provided in the survey 
without identifying the respondent CA; and consent to the inclusion of the information 
provided within statistical data but not to direct publication. The availability of different levels 
of anonymity was intended to encourage responses, while retaining flexibility for willing 
Member States to agree to the publication and attribution of their responses. Four CAs selected 
the first option; three CAs selected the second and five CAs selected the third. Selection of the 
first two options was regarded as most valuable in terms of the clear presentation of results 
and the development of an understanding of CA activity across the three zones. Therefore, 
where CAs provided information regarded as particularly helpful to the research, these CAs 
were approached individually and asked to waive their chosen anonymity level with respect 
to the relevant information. Some agreed to this request. Results are presented accordingly, 
with CAs identified and/or quoted where permitted. Information about the authorisation 
procedures of the 16 CAs which did not respond, gathered from CA websites (where available) 
is presented alongside these results. In all cases, the position stated is regarded as the official 
position of the competent authority.  
Of the 12 questionnaires which were returned, six were complete.101 The reasons for the 
incomplete questionnaires are unclear. Given the length of the questionnaire, it could have 
been that questions were accidentally missed, or skipped in the interests of time, if questions 
were regarded as too time-consuming to respond to. Alternatively, it may be that certain 
questions were not regarded by the individual respondent as relevant to the CA or perhaps 
that, despite the guarantee of anonymity, CAs were still loath to provide certain information. 
It should be noted that this tool allowed for factual information as well as opinions (subjective 
perceptions) to be collected. 
1.6. Representativeness of the data collected via the Member State survey 
Given the level of detail of the questions contained in the Member State survey and the CA 
responses, and the fact that all participating Member Sates declared their answers to be the 
official position of the relevant authority, it is considered that the information gathered is 
factual data by its nature and not just mere perception/subjective opinion. Therefore, although 
not all Member States took part in this data collection exercise, the collected data can be viewed 
as fully representative for the 12 Member States that took part in the survey (subject to the 
qualifications expressed in section VI.2). 
2. Stakeholder survey 
A survey of stakeholders in the zonal authorisation procedure was conducted. The survey102 
sought stakeholders’ views on the zonal authorisation procedure, seeking in particular their 
                                                          
101 ‘Complete’ means all questions relevant to the respondent CA were answered. Most incomplete 
surveys were missing only one or two answers. 
102 The full list of questions could be submitted upon request.  
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opinions on the functioning of the zonal system, the consistency in application of the principles 
of precaution, substitution and sustainability and the level of CA independence and 
transparency. These questions were developed on the basis of the same desk-based research 
on which the Member State survey was based. An additional step was taken involving review 
of the original questions in light of the responses of CAs to the Member State survey. Like the 
Member State survey, the stakeholder survey contained a mixture of closed and open-ended 
questions; the former designed to enable swift provision of information and the latter designed 
to encourage reflection and the expression of opinions. This tool provided primarily for 
opinions (subjective perceptions) to be collected. 
2.1 Selection of stakeholders 
Two categories of relevant stakeholders were identified: those with legal obligations under the 
Regulation and those without such legal obligations but with a legitimate interest in the 
achievement of the objectives of the Regulation or the implementation of the Regulation and 
its impacts. Within the first category fell industry, i.e. manufacturers of PPPs.103 Within the 
second category fell PPP users and health and environment stakeholders. Stakeholders were 
selected on the basis of web-based research into their activities. 
In the case of industry stakeholders, there exist both European (and international) level 
industry associations and individual PPP manufacturers. Only the former were approached.104 
This was primarily because these associations were regarded as providing a reliable voice of 
industry/individual PPP manufacturers on the matters covered in the survey due to their 
fulfilling the following criteria: operation at a European level, large membership and 
significant influence and expertise in the area of plant protection and zonal authorisation 
procedures. Wherever two or more EU level industry associations were found to represent 
similar sections of the PPP market but only one focused exclusively on PPPs, that one was 
chosen. At least one industry association representing, at EU level, the manufacturers of 
synthetic PPPs (including generic PPPs) and biological PPPs was approached; three 
associations, in total.  
With respect to PPP users, there exist European (and international) level associations 
representing large numbers of smaller member organisations operating at a national level. 
Only the former were approached for the same reason as above,105 i.e. that these associations 
were regarded as providing a reliable voice of their members on the basis of the following 
criteria: operation at a European level, large membership, significant influence and expertise 
                                                          
103 CAs also have legal obligations but were approached in the Member State survey.  
104 Except where no European level association existed, in which case the international level 
organisation was approached. It was specified in the invitation that the individual members of the 
selected associations would also be welcome to fill in the survey. 
105 It was specified in the invitation that the individual members of the selected associations would also 
be welcome to fill in the survey. 
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in the area of plant protection and zonal authorisation procedures. Three, in total, were 
approached. 
With respect to health and environment stakeholders, there exist both pan-European and 
national NGOs. The latter NGOs tend to be members of one or more of the former NGOs. A 
selection of both106 were approached in order to gather a range of views and experience at both 
European and national level and on the basis that European-level NGOs might not be able to 
speak directly to zonal authorisation procedures in individual Member States. Stakeholders in 
this group were selected on the basis of the following criteria: highest interest in the 
achievement of the objectives of the Regulation, highest level of concern regarding the 
environmental and health effects of PPPs, expertise in the area of plant protection and a specific 
focus on PPP or a declared interest in being consulted. In total, six pan-European NGOs, and 
ten national NGOs were approached. 
Finally, one international level organisation with a membership comprising EU Member 
States, was approached. In total, 23 stakeholders were approached. 
2.2 Procedure 
The survey also took the form of a self-completion questionnaire but in this case was 
constructed and distributed using the online EU survey tool from mid-December 2017 to 22 
January 2018. It was distributed to four stakeholders with legal obligations under the 
Regulation, of whom one responded; and 19 stakeholders with an interest in the achievement 
of the objectives of the Regulation, of whom none responded. As mentioned above, 
stakeholders were informed that their members were welcome to complete the survey too. 
Such members were invited to request access if they wished to do so. However, no additional 
stakeholders completed the survey. In total therefore, one response to this survey was received, 
from an industry association. This response was complete. It is unclear why only one response 
was received. Although the survey was open for over four weeks, it is possible that the timing 
(over Christmas) combined with its length deterred at least some stakeholders from 
responding. While a single response is clearly nowhere close to representative of the class of 
stakeholder to which the respondent belongs (or indeed stakeholders, generally), it did contain 
valuable information and perspectives on the zonal authorisation procedure, as presented 
below. Respondents were informed that their answers would not be linked directly to them, 
thus there is no attribution of information or quotes to individual organisations by name. The 
respondent stakeholder is referred to below as ‘the Stakeholder’. 
 
 
                                                          
106 It was specified in the invitation that the individual members of the selected associations would also 
be welcome to fill in the survey. 
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3. Zonal steering committee survey 
It was originally intended to conduct semi-structured interviews with the zonal steering 
committee (zSC)107 secretariats for the years 2017-2018. Prospective interviewees were 
approached via email to the secretariats of the three zSCs. However, one of the secretariats of 
the three zSCs suggested that instead written questions could be provided to which the 
secretariats would respond in writing. This suggestion was considered positively and applied 
across all three zones. As such, a questionnaire of open questions108 was distributed by email 
to the secretariats from late January to the end of February 2018. The questions focused on the 
operation of the zonal system and the challenges both the zones and individual Member States 
face during authorisation procedures as well as the independence and transparency of CAs in 
each zone and the implementation of the three principles discussed in section IV. Questions 
were developed on the basis of the desk-based literature review, described at the beginning of 
section V and once all the responses to the Member State survey and Stakeholder survey had 
been gathered and reviewed. This allowed questions to be refined on the basis of these 
responses. All three zSCs responded. The information submitted should not be regarded as 
the official position of the Member States in each zone but rather as the position of the 
secretariat of the zSC for the given period. Responses are quoted directly and attributed to zSC 
secretariats generally, rather than to individual Member States in order to preserve 
confidentiality. 
4. Limitations of the research design 
This research is, of course, subject to methodological limitations. First, the design emphasises 
formal independence. Thus, the information gathered is able only to indicate risks of, for 
example CA vulnerability to excessive governmental influence or regulatory capture rather 
than identify concrete evidence of either. A fuller understanding of whether CAs are in fact 
captured or excessively influenced by government would require a more focused and in-depth 
empirical investigation conducted by a multilingual team of researchers with privileged access 
to information, as indicated in section VII.1.5. Secondly, the research does not directly review 
registration reports or authorisation decisions. Given the public unavailability of this 
information (as identified in section VII.2), the time and resources necessary to gain access (via 
access to information requests) and language barriers, such an investigation is beyond the 
scope of this research. This limitation means that it is not possible to track the effect of 
government or industry influence, or Member State interpretation of the precautionary, 
sustainability or substitution principle on evaluation and authorisation decision-making. 
Thirdly, the majority of the research was conducted within a strict timeframe which reduced 
the time available to gather empirical data. This may have contributed to the low stakeholder 
response rate, especially where a longer or more flexible timeframe might have enabled less 
well-resourced stakeholders to participate. Finally, language limitations meant that only 
                                                          
107 Discussed in section VI. 
108 The full list of questions could be submitted upon request. 
Regulation (EC) 1107/2009 on the Placing of Plant Protection Products on the Market 
PE 615.668 III - 50 
English sources (for example, literature and information on CA websites) could be examined, 
representing a constraint on the completeness of the implementation ‘picture’ depicted below. 
VI – Zonal authorisation 
1. Procedure (as laid down by the Regulation concerning the placing 
of plant protection products on the market) 
The Regulation establishes the main framework for authorisation of PPPs, with detail provided 
in guidance. Article 28 PPPR requires PPPs to be authorised before being placed on the EU 
internal market. ‘Authorisation’ of a PPP is defined in Article 3(9) PPPR as ‘an administrative 
act by which the competent authority of a Member State authorises the placing on the market 
of a plant protection product in its territory’ and is permitted where, following the Uniform 
Principles109 a PPP complies with the requirements listed in Article 29 PPPR. These 
requirements largely relate to the safety of the PPP and include that its active substances, 
safeners and synergists have been approved, that these components and its residues can be 
determined, that ‘its physical and chemical properties have been determined and deemed 
acceptable’ for use and storage and that ‘in light of current scientific and technical knowledge, 
it complies with the requirements’ in Article 4(3) PPPR. These requirements were discussed in 
section IV.1 and also largely relate to the effectiveness and safety, for human and plant health 
and the environment, of the PPP in question.  
The procedure is called ‘zonal’ because the Regulation divides Member States (and Norway) 
into zones with comparable ‘agricultural, plant health and environmental (including climatic) 
conditions’ (Northern, Central and Southern) in order to avoid duplication of work, reduce 
administrative burden on industry and Member States, increase harmonisation and facilitate 
mutual recognition of authorisations.110 It is acknowledged that ‘authorisation’, in terms of the 
final decision as whether or not to allow a PPP on the market in a particular Member State is 
made by that individual Member State. Evaluation, in terms of assessing the application, is 
conducted at ‘zonal’ level by the zRMS whose conclusions are used as the basis for national 
authorisation decisions. The terminology in available guidance can sometimes be ambiguous. 
The phrase ‘authorisation procedure’ is used here to denote the evaluation and decision-
making procedure laid down in Articles 28-39 PPPR. 
The authorisation procedure and communication and co-ordination between Member States 
is facilitated by three ‘zonal steering committees’ (zSC), one for each zone, and an ‘inter-zonal 
steering committee’ (izSC), not provided for in the Regulation. The zSCs are chaired by 
participating Member States on a yearly rotating basis and meet every two months ‘to discuss 
specific applications and issues arising which should be fed into the izSC. The izSC meets every 
two months and is attended by two representatives from each zSC. It discusses co-ordination 
between zones, with respect to, for example, which Member State evaluates which parts of 
                                                          
109 Article 29(6) PPPR; Uniform Principles (n 50). 
110 Recital 29 PPPR. 
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dossiers that are shared and the evaluation of applications which only require evaluation by 
one Member State on behalf of all zones, for example applications for the authorisation of PPPs 
for use in greenhouses etc. under Article 33(2)(b) PPPR. These meetings are chaired and 
organised by the Commission and participating Member States (Commission, 2014b, pp.5–6, 
Appendices 1 and 2). Such co-ordination and the efficiencies and harmonisation sought by the 
zonal authorisation system are facilitated by the EU’s online Plant Protection Product 
Application Management System (PPPAMS). Applicants must submit their applications to 
Member States using PPPAMS, which works alongside national authorisation procedures 
rather than serving as a replacement.111 
Articles 33-39 PPPR establish the evaluation and authorisation procedure. Article 33 sets out 
what an application for authorisation must contain and provides that an applicant wishing to 
place a PPP on the market must apply for authorisation (or amendment of an authorisation) to 
each Member State in which it intends to place the PPP on the market. Applications for 
authorisation must be made in the form of a ‘draft Registration Report’ (‘dRR’) (Commission, 
2014b, p.9, 2009).112 
In addition to the legislative requirements, guidance encourages applicants to notify, at least 
six months before an application is planned, all zonal contact points in Member States within 
the relevant zone with a summary of all PPPs for which authorisation will be sought and in 
which Member States (Commission, 2014b, p.7). Applicants are also advised to request pre-
submission meetings with the envisaged ‘zonal rapporteur Member State’ (zRMS) to enable 
discussion between zRMS and applicant of the application, its potential problems, quality and 
strategy (Commission, 2014b, p.8). Again, the aim is efficient and swift operation of the zonal 
authorisation procedure (Commission, 2014b, p.7). 
The applicant should propose which Member State it expects to evaluate the application in the 
relevant zone,113 although this should have been proposed during pre-application 
(Commission, 2014b, p.7). Unless another Member State in the same zone agrees to examine 
the application, the proposed Member State will act as the zRMS and examine the 
application.114 The Regulation does not oblige the zRMS to conduct a ‘completeness check’ of 
the application. However, the application requirements set out in Articles 33 and 34 imply its 
necessity and that where any requirement is missing, the application should not be accepted. 
Such a completeness check should be administrative, designed to establish the presence of all 
required elements and conducted within six weeks and within the overall timeframe for 
                                                          
111 For more detail, see 
<https://ec.europa.eu/food/plant/pesticides/authorisation_of_ppp/application_procedure_en>, 
<https://ec.europa.eu/food/sites/food/files/plant/docs/pesticides_auth-
ppp_app_procedure_first_authorisation_of_ppp_en.pdf> accessed 2 January 2018. 
112 Currently, as at the date of completion of this manuscript in March 2018, being updated. 
113 Article 33(2)(b) PPPR. 
114 Article 35 first paragraph PPPR. 
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evaluation. Final review and confirmation of decisions on work allocation pre-submission may 
be required (Commission, 2014b, p.10). 
Under Article 35 second paragraph PPPR, the zRMS may request co-operation with other 
Member States in the same zone to ‘ensure a fair division of the workload’. Under Article 35 
third paragraph, other Member States in the same zone are prohibited from proceeding with 
the file pending assessment by the zRMS to avoid duplication of work (Commission, 2014b, 
p.4). Where an application has been made in more than one zone, the zRMSs are required to 
agree on which zRMS will evaluate the data not related to the environment and agricultural 
conditions (the core dossier) (Commission, 2014b, p.4; Article 35 fourth paragraph PPPR).  
The zRMS must make an independent, objective and transparent assessment of the application 
‘in the light of current scientific and technical knowledge’ using available guidance documents 
and allowing other Member States in the same zone to submit comments for consideration in 
the assessment.115 It must apply the Uniform Principles116 to establish whether the PPP meets 
the requirements provided for in Article 29 PPPR (above)117 and must make its assessment 
available to the other Member States in the same zone (the ‘concerned Member States’ or 
‘cMS’). The zRMS has 12 months to decide whether or not the application meets the 
requirements for authorisation, although this period can be extended for a maximum of six 
months where the zRMS needs to request additional information from the applicant.118 The 
zRMS may do this multiple times and must inform cMSs where it has requested additional 
information and the impact on the timeline (Commission, 2014b, p.11). The zRMS should also 
complete its initial assessment within eight months of submission to allow for cMS comments 
during a suggested period of six weeks (Commission, 2014b, pp.11, 13), leaving ten weeks for 
the final decision. The zonal dRR should also be sent to the applicant for its comments 
(Commission, 2014b, p.13). Comments should ‘focus on critical issues that affect the risk 
assessment’ (Commission, 2014b, p.13). Following receipt of comments, the zRMS should 
finalise their assessment and decide whether to grant or refuse authorisation (Commission, 
2014b, p.13). The assessment should take the form of a Registration Report (RR) (Commission, 
2014b, p.12). Where opinions differ on technical issues and compromise between the zRMS 
and cMS is not possible, this shall be recorded in the Reporting Table which is to be handled 
as a supplement to the RR ‘for transparency reasons’ (Commission, 2014b, p.13). 
Where the zRMS is unable to deliver its assessment within the timeframe, it should alert the 
zSC which will consider whether re-allocation or assistance is possible and appropriate 
(Commission, 2014b, p.12). 
                                                          
115 Art 36(1) first paragraph PPPR. 
116 Uniform Principles (n 50). 
117 Article 36(1) second paragraph PPPR. 
118 Article 37(1) PPPR. 
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The cMSs are required to grant or refuse authorisations on the basis of the conclusions of the 
zRMS, including where the zRMS has concluded that the use of the relevant PPP is acceptable 
in the zone in principle but not in its own territory, due to its specific conditions (Commission, 
2014b, p.14). Concerned Member States may still assess their own national requirements and 
impose appropriate conditions and ‘other risk mitigation measures’ in their own national 
authorisations.119 Where such measures cannot control their concerns over human or animal 
health or the environment, a cMS may refuse authorisation ‘if, due to its specific environmental 
or agricultural circumstances, it has substantiated reasons to consider that the product in 
question still poses an unacceptable risk…’.120 In such cases, the cMS must immediately inform 
the applicant and Commission and ‘provide a technical or scientific justification’ for this 
decision to refuse authorisation’.121 The cMSs are required to decide whether or not to 
authorise within 120 days of receipt of the assessment report and copy of the authorisation 
from the zRMS.122 Member States are required to provide the possibility of challenging a 
refusal to authorise a PPP ‘before national courts of other instances of appeal’.123 
The zRMS is required to compile a file for each application containing, amongst other things, 
a copy of the application and a report with information on the evaluation of and decision on 
the PPP.124 This file must be made available to the other Member States, the Commission and 
EFSA on request.125 
Guidance raises the possibility of publishing the final RR ‘to increase transparency and 
openness if legal provisions in the individual MS allow’ (Commission, 2014b, p.14). 
2. Evaluation and authorisation models in practice 
This section sets out the zonal evaluation and authorisation procedures reported by Member 
States in response to the Member State survey. We were reliant on the indulgence of busy CAs 
for information. The data are therefore sometimes uneven (different Member States provided 
different levels of detail), sparse and may be incomplete. Where possible, the data provided 
were cross-checked or supplemented with information gathered during the review of CA 
websites and other sources, predominantly a series of reports on audits of seven Member States 
conducted by DG SANTE in 2016-2017 (DG SANTE, 2017, p.1).126 Some Member States neither 
responded to the survey, nor provide online information in English about their zonal 
authorisation procedures.127 As such, it was not possible to report fully on these Member 
States. While some trends may be discerned, the picture presented below, therefore, is 
                                                          
119 Article 36(2) and (3) PPPR. 
120 Article 36(3) first and second paragraphs PPPR. 
121 Article 36(3) third paragraph PPPR. 
122 Article 37(4) PPPR. 
123 Article 36(4) PPPR. 
124 Article 39(1) PPPR. 
125 Article 39(2) PPPR. 
126 The Member States audited were: France, Germany, Lithuania, Luxembourg, Portugal, Spain and the 
UK. The report for Spain was unavailable. 
127 Although some websites appear to contain a lot of information in the native language. 
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inevitably incomplete. The following section begins with an account of the CAs for each 
Member State before describing the various stages in the authorisation procedure. In some 
instances, it was not entirely clear which body was the designated CA. These are indicated 
with square brackets in the tables below. Generally, national zonal authorisation procedures 
follow the overall shape of the procedure described in section VI.1. 
2.1 Competent authorities 
Article 75(1) requires Member States to ‘designate a competent authority or authorities to carry 
out the obligations of the Member States laid down in [the] Regulation’. Member States employ 
a variety of institutional structures as CAs.  
Northern zone 
In Lithuania, the CA is the State Plant Service (SPS) under the Ministry of Agriculture and 
headed by a Director. It has responsibility for conducting the evaluation, risk assessment and 
decision-making. Within the SPS, the PPP Authorisation Division has responsibility for 
evaluation and preparation of decisions regarding PPP authorisation. Decisions are taken by 
the director of SPS (DG SANTE, 2016c, p.5). In Denmark, the CA is the Danish Environmental 
Protection Agency, which contains a Pesticides and Gene Technology Unit.128 The Estonian 
CA is the Agricultural Board.129 In Finland, the CA is the Finnish Safety and Chemicals Agency 
(Tukes).130 It contains the Chemicals Department, which is responsible for ‘risk assessment, 
approvals and registration of plant protection products’.131 In Latvia, the CA is the State Plant 
Protection Service (SPPS), a direct administrative institution subordinate to the Ministry of 
Agriculture,132 managed by a director.133 The Plant Protection Department is a unit within 
SPPS, incorporating four divisions: PPP Registration Division, PPP Evaluation Division, PPP 
Control Division and the Integrated Plant Protection Division.134 KEMI, the Swedish Chemicals 
Agency, is the CA in Sweden. It is a supervisory authority under the Government.135 It is 
headed by a Director-General and contains the Authorisation and Guidance Department 
which ‘evaluates applications concerning pesticides’.136 In Norway, the CA is The Norwegian 
Food Safety Authority (NFSA), a governmental body.137  
 
                                                          
128 <http://eng.mst.dk/about-us/organisation/> accessed 23 December 2017. 
129 § 21 Plant Protection Act RT I 2004, 32, 226. 
130 <http://www.tukes.fi/en/Branches/Chemicals-biocides-plant-protection-products/Plant-
protection-products/> accessed 23 December 2017. 
131 <http://www.tukes.fi/en/Tieto-meista/About-us-something/> accessed 24 January 2018. 
132 s. 4(1) Plant Protection Law 1998. 
133 s. 4(2) Plant Protection Law 1998. 
134 <http://www.vaad.gov.lv/english/about-us/plant-protection/structural-units-of-plant-protection-
department.aspx> accessed 23 December 2017. 
135 <https://www.kemi.se/en/about-us/our-work> accessed 23 December 2017. 
136 <https://www.kemi.se/en/about-us/organisation> accessed 24 January 2018. 
137 <https://www.mattilsynet.no/language/english/plants/plant_protection_products/> accessed 23 
December 2017. 
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 CA Internal Structure Status Responsibilities 
Denmark Danish 
Environmental 
Protection 
Agency 
Contains Pesticides 
and Gene 
Technology Unit 
  
Estonia Agricultural 
Board 
   
Finland Finnish Safety 
and Chemicals 
Agency (Tukes) 
Contains Chemicals 
Department 
 Risk assessment, 
approvals and 
registration of 
PPPs 
Latvia State Plant 
Protection 
Service (SPPS) 
Contains Plant 
Protection 
Department, 
incorporating four 
divisions: PPP 
Registration 
Division, PPP 
Evaluation Division, 
PPP Control 
Division and the 
Integrated Plant 
Protection Division. 
Managed by 
director. 
Subordinate to 
Ministry of 
Agriculture 
 
Lithuania State Plant 
Service (SPS) 
Contains PPP 
Authorisation 
Division 
Under Ministry 
of Agriculture 
Evaluation, risk 
assessment and 
decision-making. 
PPP Authorisation 
Division of SPS 
responsible for 
evaluation and 
preparation of 
authorisation 
decisions. 
Decisions taken by 
Director of SPS. 
Norway The Norwegian 
Food Safety 
 Governmental 
body 
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Authority 
(NFSA) 
Sweden Kemikalie-
inspektionen 
(KEMI) 
Headed by 
Director-General. 
Contains 
Authorisation and 
Guidance 
Department 
Supervisory 
body under 
the 
Government 
Agency head/ 
director 
responsible for 
decisions. 
Authorisation and 
Guidance 
Department 
evaluates 
applications. 
Table 1: Northern zone competent authorities 
Central zone 
In Austria, the CA is the Federal Office for Food Safety (BAES), a subordinate agency of the 
Federal Ministry of Agriculture and Forestry, Environment and Water Management,138 
managed by a director. In the Netherlands, the CA is the Board for the Authorisation of Plant 
Protection Products and Biocides (Ctgb), a semi-autonomous agency whose PPP-related 
activities are overseen by the Ministry of Economic Affairs. The Ctgb consists of a Board and a 
Board Secretariat which ‘makes preparations – both scientific and administrative – for the 
decisions’.139 In Belgium, the CA is the Service Plant Protection Products and Fertilizers 
(SPPPF) of the Directorate General for Animals, Plants and Food which is part of the Federal 
Public Service Public Health, Food Chain Safety and Environment (FPS-PHFCSE and SPPPF, 
2016, p.3). It was difficult to identify the Hungarian CA. However, it appears to be the National 
Food Chain Safety Office (NFCO), within the Ministry of Rural Development and which 
contains the Directorate of Plant Protection and Soil Conservation (DPPSC).140 The DPPSC 
incorporates the Departments of Authorisation and Evaluation. The former grants 
authorisations for PPPs; the latter ‘summarizes, analyzes and evaluates results of efficacy and 
residue trials carried out with PPPs…, prepares expert’s [sic] opinions, and prepares the 
registration documents for decision-making’.141 In Luxembourg, the CA is the Minister of 
Agriculture, Viticulture and Consumer Protection (DG SANTE, 2016d, p.4). The CA in 
Romania appears to be the National Committee for PPP Approval (CNOPPP) (Government of 
Romania, 2013, p.7). In the Czech Republic, the CA is the State Phytosanitary Administration 
(SPA) which is subordinate to the Ministry of Agriculture and appears to be responsible for 
                                                          
138 <https://www.baes.gv.at/en/about-us/> accessed 23 December 2017. 
139 <https://english.ctgb.nl/about-ctgb/board-and-board-secretariat> accessed 23 December 2017. 
140 <http://www.ceureg.com/17/docs/presentations/IV_6_Milan%20Panczel.pdf> accessed 24 
January 2018. 
141 <http://portal.nebih.gov.hu/hu/web/english/hungarian-forest-management/-
/asset_publisher/pHBk9pq6UNxK/content/directorate-of-plant-protection-and-soil-
conservation/contacts> accessed 27 December 2017. 
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registration of PPPs, ‘their testing and testing methods of plant protection, supervision of 
pesticide testing in the Czech Republic’.142 In Poland, the CA appears to be the Department of 
Plant Breeding and Protection.143  
In Ireland, the CA is the Department of Agriculture, Food and the Marine,144 which contains 
the Pesticide Controls Division (PCD) and the Pesticide Registration Division (PRD) (together, 
the Pesticides Registration and Control Division (PRCD)). The PCD is responsible for 
implementing the Regulation. The PRD contains five expert units whose scientists evaluate 
pesticides.145 Germany has designated four CAs: Federal Office for Consumer Protection 
(BVL) Federal Research Centre for Cultivated Plants (JKI), the Federal Institute for Risk 
Assessment (BfR) and Federal Environment Agency (UBA). BVL is responsible for co-
ordinating the evaluation and authorisation of PPPs and along with JKI and DfR sits under the 
aegis of the Federal Ministry of Food and Agriculture. UBA sits under the Federal Ministry for 
the Environment, Nature Conservation, Building and Nuclear Safety (DG SANTE, 2016a, p.4). 
In Slovenia, the CA is the Administration of the Republic of Slovenia for food safety, 
veterinary and plant protection (UVHVVR), which is a body within the Ministry of 
Agriculture, Forestry and Food and contains a PPP Division.146 In Slovakia, the CA is the 
Department of Pesticide Registration (ORP),147 within the Central Control and Testing Institute 
in Agriculture (ÚKSÚP), which is ‘a national budget organization directly managed by the 
Ministry of Agriculture’.148 In the UK, the CAs are the Secretary of State for Environment, Food 
and Rural Affairs (England and Wales), the Scottish Ministers (Scotland)149 and the 
Department of Agriculture, Environment and Rural Affairs (DAERA) (Northern Ireland) (DG 
SANTE, 2016f, p.5). The English, Welsh and Scottish CAs’ functions, in relation to PPPs, are 
delegated to the Health and Safety Executive (HSE). The HSE is an Executive Non-
Departmental Public Body of the Department for Work and Pensions (DWP)150 and contains 
the Chemicals Regulation Division (CRD) (DG SANTE, 2016f, p.5). The CRD is responsible for 
the evaluation and authorisation of PPPs and also acts as the delivery body for DAERA.151 
 
                                                          
142 <http://eagri.cz/public/web/en/srs/portal/about-us/> accessed 23 December 2017. 
143 <http://www.minrol.gov.pl/eng/Ministry/Departments-and-offices/The-Department-of-Plant-
Breeding-and-Protection> accessed 23 December 2017. 
144 <http://www.pcs.agriculture.gov.ie/plantprotectionproducts/> accessed 27 December 2017. 
145 <http://www.pcs.agriculture.gov.ie/aboutus/whatareourresponsibilities/> accessed 24 January 
2018. 
146 <http://www.uvhvvr.gov.si/en/about_the_authority/organisation/> accessed 23 December 2017. 
147 <http://www.uksup.sk/orp-cinnost/> accessed 23 December 2017. 
148 <http://www.uksup.sk/charakteristika> accessed 23 December 2017. 
149 Reg. 3 Plant Protection Product Regulations 2011. 
150 Framework Document Between The Health and Safety Executive and The Department for Work and 
Pensions 2016, 2016 para. 1.1. 
151 <https://www.daera-ni.gov.uk/articles/departmental-responsibilities-regarding-pesticides> 
accessed 27 December 2017. 
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 CA Internal 
Structure 
Status Responsibilities 
Austria Federal Office 
for Food Safety 
(BAES) 
Managed by 
Director 
Subordinate 
agency of the 
Federal Ministry of 
Agriculture and 
Forestry, 
Environment and 
Water 
Management 
 
Belgium Service Plant 
Protection 
Products and 
Fertilizers 
(SPPPF)  
 Part of Directorate 
General for 
Animals, Plants and 
Food which is part 
of Federal Public 
Service Public 
Health, Food Chain 
Safety and 
Environment 
Federal Minister 
of Public Health 
responsible for 
decisions. 
Czech 
Republic 
State 
Phytosanitary 
Administration 
(SPA) 
 Subordinate to 
Ministry of 
Agriculture 
Registration of 
PPPs, ‘their testing 
and testing 
methods of plant 
protection, 
supervision of 
pesticide testing 
in the Czech 
Republic’ 
Germany Federal Office 
for Consumer 
Protection 
(BVL), Federal 
Research Centre 
for Cultivated 
Plants (JKI), the 
Federal Institute 
for Risk 
Assessment 
(BfR) and 
Federal 
 BVL, JKI and BfR: 
under Federal 
Ministry of Food 
and Agriculture. 
UBA: under Federal 
Ministry for the 
Environment, 
Nature 
Conservation, 
Building and 
Nuclear Safety 
BVL: co-ordinating 
the evaluation 
and authorisation 
of PPPs. 
Agency head/ 
director 
responsible for 
decisions. 
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Environment 
Agency (UBA).  
Hungary [National Food 
Chain Safety 
Office] 
Contains the 
Directorate of 
Plant 
Protection and 
Soil 
Conservation 
which contains 
the 
Departments 
of 
Authorisation 
and Evaluation 
 Department of 
Authorisation 
grants 
authorisations. 
Department of 
Evaluation 
evaluates 
applications and 
prepares 
documents for 
decision-making.  
Ireland Department of 
Agriculture, 
Food and the 
Marine 
Contains the 
Pesticide 
Controls 
Division (PCD) 
and Pesticide 
Registration 
Division (PRD) 
(together 
PRCD) 
 PCD responsible 
for implementing 
Regulation. PRD 
responsible for 
evaluation. 
Luxem-
bourg 
Minister of 
Agriculture, 
Viticulture and 
Consumer 
Protection 
   
Nether-
lands 
Board for the 
Authorisation of 
Plant Protection 
Products and 
Biocide (Ctgb) 
Board and 
Board 
Secretariat 
Semi-autonomous 
agency. PPP-
related activities 
overseen by 
Ministry of 
Economic Affairs. 
Board Secretariat 
‘makes 
preparations – 
both scientific and 
administrative – 
for the decisions’. 
Board of 
Commissioners is 
responsible for 
decisions. 
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Poland [Department of 
Plant Breeding 
and Protection] 
   
Romania National 
Committee for 
PPP Approval 
(CNOPPP) 
   
Slovakia Department of 
Pesticide 
Registration 
(ORP) 
 Within Central 
Control and Testing 
Institute in 
Agriculture 
(ÚKSÚP), which is 
‘a national budget 
organization 
directly managed 
by the Ministry of 
Agriculture’ 
 
Slovenia Administration 
of the Republic 
of Slovenia for 
food safety, 
veterinary and 
plant protection 
(UVHVVR) 
Contains PPP 
Division 
Body within 
Ministry of 
Agriculture, 
Forestry and Food 
 
UK Secretary of 
State for 
Environment, 
Food and Rural 
Affairs (England 
and Wales), 
Scottish 
Ministers 
(Scotland), 
Department of 
Agriculture, 
Environment 
and Rural Affairs 
(DAERA) (N. 
Ireland). 
CA functions 
delegated to 
Health and 
Safety 
Executive 
(HSE).  
Contains 
Chemicals 
Regulation 
Division (CRD).  
HSE: overseen 
by Board. 
HSE: Executive 
non-Departmental 
Public Body of 
Department for 
Work and Pensions 
CRD: evaluation 
and authorisation 
of PPPs 
Table 2: Central zone competent authorities 
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Southern zone 
In Bulgaria, there are two CAs:152 the Bulgarian Food Safety Agency (BFSA)153 which operates 
under the Minister of Agriculture and Food and the Centre for Risk Assessment on Food Chain 
(CRAFC). BFSA is headed by an executive director, proposed by the Minister of Agriculture 
and Food and appointed by the Prime Minister.154 In Cyprus, the CA appears to be the 
Agrochemicals Control Section of the Department of Agriculture, within the Ministry of 
Agriculture, Rural Development and Environment.155 In Italy, the CA is Office VII of the 
Directorate General for Food Hygiene, Food Safety and Nutrition (DGFHFSN) within the 
Ministry of Health (DG SANTE, 2016b, p.4). In France: the CA is French Agency for Food, 
Environmental and Occupational Health and Safety (ANSES) which is responsible for 
assessing the efficacy and risks of PPPs and for their authorisation. However, to ensure the 
independence of ANSES’s scientific expertise, the risk assessment and risk management stages 
are institutionally separate, the former performed by the Regulated Products Assessment 
Department (DEPR) and the latter by the Marketing Authorisation Department (DAMM) 
within ANSES (ANSES, 2015, pp.6–8). The Director General is authorised to issue marketing 
authorisations (ANSES, 2015, p.5). In Spain, it was extremely difficult to determine with 
certainty the CA but there seemed to be a large amount of information, in Spanish, about PPP 
authorisation on the website of the Ministry of Agriculture and Fisheries, Food and 
Environment.156 In Greece, searches for the CA were inconclusive. The Ministry of Rural 
Development and Food (MRDF) appears to contain the Department of Plant Protection 
Products and Biocides (DPPPB), the Directorate of Plant Produce Protection (DPPP) and the 
General Directorate of Sustainable Plant Produce (DGSPP).157 However, it is unclear where the 
responsibility lies. In Malta, the CA is the Technical Regulations Division, within the Malta 
Competition and Consumer Affairs Authority (MCCAA).158 A Minister-appointed Pesticides 
Control Board advises the Director of the MCCAA on inter alia, matters relating to the 
registration of pesticides.159 In Croatia, the CA is the Ministry of Agriculture. In Portugal, the 
CA is the General Directorate for Agricultural and Veterinary Affairs (DGAV), with 
responsibility for authorisation assumed by the Pesticides Division of the Sanitary and Defence 
Directorate (DG SANTE, 2016e, p.5). 
                                                          
152 Communication from the Bulgarian Centre for Risk Assessment on Food Chain. 
153 <http://www.babh.government.bg/en/Page/about_us/index/about_us/About%20us> accessed 
23 December 2017. 
154 Communication from EPRS. 
155 <http://www.moa.gov.cy/moa/da/da.nsf/page29_en/page29_en?OpenDocument> accessed 23 
December 2017. 
156 <http://www.mapama.gob.es/es/agricultura/temas/sanidad-vegetal/productos-
fitosanitarios/registro/menu.asp> accessed 23 December 2017. 
157 (DG SANTE, 2015, p.5) See also, < http://wwww.minagric.gr/syspest/syspest_menu_eng.aspx> 
accessed 24 January 2018. However, a different arrangement is suggested here: < 
http://www.minagric.gr/images/stories/en_docs/ministry/organogramma_apostolou121217_eng.pd
f> accessed 24 January 2018. 
158 s. 4 Plant Protection Products (Implementation) Regulation 2011. 
159 Article 10 Pesticides Control Act 2001. 
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 CA Internal Structure Status Responsibilities 
Bulgaria Bulgarian Food 
Safety Agency 
(BFSA) and 
Centre for Risk 
Assessment on 
Food Chain 
(CRAFC) 
BFSA headed by 
executive director 
Under 
Minister of 
Agriculture 
and Food 
 
Croatia Ministry of 
Agriculture 
   
Cyprus [Agrochemicals 
Control Section] 
 Part of 
Department of 
Agriculture, 
within 
Ministry of 
Agriculture, 
Rural 
Development 
and 
Environment 
 
France French Agency 
for Food, 
Environmental 
and 
Occupational 
Health and 
Safety (ANSES)  
Contains Regulated 
Products 
Assessment 
Department (DEPR) 
and Marketing 
Authorisation 
Department 
(DAMM) 
 ANSES: assessing 
efficacy and risks 
of PPPs. 
Authorisation 
decisions. 
DEPR: risk 
assessment. 
DAMM: risk 
management. 
Director General 
issues marketing 
authorisations 
Greece [Department of 
Plant Protection 
Products and 
Biocides 
(DPPPB) and the 
Directorate of 
Plant Produce 
 DPPP is within 
Directorate-
General of 
Sustainable 
Plant 
Production 
(DGSPP) of the 
Ministry of 
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Protection 
(DPPP)] 
Rural 
Development 
and Food 
(MRDF) 
Italy Office VII of the 
Directorate 
General for 
Food Hygiene, 
Food Safety and 
Nutrition 
(DGFHFSN)  
 Within the 
Ministry of 
Health 
 
Malta Technical 
Regulations 
Division 
 Within Malta 
Competition 
and Consumer 
Affairs 
Authority 
 
Portugal General 
Directorate for 
Agricultural and 
Veterinary 
Affairs (DGAV) 
Contains Pesticides 
Division of the 
Sanitary and 
Defence 
Directorate 
  
Spain [Ministry of 
Agriculture and 
Fisheries, Food 
and 
Environment] 
   
Table 3: Southern zone competent authorities 
As the above information demonstrates, Member States employ a variety of institutional 
structures for their CAs. Some opt for an agency structure, favoured by Scandinavian Member 
States and several Member States in other zones. Others choose divisions, services or offices 
within the relevant ministries or government departments or provide that ministries or 
departments themselves are the CA. In still other Member States, the CA may be an individual 
minister or secretary of state. There seems to be no discernible trend or preference for particular 
structures according to zone. However, CAs seem largely to operate within, or are overseen 
by, a ministry, government department or the government generally. This would suggest such 
CAs are semi-independent. 
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2.2 Pre-application 
Only the Netherlands reports conducting pre-submission meetings with applicants, noting 
that ‘this meeting has a positive effect on the quality of the dossier submitted’.160 However, it 
appears from the website review and zSC survey that in the UK,161 Belgium (FPS-PHFCSE and 
SPPPF, 2016, p.9). Czech Republic (SPA, n.d., pp.4–5) Germany (BVL, 2012, p.5) and all 
Northern and Central zone Member States and Portugal162 at least, such meetings are also 
available.163 However, not all applicants request them.164 Almost half of all Member States 
require advance notification (usually six months) of intention to apply for authorisation 
(Belgium (FPS-PHFCSE and SPPPF, 2016, p.5), Netherlands,165 Czech Republic (SPA, n.d., 
p.4), UK,166 Germany167 Slovenia168 and all Northern zone Member States (Northern zone, 
2017, p.8)) in accordance with the guidance (above).169 One Southern zone Member State 
reports that different Member States in the Southern zone have different methods for accepting 
applications, based on the resources available and the need to comply with deadlines in the 
Regulation: some operate a ‘first come, first served’ policy up to an annual limit; others accept 
applications on a trimestral or annual basis. National plant protection priorities may also be a 
consideration in the acceptance of applications. 
2.3 Completeness check and allocation for evaluation 
Following submission of the application, based on the website review and Member State 
survey responses, about a third of Member States appear to conduct a completeness check, or 
variation thereof.170 The UK, for example, subjects applications to a two-stage sift involving a 
validation check to determine whether the application is complete and a detailed technical sift 
                                                          
160 Member State survey response. 
161 <http://www.hse.gov.uk/pesticides/topics/pesticide-approvals/pesticides-registration/applicant-
guide/the-applicant-guide-zonal-a.htm> accessed 27 December 2017. 
162 Zonal Steering Committee survey responses. 
163 Such information was not available in English for the remaining Member States. 
164 SZSC survey response. 
165 <https://english.ctgb.nl/plant-protection/types-of-application/procedure-zonal-application> 
accessed 27 December 2017. 
166 <http://www.hse.gov.uk/pesticides/topics/pesticide-approvals/pesticides-registration/applicant-
guide/the-applicant-guide-zonal-a.htm> accessed 27 December 2017. 
167 
<https://www.bvl.bund.de/EN/04_PlantProtectionProducts/03_Applicants/04_AuthorisationProced
ure/01_FormsTemplates/ppp_FormsTemplates_node.html> accessed 3 January 2018 
168 
<http://www.uvhvvr.gov.si/en/areas_of_competence/plant_protection_products/authorisation_of_p
pps/authorisation_and_permits_for_ppps/authorisation_of_ppps_in_zones/#c18302> accessed 3 
January 2018. 
169 Such information was not available in English for the remaining Member States. 
170 Such information was not available in English with respect to Austria, Belgium, Estonia, Hungary, 
Luxembourg, Poland, Romania, Slovenia, Slovakia, Sweden and all the Southern zone Member States. 
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to determine whether the application is of sufficient quality to undergo full evaluation.171 These 
decisions are peer reviewed by a senior officer.172 In the Netherlands,173 risk assessors each 
check the part of the application which relates to their area of expertise (e.g. ecotoxicology, 
residues, efficacy, etc.). Some Member States may reject incomplete applications at this stage 
and require re-submission (for example, UK,174 Netherlands); others imply that applicants 
may still submit the additional information required (Germany (BVL, 2012, p.9), Czech 
Republic (SPA, n.d., p.7), Sweden,175 Belgium (FPS-PHFCSE and SPPPF, 2016, p.3), 
Portugal,176 the Netherlands (where the missing information can be easily supplied)177 and one 
Northern zone Member State).178 One Southern zone Member State indicates that different 
Southern zone Member States may start counting down towards the deadline at different 
times, for example from receipt of application or confirmation of completeness. One Central 
zone Member State reports that decisions at this stage are peer reviewed by a senior officer. 
Some Member States (UK,179 Sweden,180 Netherlands,181 and two Central and one Southern 
zone Member State) appoint a project manager or equivalent to see the application through the 
authorisation procedure.182 The UK provided more detail about this role, stating that they 
guide the application through the procedure, communicate with the applicant, co-ordinate the 
specialist evaluations, collate final documentation and seek comments from other Member 
States. It is their responsibility to ensure delivery to cost, regulatory quality and adherence to 
the legal deadline. These project managers appear to perform valuable functions in terms of 
keeping procedures on track, co-ordination and communication. As such, they form an 
example of best practice. Overall, with respect to this aspect of the procedure, there seem to be 
no zone-specific models; there are examples of these procedures in all zones. 
2.4 Evaluation 
At the evaluation stage, the divergence between procedures is slightly greater, although they 
do largely consist of one or more phases of evaluation, during which additional information 
                                                          
171 <http://www.hse.gov.uk/pesticides/topics/pesticide-approvals/pesticides-registration/applicant-
guide/the-applicant-guide-zonal-a.htm> accessed 27 December 2017. 
172 Member State survey response. 
173 Member State survey response. 
174 <http://www.hse.gov.uk/pesticides/topics/pesticide-approvals/pesticides-registration/applicant-
guide/the-applicant-guide-zonal-a.htm> accessed 27 December 2017. 
175 <https://www.kemi.se/en/directly-to/apply-for-authorisation/this-is-how-we-handle-your-
application> accessed 3 January 2018. 
176 Member State survey response. 
177 <https://english.ctgb.nl/plant-protection/assessment-framework/registration-manual/how-we-
handle-application> accessed 27 December 2017. 
178 Such information was not available in English for the remaining Member States. 
179 <http://www.hse.gov.uk/pesticides/topics/pesticide-approvals/pesticides-registration/applicant-
guide/the-applicant-guide-zonal-a.htm> accessed 27 December 2017. 
180 Member State survey response. 
181 Member State survey response. 
182 Such information was not available in English for the remaining Member States. 
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may be requested from applicants. Some respondents provided fairly generic information 
about their evaluation processes along the lines that during this stage, applications are 
allocated to the relevant experts and additional information may be sought from applicants. 
Online information in English about this aspect of the procedure was either unavailable or 
very limited in most Member States.183 Available detail (either online or from the Member State 
survey) is presented below. However, without full access to the information in native 
languages on CA websites, it is impossible to establish a full picture of the zonal authorisation 
procedures in operation and their diversity or similarity both across Europe and within each 
zone. 
Northern zone 
In Sweden, evaluation is conducted in-house by the Authorisation and Guidance Department 
of KEMI184 (chemists, ecotoxicologists, fate experts and toxicologists, with agronomists and 
legal advisors in support185) and involves assessment of the health and environmental risks of 
the PPP and evaluation of efficacy (with agronomists at the National Board of Agriculture) and 
residues (with toxicologists at the National Food Agency).186 ‘[S]upplementary documentation’ 
may be requested if necessary.187 KEMI’s website states that if, during evaluation, it appears 
that an application must be rejected or authorised subject to stricter conditions than those 
applied for, the applicant will be informed before that decision is taken and given an 
opportunity to express its views.188 In Lithuania, assessment of the application, including risk 
assessment for human and animal health, is conducted by the Plant Protection Product 
Authorisation Division of the SPS.189 In Latvia, the PPP Registration and Environment and 
Ecotoxicology Divisions prepare assessments as to the compliance of PPPs with the 
requirements of regulation.190 In Norway, NFSA assesses the possible environmental and 
health risks of PPPs and assesses whether the product is ‘agronomically effective’.191 
                                                          
183 Austria, Bulgaria, Croatia, Cyprus, Denmark, Estonia, Finland, Greece, Hungary, Ireland, Italy, 
Latvia, Luxembourg, Malta, Norway, Poland, Portugal, Romania, Slovakia, Slovenia, Spain. 
184 <https://www.kemi.se/en/about-us/organisation> accessed 27 December 2017. 
185 Member State survey response. 
186 <https://www.kemi.se/en/directly-to/pesticides-and-biocides/plant-protection-products> 
accessed 27 December 2017; survey response. 
187 Member State survey response. 
188 <https://www.kemi.se/en/directly-to/apply-for-authorisation/this-is-how-we-handle-your-
application> accessed 27 December 2017. 
189 <http://www.vatzum.lt/en/activity/fields-of-activity/plant-protection-products-authorisation/> 
accessed 27 December 2017. 
190 <http://www.vaad.gov.lv/english/about-us/plant-protection/structural-units-of-plant-protection-
department.aspx> accessed 27 December 2017. 
191 < 
https://www.mattilsynet.no/language/english/plants/plant_protection_products/authorisation_of_
plant_protection_products.20905> accessed 27 December 2017. 
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Central zone 
In Belgium, the Authorisation Committee for pesticides for agricultural use (which meets at 
least once a month (FPS-PHFCSE and SPPPF, 2016, p.4)) and other services and experts, 
including the Belgian Scientific Institute for Public Health and the Agronomic Research Centre 
of Gembloux, evaluate each section of the application and perform a risk assessment according 
to ‘agreed European models/Guidance documents’.192 The expert reports are emailed to the 
applicant as soon as they are available. Any additional information received will be evaluated 
by the Authorisation Committee during a meeting, after which further information may be 
requested (FPS-PHFCSE and SPPPF, 2016, p.16). The conclusions drawn are then examined by 
an Advisory Board (the Registration Committee).193 In Germany, ‘assessment authorities’ 
(BVL, BfR, JKI and UBA) (BVL, 2012, pp.5–6) engage in an initial evaluation of the application. 
This is followed by ‘Assessment phase I’ during which the assessment authorities may request 
additional information from the applicant. ‘Assessment phase II’ follows submission of this 
additional information and culminates in the assessment authorities providing a decision on 
‘consent and their assessments’ i.e. their contributions to the dRR (BVL, 2012, p.6). Evaluation 
is performed by in-house scientific advisers’.194 In the Netherlands, risk assessors in the Board 
Secretariat assess the risk of the PPP in their respective areas (‘fate and behaviour, 
ecotoxicology, human toxicology, residues, efficacy and physical properties and analytical 
methods’). Each risk assessor group is peer reviewed. Applicants may be requested to submit 
additional information.195 In the Czech Republic, two institutions are involved in the 
authorisation of PPPs: the Czech SPA and the Czech Ministry of Health. The former evaluates 
ecotoxicology, fate and behaviour, physical chemical properties and efficacy and makes the 
authorisation decision. The latter contracts evaluation of toxicology, operator exposure and 
residues out to the Czech National Institution of Public Health which supplies both with its 
report (SPA, n.d., p.5). The SPA may request further information (SPA, n.d., p.7). 
In Slovenia evaluation begins with a meeting amongst ‘external evaluators from designated 
institutions [and the dossier is] divided among different parts of evaluation and discussed’. 
Next the individual evaluations are completed in the form of the zonal registration report and 
uploaded to a national central documentary programme and the co-ordinator informed.196 In 
Slovakia, the ORP appears responsible for assessment of PPPs and dossier evaluation.197 In the 
UK, accepted applications are placed into the appropriate stream. During or after an initial 
evaluation (occurring in weeks 0-30) a maximum of two requests for additional information 
may be made, the first generally relating to chemistry, toxicology, residues and fate and 
behaviour and the second generally relating to operator exposure, ecotoxicology and efficacy. 
                                                          
192 Member State survey response. 
193 Member State survey response. 
194 Member State survey response. 
195 Member State survey response. 
196 Member State survey response. 
197 <http://www.uksup.sk/orp-cinnost/> accessed 27 December 2017. 
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In weeks 30-43, this additional information is evaluated.198 In Austria, ‘[a]ssessment reports 
and opinions of AGES199 experts in the fields of toxicology, residue behaviour, environmental 
fate and ecotoxicology, efficacy and phytotoxicity as well as physico-chemical properties and 
analytical methods form the basis for the decision on authorisation’.200 In Ireland, evaluation 
appears to be conducted by the Pesticide Registration Division, which contains ‘five expert 
units consisting of the Chemistry Unit, Ecotoxicology Unit, Efficacy Unit, Environmental Fate 
& Behaviour Unit and the Toxicology Unit. The expert units are made up of Agricultural 
Scientists, Biologists, Micro-biologists, Chemists, Ecotoxicologists and Toxicologists’.201 
Southern zone 
In France, assessment of the application is conducted by DEPR on the basis of studies provided 
by the applicant in support of their applicant, data from wider literature, ANSES studies and 
from vigilance and surveillance schemes (ANSES, 2015, p.7). There may be communication 
with the applicant for further information or clarification. In another Southern zone Member 
State, the ‘detailed evaluation’ culminates in a meeting between all experts involved to 
compare conclusions on different areas of evaluation and define any data gaps, leading to a 
request for additional information from the applicant and evaluation of the additional data 
provided. In Portugal, following the detailed evaluation, all experts meet to compare the 
conclusions of their respective evaluations. Any data gaps are defined and requested from the 
applicant. Once received the additional data are evaluated. 
Member States employ a range of services and experts to evaluate applications. Those 
indicated by respondents are summarised in table 4. 
Which of the 
following 
evaluates 
the 
application?  
Individual 
civil servants 
Individual in-
house 
scientific 
advisers 
Individual 
external 
experts/ 
consultants 
An expert 
advisory 
committee 
Other 
 3 9 
Including: 
Belgium, 
Germany, 
6 
Including: 
Belgium, 
Netherlands 
4 
Including: 
Belgium 
1 
                                                          
198 <http://www.hse.gov.uk/pesticides/topics/pesticide-approvals/pesticides-registration/applicant-
guide/the-applicant-guide-zonal-a.htm> accessed 27 December 2017. 
199 Austrian Agency for Health and Food Safety. 
200 <https://www.baes.gv.at/en/plant-protection-products/authorisation-of-plant-protection-
products/authorisation-procedure/> accessed 23 December 2017. 
201 <http://www.pcs.agriculture.gov.ie/aboutus/whatareourresponsibilities/> accessed 27 December 
2017. 
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Netherlands, 
Sweden 
Table 4: Services and experts involved in evaluation 
2.5 Commenting 
The evaluation procedures described above result in the production of a dRR which is sent to 
the cMSs and applicant for comments. It is on the basis of these comments that the RR is 
finalised. This process is, indeed, reported by most respondents to the Member State survey 
and/or described online, although limited or no information about this stage is available in 
English for many Member States.202 In France, the DEPR ‘endorses a document called 
‘“Conclusion of the assessment”, which specifies, for each criterion of the uniform principles, 
whether or not the result complies with the requirements of European regulations’ and 
supports the authorisation decision. This is a summary of the RR, part of which is published 
on ANSES’s website, in the interests of transparency along with the ‘Conclusions’ (ANSES, 
2015, p.7). Slovenia reports that all comments from Member States ‘are addressed’. Sweden 
reports that ‘all comments will be taken under consideration and the evaluation changed if 
necessary’.203 The Netherlands reports that the ‘dRR is amended based on the comments. A 
final risk assessment is drafted with the same peer review within the risk assessors groups’.204 
One Southern zone Member State reports that any comments are provided to the experts who 
‘evaluate any emerging data-gaps based on comments received’. Additional information is 
again requested from the applicant where necessary and evaluated when received. Two other 
Member States (one Central and one Southern) report similar procedures. In the Czech 
Republic, ‘the SPA processes the other Member States’ comments and incorporates any 
amendments to the evaluation report highlighted by those comments. The SPA records in the 
reporting table which observations were incorporated, and which were not’ (SPA, n.d., p.8). In 
Portugal, cMS comments are provided to experts who ‘evaluate any emerging data gaps based 
on comments received’. Further information is then requested from applicants.205 This 
additional information is then evaluated. One Southern zone Member State reports 
disagreement among Southern zone Member States over whether further information 
provided in response to requests after the commenting stage require a further round of 
commenting, which may result in deadlines being missed. 
2.6 Conclusion of evaluation and authorisation decision-making 
Once comments have been received and addressed and the final RR produced, a final decision 
on authorisation is made. Again, available information indicates that Member States operate 
                                                          
202 Austria, Bulgaria, Croatia, Cyprus, Denmark, Estonia, Finland, Greece, Ireland, Italy, Latvia, 
Lithuania, Luxembourg, Norway, Poland, Romania, Slovakia and Slovenia, Portugal, and Spain. 
203 Member State survey response. 
204 Member State survey response. 
205 One Southern zone Member State reports that several Southern zone Member States make such 
requests. 
Regulation (EC) 1107/2009 on the Placing of Plant Protection Products on the Market 
PE 615.668 III - 70 
according to slightly different structures and procedures. However, again limited or no 
information is available in English in many Member States.206  
Northern zone 
In Sweden, senior officers meet to discuss the conditions of use which will be included in the 
authorisation, or reasons for rejection, as applicable. The applicant is then granted an 
opportunity to comment on ‘factual issues’ related to the suggested conditions of use or 
reasons for rejection. Any comments are taken into consideration. Finally, ‘the decision is then 
signed normally by one of the senior officers attending the… meeting and the person 
responsible for the application’.207 Latvian legislation suggests that the decision is taken by the 
SPPS.208 In Lithuania, while the PPP Authorisation Division is responsible for the preparation 
of decisions regarding PPP authorisation, decisions are ultimately taken by the Director of the 
SPS (DG SANTE, 2016c, p.5). 
Central zone 
In the Netherlands, the final RR is submitted to the Board of the Ctgb with non-binding advice 
as to authorisation or rejection of the application and, ‘when applicable mitigating measures 
or amendments of the authorisation’.209 The Ctgb website elaborates: the Secretariat of the Ctgb 
prepares and submits a draft decision to the Board of the Ctgb which checks the decision to 
make sure it is correct before deciding whether or not to authorise the PPP and on conditions 
of use.210 In Belgium, the dossier is again placed on the agenda of the Authorisation Committee 
which produces a final RR and decision on authorisation (FPS-PHFCSE and SPPPF, 2016, p.16). 
In the Czech Republic, the SPA compiles the decision proposal and sends it to the applicant 
with a ‘summary of how the SPA dealt with the applicant’s comments to the evaluation report’ 
including grounds for not accepting any comments. The applicant is allowed ten days to 
comment. ‘The coordinator incorporates any observations into the decision granting or 
refusing marketing authorisation for the plant protection product (SPA, n.d., p.8). In Germany, 
the BVL compiles the comments of Member States and the applicants and sends them to JKI, 
UBA and BfR ‘for consideration for the final assessment’. On this basis the BVL compiles the 
final RR. If a refusal seems likely, the applicant is allowed a hearing (BVL, 2012, p.7). BVL is 
required to make the decision on authorisation in consultation with JKI and BfR and in 
agreement with UBA. Thus, BVL and UBA share competence in risk management, entailing 
decision-making by consensus (DG SANTE, 2016a, p.5). In Slovenia, ‘[t]he body competent for 
plant protection products… within the Ministry competent for agriculture… shall decide on 
the authorisation…, based on consensus granted by the administrative body responsible for 
                                                          
206 Austria, Bulgaria, Croatia, Cyprus, Denmark, Estonia, Finland, Greece, Hungary, Ireland, Italy, 
Lithuania, Luxembourg, Malta, Norway, Romania, Poland, Portugal, Slovakia, and Spain. 
207 Member State survey response. 
208 S. II.5, Cabinet Regulation (LV) No. 509 Adopted 24 July 2012 “Regulations Regarding the Placing on 
the Market of Plant Protection Products According to Regulation No 1107/2009”. 
209 Member State survey response. 
210 <https://english.ctgb.nl/plant-protection/application-process> accessed 23 December 2017. 
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chemicals’.211 UVHVVR adopts the authorisation decision in agreement with the Chemicals 
Office within the Ministry of Health.212 The UK notes that where Member States have differing 
opinions on technical issues, the zRMS and cMS shall try to reach a compromise. Where this is 
not possible, it will be recorded in a Reporting Table and included as a supplement to the RR, 
for transparency. Ultimately, the zRMS makes the decision.213 Authorisations are granted by 
the CRD of the HSE, on behalf of Ministers.214 Applicants are given written reasons for a 
refusal.215 
Southern zone 
In France, authorisations are prepared by the Marketing Authorisations Decisions unit in 
DAMM, supported where necessary by the Marketing Authorisations monitoring committee 
and ANSES guidelines on the criteria for authorisation (ANSES, 2015, p.8). In Portugal, the 
final RR is provided to the cMSs and applicant along with the national authorisation decision 
and approved draft label. One Southern zone Member State reports that some Southern zone 
Member States rely on the authorisation decision of the zRMS (Part A of the final RR) without 
any change, while others issue national Part As. 
The nature of the expert advice provided to decision-makers varies between Member States, 
with six Member States (including Sweden) reporting that it was binding and four (including 
Belgium and the Netherlands) reporting that it was ‘purely consultative’. Belgium elaborated 
that its Advisory Board ‘may overrule a risk assessment conclusion, by means of well-argued 
solution [sic] in order to reach an acceptable risk for which the evaluation was negative’, 
though health and environmental protection remain the priority. One reports in-house 
scientific advice was binding but that any advice from its expert advisory committee was 
consultative. No trend with respect to individual zones emerged. 
Despite the sparsity and incompleteness of the data, one or two tentative observations may be 
made with respect to trends within zones. Firstly, in the Northern zone, evaluation seems 
largely to be conducted in-house in the CA, whereas in the Central zone, there are more 
examples of evaluation activities being conducted by one or more bodies and there was one 
example of this in the Southern zone. Secondly, in the Northern zone, decisions appear largely 
to be made, or at least signed, by the CA director or senior officer(s). In the Central zone, there 
                                                          
211 Article 5(2) Plant Protection Products Act (ZFfS-1) (UL RS 83/12), available at 
<http://www.uvhvvr.gov.si/en/legislation_and_documents/plant_protection_products/si_legislatio
n/> accessed 24 January 2018. 
212 < 
http://www.uvhvvr.gov.si/en/areas_of_competence/plant_protection_products/authorisation_of_pp
ps/authorisation_and_permits_for_ppps/> accessed 23 December 2017. 
213 <http://www.hse.gov.uk/pesticides/topics/pesticide-approvals/pesticides-registration/applicant-
guide/the-applicant-guide-zonal-a.htm> accessed 27 December 2017. 
214 <http://www.hse.gov.uk/pesticides/topics/pesticide-approvals/pesticides-registration.htm> 
accessed 27 December 2017. 
215 < http://www.hse.gov.uk/pesticides/topics/pesticide-approvals/pesticides-
registration/applicant-guide/what-happens-once-my-application-is-completed.htm> accessed 24 
January 2018. 
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were more examples of decision-making shared, or a requirement for consensus, between 
bodies. Data for the Southern zone are too limited to support a similar observation. 
Otherwise, Member State practice during evaluation and authorisation is characterised by 
difference. Member States employ a diversity of institutional structure for their CAs. Most 
Member States appear to conduct completeness checks but these checks operate differently; 
for example, they may consist of one or two stages and some may reject incomplete 
applications at this stage while others may still accept submission of missing data. During 
evaluation, Member States may differ in terms of the numbers of authorities examining 
applications, the type and timing of communication with applicants and the structure of their 
evaluation, for example requests for more information from applicants may occur before or 
after the commenting stage. Finally, during completion of the evaluation and final decision-
making, Member States may differ in terms of where responsibility lies for the preparation of 
the final registration report and for the ultimate decision, the availability to the applicant of 
opportunities to comment on, or attend a hearing with respect to, the final decision and the 
nature of the advice on which the decision is based. 
2.7 Zonal system 
DG SANTE’s 2016-2017 audit concluded that the zonal system was ‘not working effectively’ 
and that most Member States were not using the system as envisaged by the Regulation (DG 
SANTE, 2017, pp.I, 18). It identified various problems. Member States generally neither take 
advantage of work done by each other nor implement work-sharing systems (DG SANTE, 
2017, p.5). This was attributed mainly to lack of use of harmonised methods and models for 
evaluation or the existence of additional national data requirements to address specific 
national conditions which make Member States reluctant to accept each other’s evaluations 
(DG SANTE, 2017, pp.7–8). A variety of guidance documents covering certain areas of PPP 
evaluation is available on the Commission website.216 However, it appears that some areas are 
still to be agreed (see, for example Commission, 2017, p.2) and that some guidance is unable to 
cover every possible scenario and instead recommend evaluation on a case by case basis (see, 
for example EFSA Panel on Plant Protection Products and their Residues (PPR), 2012, p.4). The 
consequences of the lack of use of harmonised methods and models are delays (DG SANTE, 
2017, p.18), a huge duplication of evaluation work and failure to free-up resources. These 
findings were largely echoed by the CZSC secretariat217 and the Stakeholder, which notes ‘a 
serious imbalance between Member States in their resources’. It reports specifically that 
duplication results from a lack of trust between Member States which would require time to 
improve, though it did observe that the number of specific national data requirements was 
declining. Furthermore, imbalances in the numbers of applications submitted between 
Member States combined with difficulties of co-operation and work-sharing ‘undermine the 
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https://ec.europa.eu/food/plant/pesticides/approval_active_substances/guidance_documents_en#d
dar> accessed 3 April 2018. 
217 CZSC survey response. 
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aim of the Regulation to ensure a fair division of the workload’ (DG SANTE, 2017, p.9), as 
envisaged by Article 35 second paragraph PPPR.  
The results from the Member State and zSC surveys paint a slightly more optimistic picture, 
indicating that despite problems, Member States seem to be making productive and frequent 
use of the zonal system. The CZSC secretariat notes that its Member States are still 
transitioning from ‘operating individually to operating as a zone’ and that while this could not 
be achieved in the space of 5 years, could be achieved in the longer term. The Stakeholder too 
considers that the Regulation is encouraging coherence among zonal authorisation procedures 
‘to a great extent’ noting that work-sharing within zones has now exceeded that achieved 
under Directive 91/414/EEC. It also recognises that ‘Member States to a large extent have the 
desire to improve harmonisation’. 
Member States were asked how often they communicate with other Member States during the 
zonal authorisation procedure. Eight report they communicate 'often' while three selected 
‘sometimes’. Only one selected ‘rarely’ and none selected ‘never’. Furthermore, 11 out of the 
12 respondents find the zonal system/work of the zSC either ‘very helpful’ (eight) or ‘quite 
helpful’ (three). Only one finds it ‘neither helpful nor unhelpful’.  
Table 5 indicates the range of reasons for communication with the zone. In addition, Sweden 
comments that Member States consult on interpretation of the Regulation. Another Member 
State reports that the conference calls every two months are used to ‘discuss procedural issues 
and future work planning’. The Netherlands reports use of the zonal system to share 
knowledge and expertise, ‘safeguard the quality’ and promote co-operation, which it notes has 
intensified recently. In addition, it reports the establishment of a Directors Conference which 
backs up voluntary co-operation by ensuring ‘Member States commit to the agreements’. 
Reason 
for 
communi-
cation 
Advice Expert 
support 
Technical 
support 
Exchange 
research 
practices 
Peer 
review 
Share 
information 
about 
application 
Regarding 
comparative 
assessment 
Discuss 
market-
related 
issues 
Other 
 6 
Inc. 
Sweden 
8 
Inc. 
Germany 
Sweden 
5 
Inc. 
Sweden 
1 9 9 3 3 1 
Table 5: Reasons for communication within zones 
Member State comments generally indicate a positive attitude towards the zonal system. Seven 
Member States comment on the role the zonal system has played in harmonising evaluation 
methods and other procedures between Member States.  
Sweden/the NZSC secretariat comment that the zonal system has enabled the workload to be 
shared in a way that was not possible before, that it has resulted in better evaluations and 
swifter authorisation of PPPs and that the zonal system helps highlights areas of disagreement. 
The Netherlands too sees it as a mechanism for facilitating resolution of disagreements and 
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predicts the system will eventually lead to more efficient use of available capacity amongst 
CAs. Likewise, the CZSC secretariat reports that zonal discussion helps solve problems and 
disagreements over risk assessment methodologies and specific dossiers, leading to an 
‘increasingly cooperative assessment and authorisation practice’. The SZSC secretariat reports 
similar benefits. Sweden also reports biennial harmonisation workshops in the Northern zone 
since 2010 leading to development of Northern zone guidance documents (for example, 
Northern zone, 2017) (which state harmonised and un-harmonised approaches) including 
guidance on biological efficacy.218 The NZSC secretariat, in addition, reports coming ‘very far’ 
in terms of harmonisation and collaboration, ‘better cooperation between experts’, citing 
regular teleconferences between experts within the areas of expertise, facilitating 
harmonisation and resolution of ‘difficult evaluation issues’. 
The CZSC secretariat elaborates, commenting that the zonal system provides an ‘effective peer 
review process, which greatly improves the credibility of the assessment and safeguards its 
quality’ and that it promotes co-operation, improves communication and collaboration 
between Member States. It identifies various achievements which support these activities, 
including the 2017 establishment of a secretariat to maintain continuity across rotating chairs, 
establishment of a Director’s Consultation Group to ‘exchange information and reach 
agreements at a higher level’ and the regular zonal teleconferences and annual meetings. 
Furthermore, the system improves mutual understanding of each other’s approaches to risk 
assessment, enabling discovery of harmonised solutions. It feels the Central zone is on course 
to achieve the aims of the zonal system (avoiding duplication of work, reducing administrative 
burden on industry and providing more harmonised availability of PPPs)219 but notes room 
for improvement. 
Belgium also notes the role of the zonal system in simulating work-sharing. Another 
(Southern zone) Member State reports it ‘[g]ain[s] experience and knowledge on what is 
happening in the zone’. The Netherlands notes the establishment of working agreements since 
2014, development of an inventory of best practices and work on harmonising implementation 
of guidance documents. Another Central zone Member State reports quarterly meetings 
attended by many Member States ‘to discuss procedural issues and devise new guidance to 
promote harmonisation’. It also reports that scientists ‘meet frequently but less regularly to 
discuss shared issues and develop new harmonised guidance’, noting that ‘[h]armonised 
guidance is essential and has led to major efficiency gains’.  
Challenges identified include informing other (Northern zone) Member States about delays,220 
inconsistent implementation of harmonised guidance by Member States which can undermine 
the processing of zonal applications and the existence of additional, specific national 
requirements.221 Indeed, Germany notes that the zonal system only works ‘if Member States 
                                                          
218 NZSC survey response. 
219 Recital 29 PPPR. 
220 Swedish Member State survey response. 
221 Anonymous survey response (Central zone).  
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work together towards harmonisation both in procedure and assessment’. In addition, the 
NZSC secretariat reports difficulties in finding out about the progress of an evaluation and 
whether delays are occurring, though it feels that overall, timelines are kept ‘relatively well’ in 
the Northern zone. The CZSC secretariat also reports problems with keeping to legal 
timeframes. Finally, the SZSC secretariat reports problems associated with the timing of 
publication of different parts of the final RR: the applicant is informed of the completion of the 
evaluation and grant of authorisation by the zRMS while the cMSs only receive the final RR, 
required for their national decisions, from the zRMS later. It reports, furthermore, that some 
zRMSs publish different parts of the final RR at different times, sometimes subject to a delay 
following grant of the authorisation. 
Further challenges identified by the CZSC secretariat include heavy workload due to large 
numbers of applications and, despite a desire among all Member States for extensive 
harmonisation, difficulties achieving harmonisation. The latter it attributed to national level 
refinement in environmental risk assessment methodologies in guidance documents, existence 
of national requirements and the fact that the Central zone spans different EPPO zones. The 
workload, it notes, depends on applicant choice of zRMS and reports difficulty in assessing the 
fairness of workload distribution due to national differences in agriculture and sizes of 
Member States and their CAs. 
The SZSC secretariat identifies several specific challenges, including the following. Firstly, the 
existence of nationally-specific risk mitigation measures. This, it states, is being addressed by 
the development of harmonised risk mitigation measures which may be used across the entire 
zone but adapted to specific national conditions. Secondly, it reports different approaches 
among Member States to efficacy assessment. Some do not follow Articles 29(1)(a) and 4(3)(a) 
PPPR and EPPO guidelines on minimum effective dose and do not base authorisation on the 
efficacy of the uses applied for and the minimum dose for the acceptable efficacy. There is no 
scope under Article 36(3) PPPR for cMSs to introduce national requirements in relation to 
efficacy, meaning that cMS CAs have no choice but to authorise uses of PPPs that they would 
not authorise as zRMS due to the lack of a demonstration of minimum effective dose. Finally, 
the SZSC secretariat reports difficulties due to changes in guidance documents and endpoints 
relevant to the assessment of PPPs resulting from confirmatory data, which occur during 
evaluation. This causes incompatibility between the approval conditions of the active 
substance and the grounds on which a PPP is evaluated and delays, where a reassessment is 
triggered. It recommends that such changes not be applied to PPPs already under assessment. 
The matter of resources was often raised. The NZSC secretariat reports that while many 
Member States are small, with limited resources, there is an attempt to share work fairly and 
that Member States are open with each other about their resource problems. Likewise, the 
CZSC secretariat reports that not all CAs have the financial wherewithal to accommodate 
increased demand, though it too attempts to distribute the workload fairly. The SZSC 
secretariat argues that an unforeseen consequence of the zonal system was an increase in the 
costs associated with co-ordination within the zone. It reports, further, that smaller Member 
States receive roughly the same number of applications as larger Member States ‘meaning that 
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even as Concerned MS or for Mutual Recognition, the resources are stretched thin just to grant 
authorisations’. Thus, the SZSC secretariat does not regard the overall administrative burden 
as having been reduced. However, it praised the practice whereby the applicant contacts 
prospective zRMS to determine their willingness to receive a new application. This, it argues, 
benefits applicants as they do not wish to submit applications to reluctant CAs and benefits 
CAs as only those able and willing will receive applications. It also comments on the quality 
of RRs. It reports the need, with respect to RRs from some zRMSs, for cMSs to scour the entire 
document to discover the reasoning behind a particular conclusion/authorisation condition 
and to ascertain whether any limitations imposed by the zRMS result from national specific 
requirements (permitted under Article 36(3) PPPR) or from EU requirements to act on such 
national specific requirements. Both require expert resources which could be better employed 
elsewhere. 
ZSC secretariats were asked whether Member States trusted each other and each other’s 
evaluations. The NZSC secretariat reports ‘[g]enerally, there is trust between NZ MS’. 
Disagreements over evaluations are solved ‘by direct contact with the zRMS or via 
teleconferences’. Non-harmonised areas and possible areas of mistrust are discussed and 
resolved during the annual updating of the Northern zone guidance document. The CZSC 
secretariat attributed mistrust to national differences in methodologies and models used for 
evaluation, leading to work duplication and different decisions. The SZSC secretariat reports 
differing levels of trust (measured according to the extent to which Member States comment 
on dRRs) among Southern zone Member States, which it attributes largely to available 
resources. 
The Stakeholder feels that the Northern and Southern zones are working ‘quite well’ but that 
the Central zone is working ‘very badly’. It links the level of functioning of each zone to the 
level of similarity between the zone’s Member States, attributing the poor functioning of the 
Central zone to ‘high variability in agricultural and climatic conditions, as well as the variety 
in the size and experience level in’ CAs and more national data requirements and competing 
risk assessment methodologies, representing a greater challenge than that faced by either of 
the other two zones. It notes the Southern zone is ‘making progress’ in terms of harmonisation. 
It cites language as a problem in all zones and also notes that the ‘drafting and quality’ of RRs 
could be improved, reporting that publication of all RRs in one language – English – would 
benefit all. It also suggests that European funding to support co-ordination would accelerate 
the improvement of the zonal system. 
Finally, the Stakeholder feels that the inter-zonal system is working ‘quite badly’. This, it 
attributes to a lack of priority from Member States already struggling to meet challenges at the 
zonal level. It notes significant differences in approach even in those areas where harmonising 
is possible, for example, uses under ‘controlled conditions’.222 The NZSC secretariat also 
                                                          
222 It is assumed the Stakeholder is referring to those uses specified in Article 33(2)(b) (including use in 
greenhouses, as post-harvest treatment etc.) where only one Member State need evaluate the 
application for all zones. 
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reports co-operation at this level is ‘more challenging as there is not much harmonisation and 
communication between the zones’ and that the inter-zonal system in particular can always 
work better, for example, in terms of harmonisation and efficiency. 
The challenges identified are not surprising from a theoretical point of view. The functions of 
such networks of national regulators may include the spread of regulatory practices across 
Europe, sharing information and best practices, regulatory convergence (for example common 
approaches to implementation and development of best practice) and co-operation (Groenleer, 
2011). However, the retention of discretion by national regulators (here, for example, over 
national data requirements) and a lack of mutual trust may limit the harmonisation achievable 
through co-operation (Groenleer, 2011, p.557), despite attempts to overcome mistrust between 
Member States, described above. Furthermore, the activities of regulatory science (i.e. science 
used in regulatory decision-making (Jasanoff, 1990, pp.76–79)) are deeply embedded in 
national regulatory systems, culture and relations (Rothstein et al., 1999, pp.252–253). Writing 
in the context of harmonisation of evaluation procedures under Directive 91/414/EEC,223 
Rothstein et al. argue that such harmonisation and standardisation present a challenge for, and 
even a threat to, the conduct of national regulatory science. Conversely, national regulatory 
science can act as a barrier to the implementation of harmonised procedures (Rothstein et al., 
1999, p.256). The Stakeholder echoes these observations, reporting ‘a lot of variation’ between 
Member State zonal authorisation procedures which it attributed to national differences in 
government structures, financing systems and involvement of external evaluation bodies. It 
feels complete harmonisation is unrealistic but noted ‘much room for improvement’. 
3. Summary and recommendations 
The picture of the zonal system which emerges is that of both significant progress and 
significant challenges and even frustration.224 Both Member States and the Stakeholder appear 
to value the zonal system for the potential it offers for work-sharing; improved harmonisation, 
co-operation and collaboration; promotion of mutual understanding; resolution of 
disagreements etc., and acknowledge the benefits both for Member States and industry that it 
has so far provided. On the other hand, significant delays persist as a result of the challenges, 
some of which are regarded as due to unavoidable differences in environmental conditions.225 
Communication between Member States could still be improved and problems relating to the 
timing of publication and sharing of RRs have been identified. Unsurprisingly, a major 
challenge is adequate resourcing of CAs. While the zonal system is partly designed to ease the 
burden of work on CAs, the workload may still be substantial and, despite attempts to share 
work fairly, may be unevenly distributed. In addition, co-ordination within the zonal system 
itself and scrutinising RRs (especially poorer quality RRs) require resources. Finally, 
establishing trust between different CAs has long been difficult (Rothstein et al., 1999, pp.257–
258) and remains so, despite evidence of headway. The zonal system is clearly a work in 
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224 Stakeholder survey response. 
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progress and will likely require a significant amount of effort on the part of Member States to 
improve its functioning. However, early signs are promising. 
Due to the stage of development of the zonal system, as well as the quality of the data currently 
available, it may also be too early to draw any concrete conclusions about its operation. For 
example, it is not yet possible to identify the convergence of diverse procedures within the 
zones towards zonal models for evaluation and authorisation. Although some similarities may 
be discerned between Member States within zones, these are not strong and overall, diversity 
and difference largely characterise the institutions and procedures examined in this section.  
The zonal system is complex and improvements in its operation, for example, harmonisation 
and work-sharing, will take time, as the CZSC secretariat notes (above). Member States are 
working on these matters and making progress. It will also take time to build the trust 
necessary to support greater harmonisation and more efficient operation. Given the potential 
barriers to trust between Member States (for example, differences in national regulatory 
science, language or (perceived) resource inadequacies) continued trust-building and even the 
continuation of the status quo are not necessarily guaranteed. 
Recommendations 
Further, longer-term (external) qualitative and quantitative empirical research is 
recommended to understand better the operation of the zonal system, the challenges each 
zone faces, how these may be overcome and the potential for improving evaluation and 
the overall authorisation process. Such research could identify further examples of best 
practice with a view to promoting sharing and policy learning among Member States. For 
example, it was unclear whether all Member States assign project managers to manage 
applications. Further research could investigate Member State experience with the use of 
project managers and whether, for example, they reduce the occurrence of delays.  
Member States are encouraged to continue communicating and working together in their 
zones and to step-up activities designed to improve harmonisation of, for example, 
methods and models for evaluation and to achieve fairer work-sharing with the aim of 
strengthening trust between each other. Chairs of zSCs/zSC secretariats are encouraged 
to take particular responsibility for co-ordinating and pushing forward these activities. The 
Southern zone, particularly, could consider introducing guidelines or other measures both 
governing the timing of RR publication and to improve efficacy assessment within the zone. 
Information about, and understanding of, the zonal system more generally could be 
improved in order to provide an evidence base for possible future action and support. The 
Commission is therefore advised to continue monitoring the zonal system, including 
stakeholder experiences of the zones, in order to keep track of its progress. The 
Commission and zSCs are also encouraged to consider whether it would be feasible and 
valuable for zSCs to report (for example, annually) to the Commission on progress in their 
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zones. The Commission is encouraged to provide support, for example financial and 
administrative, for the production of such reports to ensure their quality. In the interests 
of transparency, any such reports should be made publicly available. 
 
VII – Results and discussion 
1. Independence 
As described in section V.1, the questions on independence were divided into four categories: 
formal independence from government; independence from the regulated industry; 
organisational autonomy and substantive independence. These questions were also prefaced 
by three general questions concerning the formal independence of the CA, who is responsible 
for CA decisions regarding PPP authorisations and the professional background of the current 
agency head/commissioners. Eleven Member States report that the ‘independence of the 
competent authority [was] formally stated either in legislation or in the statute of the 
competent authority’. The final Member State reports that it was not but commented that 
‘[t]hose working for the competent authority are bound by the Civil Service Code, which 
requires (inter alia) that they are impartial’. Two Member States report that a Board of 
Commissioners was responsible for decisions and seven report that the agency head/director 
was responsible. Of the latter, Sweden reports that in practice responsibility for most decisions 
was delegated to officers of the authority. One reports that responsibility lay with the ‘[e]xpert 
team evaluating the application incl. their co-ordinator. The Head is only signing the decision 
prepared [sic]’. It notes further that the decision ‘always follows the conclusions of experts’. 
Belgium reports that the Federal Minister of Public Health was responsible. One Southern 
zone Member State reports that decisions are sub-delegated to the Deputy Director-General 
responsible for phytosanitary issues. 
The structures of the CAs reported correspond to the categories regulators generally fall into 
(Larsen et al., 2006, p.2862), being led either by commissions or boards, or by an agency head 
or director. As discussed in section II.3, it is likely that the decision-making of commissions 
will lean towards more compromise and consensus than the decision-making of an agency 
head,226 although this may not necessarily produce better decisions (Graham, 1998, p.506). 
Commissioners and board members tend to be experts in different relevant areas. Agency 
heads tend more to have backgrounds as civil servants (Larsen et al., 2006, p.2862). The two 
Member States (from the Central and Southern zones) with commission-type CAs did indeed 
report professional backgrounds of the commissioners in relevant specialist areas. Member 
States with agency-type CAs (from all zones) report professional background predominantly 
                                                          
226 Although note discussion in sub-section VII.2.6 and below in relation to substantive independence, 
that some Member States require decisions to be made on the basis of consensus between different 
bodies even if the CA itself is an agency with a single head, for example, Germany. 
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in natural sciences, especially plant-related, agricultural, business and management, civil 
service or law.  
1.1 Formal independence from government 
These questions concerned the status of the agency head/commissioners. One respondent 
simply referred to its national civil service code in response to these questions and Belgium 
indicated that these questions were not relevant for a Minister. Therefore, the responses of the 
remaining ten Member States are reported here. In seven Member States agency 
heads/commissioners are appointed for fixed terms (six of 4-6 years, one of 1-3 years). Q25 
asked Member States about the provisions regarding dismissal of the agency 
head/commissioners. In no Member States is dismissal impossible. However, in four Member 
States agency heads/commissioners are protected to a certain extent from dismissal during 
their term; dismissal is only possible ‘for reasons unrelated to the substance of authorisation 
decisions [such as] economic interests in the PPP industry, significant neglect of duties etc.’. 
Six respondents report that there were no specific provisions for dismissal or that ‘dismissal 
was possible at the appointer’s discretion’. Of these, Germany reports the position is ‘subject 
to general regulations for civil servants’. Thus, while more than half appeared to accept that 
independence is enhanced by fixed-term appointments, fewer than half report some protection 
from dismissal. In addition, most Member States allow appointments to be renewed,227 which 
could create incentives to act to please the appointers (Johannsen, 2003, p.45), and potentially 
reduce independence. 
In terms of appointment of the agency head/commissioners, there was a fairly even spread 
across the various range of appointers: a mix of the legislature and executive: two; the 
legislature: one; the executive collectively: two; one or two ministers: three. There was no 
discernible pattern within zones. Germany reports the appointer of the President of the CA 
(BVL) is the Federal Ministry of Food and Agriculture which, as a ministry would probably 
form part of the executive; the President then appoints the head of the PPP department in BVL. 
One Member State identified ‘the Government’ as the appointer. Involvement of the legislature 
helps ensure independence (Smith, 1997). However, only three in total report its involvement. 
In nine Member States, independence is a formal requirement for the appointment and in eight, 
regulators are prohibited from holding other offices in government. In one this is permitted 
‘with the permission of the executive’. Only in the Netherlands is this possible but is 
apparently subject to strict conditions relating to conflicts of interest and ongoing 
monitoring.228  
Member States were also asked one question relating to substantive, as opposed to formal, 
independence, i.e. the independence of the CA’s actual decision-making. They were asked: 
‘[t]o what extent is the competent authority responsible for the authorisation of new PPPs 
under the zonal authorisation procedure?’. Eight Member States report that the CA is ‘solely 
                                                          
227 Two once, and five more than once. In the other three, positions have no fixed term. 
228 Detail provided in the Netherlands Member State survey response. 
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responsible’; three (all Central zone) report that the CA ‘shares decision-making power with 
another institution’. Of the three, Belgium notes that ‘regional authorities are represented in 
the Authorisation Board’ which makes the decision. One comments that a negative conclusion 
from its Ministry of Health, which evaluates the effects of the PPP on human health would 
result in a rejection of the application. Germany declined to answer the question, referring 
instead to the three assessment authorities (JKI, BfR and UBA). As stated in section VI.2.6, BVL 
decides on authorisation in consultation with JKI and BfR and in agreement with UBA. Thus, 
BVL and UBA share competence in risk management, entailing decision-making by consensus 
(DG SANTE, 2016a, p.5). 
The Stakeholder comments that CAs may be pressured by their governments in response to 
‘heavy lobbying from anti-pesticide civil society organisations’ although it noted this was more 
common during EU level of evaluations of active substances. It believes, however, that some 
governments ‘issue legislation that ignores or goes beyond the EU PPPR’. 
As the discussions in this section and section VI.2.1 show, several CAs are located within 
government departments or ministries and therefore may be described as ‘semi-independent’ 
of government (Thatcher, 2002a, p.129). Although this research has not compared regulator 
structures in pesticides regulation with other regulatory domains, other comparative research 
has identified lower levels of delegation to fully independent IRAs in social regulation 
(including pesticides regulation) than in economic regulation (Gilardi, 2005, p.85), so this result 
is perhaps not surprising. It also does not necessarily mean that regulation is unreliable as a 
result. As discussed in sections I and II.3, formal independence does not automatically 
guarantee fair and reasonable decision-making (Stern, 1997, pp.72–74); for instance, it may be 
more important that regulators build a reputation for decision-making with these qualities 
regardless of institutional structure. 
1.2 Independence from regulated industry 
Independence from the regulated industry may be enhanced by ‘maximis[ing] the relational 
distance from the industry’ through prohibiting former employees of industry from being 
appointed regulators (Johannsen, 2003, p.45). Three (Central zone) Member States employ this 
measure with respect to the agency head/commissioners while six allow appointments from 
industry/industrial associations. One (Southern zone) Member State reports it has no specific 
provisions. No Member States allow the agency head/commissioners to be employed in the 
regulated industry or industrial associations during their term. 
Independence from industry during the appointment may also be enhanced by restricting a 
regulator’s freedom to accept jobs in industry on expiry of their appointment. Only one 
(Northern zone) Member State reports prohibiting the agency head/commissioners from 
accepting positions in industry for one or more years following their term, while Germany 
reports that due to the civil service status of the agency head, ‘any paid activity after retirement 
[is] subject to approval by the agency’. Seven Member States report no provisions restricting 
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employment of the agency head/commissioners in industry following their term.229 There is 
some correlation between the power to appoint from industry and the absence of restrictions 
on employment in industry following the term. Of the Member States exhibiting this 
correlation, Sweden reports that previous employment in industry ‘could be regarded as a 
disqualification’ according to Swedish administrative law and that conclusion of an 
employment agreement prior to the end of the term could also be a violation of Swedish 
administrative law. The Netherlands reports that previous employment in industry (and in 
NGOs or other organisations in this sector, e.g. farmers organisations) ‘in practice… is a reason 
for rejection in the selection of Board members or head of agency’ and that again ‘in practice 
[employment in industry following the term] does not happen as it is a violation of the spirit 
of our integrity code’. There is a trade-off here. While restrictions on appointing former 
industry employees and on post-appointment industry employment can reinforce 
independence from industry, it may hinder appointment of regulators with the necessary 
expertise (Gönenç, Maher and Nicoletti, 2000, p.43). 
In eight Member States, there are provisions forbidding the agency head/commissioners from 
having any personal or financial interest in the PPP industry (seven in relation both to the 
appointment and individual cases; one in relation to individual cases). Only two (both 
Southern zone) report no such provisions. Two Member States referred to their policy on 
conflicts of interest, including annual monitoring. 
The Stakeholder considers that CAs are independent from industry/PPP manufacturers in the 
sense that it is not aware of any CAs in which industry representatives have a vote in 
authorisation decisions. This answer appears to interpret the requirements for independence 
rather more narrowly than the approach adopted in this report. The Stakeholder also confirms 
that opportunities for communication between evaluators and applicants are many.230 
Stakeholders were asked, additionally, whether they believed CAs were independent of civil 
society organisations (CSOs) which campaign on pesticides. The Stakeholder believes most 
CAs are but indicated a belief that ‘[s]ome Member States respond in a non-scientific manner 
to pressure from CSOs by demanding more data than scientifically warranted, or by taking 
measures that serve political purposes rather than rational ones’. All zSC secretariats report a 
belief that the CAs in their zones are independent of government, industry and green CSOs. 
Such responses are perhaps unsurprising and it is at least open to question whether zSC 
secretariats would in fact report any concerns about the independence of CAs in their zones. 
It is not unheard of for direct interaction between regulators and the regulated industry to be 
restricted, for example through a ban on discussions of pending cases (Johannsen, 2003, p.47). 
However, as discussed in section VI.2, such direct interaction is a key feature of the PPP 
authorisation process and encouraged. On the one hand, this may lead to efficiency gains and, 
depending on the nature of the interaction, may help overcome some challenges associated 
with asymmetric information (Johannsen, 2003, p.47). On the other hand, such ongoing 
                                                          
229 One Member State (in addition to the two already mentioned) did not answer this question. 
230 It noted that this was to discuss the results of risk assessment submitted in response to CA requests. 
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interaction may reduce the relational distance between regulator and industry. As discussed 
in section II.2, repeated interaction may increase the risk of ‘cultural capture’ whereby the 
regulator adopts a viewpoint favourable to industry through, inter alia, increasing 
identification with industry interests. That said, as discussed in section VII.2.3, in practice the 
level of communication between applicants and CAs may vary across the EU. However, France 
appears to be taking steps to address the risks of exposure to attempts by interested parties to 
influence its CA’s decision-making process (ANSES, n.d., p.1). ANSES has stated it is drawing 
up a ‘charter on relations with interest groups, to prevent any risk of interference in the 
Agency’s assessment and decision-making processes, while remaining faithful to its 
willingness to engage in dialogue’ (ANSES, 2015, p.4). The charter is designed to achieve equity 
of access for interested parties, guaranteed expression of a plurality and diversity of points of 
view, transparency and the traceability of interventions and increased awareness amongst staff 
about interactions with interested parties (ANSES, n.d.). These steps, if implemented well, 
offer an example of good practice and are therefore worth attending to. Greater understanding 
of ANSES’s experience with this charter and its success (or otherwise) would be a valuable aim 
for further research, especially with a view to assessing its potential for adoption by other CAs. 
1.3 Organisational autonomy 
As discussed in section II.3, for regulators to operate independently from the government and 
legislature, they require a degree of organisational autonomy and exemption from direct 
control (e.g. overruling its decisions) or indirect control (e.g. cutting its budget) (Johannsen, 
2003, p.48). Regulatory independence may be partially guaranteed by exceptions from state 
budget regulation and restrictive civil service salary rules (Johannsen, 2003, p.48; Smith, 1997). 
External funding (e.g. a fee levied on applicants) is regarded as more stable than government 
funding as it may protect authorities from both general cut-backs and politically motivated 
budget cuts (Johannsen, 2003, p.48) although, as discussed in section II.3, dependence on 
industry for funding may compromise CA independence from industry. Based on the Member 
State survey and website review, overall it appears that at least ten Member States, across all 
zones, levy fees.231 Seven Member States report that the source of their budget is the 
Government. Of these, one reports that the fees levied on applicants only cover costs and are 
not a source of income. Germany reports that fees levied on applicants are directed to the 
Government. The Stakeholder reports a belief that diversion of fees to central budgets occurs 
much more widely which it believes prevents the relevant CAs from contributing adequately 
to work-sharing within zones. This is an interesting insight. However, its accuracy would have 
to be investigated through further empirical research. Five Member States report their budgets 
derive from a combination of Government and external funding. Of these, the Netherlands 
reports that external funding makes up 85% of its budget; 70% from application fees and 15% 
from an annual fee levied on all authorisation holders. In addition. DG SANTE found, in its 
audit, that four Member States (of the eight audited) have decided not to recover costs. It also 
revealed delays or the lack of a system to update fees to reflect the actual costs involved in the 
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authorisation process (DG SANTE, 2017, p.3). These data suggest therefore, fairly low levels of 
autonomy in this respect due to CA funds deriving largely from government. 
Three more questions related to organisational autonomy: who controls budgetary spending, 
who decides the CA’s internal organisation (procedures, allocation of responsibility, tasks etc.) 
and who is in charge of the CA’s personnel policy (recruitment, promotion, salaries). In 
response to the first two questions, nine Member States selected ‘the competent authority’ 
while three selected ‘the competent authority and government in co-operation’. In response to 
the last question, five selected each of the ‘competent authority’ and ‘the competent authority 
and government in co-operation’ while two selected ‘the government’. Three Member States 
referred to some kind of government policy/guidelines governing salaries. Germany noted 
that salary is based on the general civil service pay scale. The Netherlands reports that 
‘salaries… must fulfil the governmental requirements’. This is noteworthy as autonomy over 
personnel policy is regarded as a defining characteristic of regulatory independence 
(Johannsen, 2003, p.50; Smith, 1997). Four were fully autonomous according to these three 
criteria; three from the Central zone, one from the Northern zone. 
1.4 Resources 
The final category of questions relates to the resources and capacities of CAs. Adequate in-
house technical expertise can reduce information asymmetry and counter the risk of regulatory 
capture and adequate remuneration can facilitate recruitment and retention of such qualified 
professional staff (Smith, 1997).232 While most of these questions were designed to gain an 
insight into the operational challenges CAs face they may also contribute to an understanding 
of the challenges of information asymmetry (along with targeted questions), which do relate 
to regulator independence. 
Eleven Member States report that their CA’s budget is ‘adequate to fulfil its duties with respect 
to the zonal authorisation procedure’. One Member State reports it is not. One Member State 
did not respond. Nine Member States consider that their CA’s ‘operational resources support 
an effective and efficient authorisation procedure’. Three do not. One of these (Southern zone) 
cites a lack of specialised human resources as the reason. 
Q37 concerned available expertise and asked whether the CA possesses sufficient in-house 
expertise (experts, knowledge, e.g. access to databases, etc.) in all the areas necessary to 
evaluate the application in house (including comparative assessment) (or access to such 
expertise from external sources) to make the authorisation decision. Eight Member States 
report they had sufficient in-house expertise in all or most of the necessary areas. Sweden notes 
it consults ‘other agencies in their areas of expertise: Swedish Board of Agriculture for efficacy 
and National Food Administration for residues’. The Netherlands comments that the Ctgb has 
contracted external scientists, depending on workload. It indicates that it may seek second 
opinions from other institutions, including universities. Although external experts may bolster 
regulator independence through the provision of independent advice, academics are still 
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vulnerable to capture (Zingales, 2014). With respect to comparative assessment, the Dutch 
Inspection Service performs the agricultural assessment on the Ctgb’s behalf. One (Southern 
zone) reports it has sufficient in-house expertise in some of the necessary areas, commenting 
that evaluation of zonal applications is outsourced to experts. Another (Southern zone) reports 
it has no in-house expertise but has access to external expertise and one (Central zone) reports 
it has neither in-house expertise nor access to external expertise. One did not select an answer, 
instead leaving a comment, the meaning of which was, unfortunately, unclear. Two report 
deficiencies in expertise. Overall, there is much variation in the levels of in-house expertise and 
access to external expertise among Member States. 
Q41 posed a similar question in relation to technical resources and asked whether the CA 
possesses or has access to sufficient technical equipment/processes necessary for evaluation 
and the authorisation decision. Five (all Central zone) Member States report they possess/have 
access to sufficient, or most of the, technical equipment/processes necessary. Of these, 
Germany comments that BVL has a laboratory but notes its inability to analyse certain types 
of substance and gaps in its ability to determine various properties of substances. One 
(Southern zone) Member State reports it possesses/has access to some of the technical 
equipment/processes and comments that it lacks IT platforms and laboratory capacity for 
formulation analysis. One Southern zone Member State reports it does not possess/have access 
to the necessary technical equipment/processes. Five report the question was not relevant, of 
which Sweden comments it does not need to do any technical work during evaluation as this 
is the responsibility of applicants pre-authorisation. 
Three further questions attempted to focus more specifically on information asymmetry. With 
respect to recruitment, four Member States report that it is ‘quite easy’ to recruit staff with the 
necessary expertise, technical skills and experience. However, one of these (Sweden), 
comments that it is ‘generally difficult to find’ staff with experience specifically in risk 
assessment of PPPs and regulatory issues. Three report it is ‘quite difficult’ and five report it 
is ‘very difficult’. No zone-specific trends were discernible. Member State comments indicate 
that this is a complex and evolving matter. For example, the Netherlands comments that two 
years previously, recruitment was ‘very difficult’ but is currently ‘quite easy’ and new staff 
complete a year-long in house training. Another (Central zone) Member State which selected 
‘quite difficult’ provides more detail: ‘[u]ntil a decade ago recruiting graduates with two or 
more years’ experience in a relevant industry was relatively easy’. It cites several reasons: 
fewer people/graduates with relevant experience due to changes in higher education and 
consolidation in the agrochemical industry; constraints on Civil Service remuneration making 
posts less attractive and high demand in other areas of industry for science specialists with 
relevant experience (e.g. toxicologists). This CA has responded to these recruitment difficulties 
by recruiting ‘relatively new graduates and commit[ting] major resources to training them in 
the required areas’. One other (Southern zone) Member State, who reports that recruitment is 
‘very difficult’ also refers to training experts in house ‘for several years’. Another (Central 
zone) Member State which selected ‘very difficult’ refers generally to limitations on recruiting 
new staff in the public sector. DG SANTE reports similarly that four Member States identified 
‘restrictions on public services in hiring new staff’ as contributing to failures to comply with 
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deadlines in the Regulation (DG SANTE, 2017, p.4). Commitments to in-house training may 
be identified as best practice. CA provision of opportunities to develop expertise outside 
industry may enhance independence from industry by reducing both reliance on industry 
training as a source of staff knowledge and the associated risk of over-identification with 
industry interests, as discussed in section II.2. Such staff development may be particularly 
valuable where constraints on remuneration reduce CA ability to attract expert staff from 
industry or consultancies. 
With respect to employee retention, two (both Central zone) report it is ‘very easy’ to retain 
such staff. Of these, the Netherlands, attributes this to the Ctgb offering ‘a challenging working 
environment and [being] socially relevant, meaning that it is seen as an interesting employer’. 
Five report it is ‘quite easy’. Three report it is ‘quite difficult’. Of these, one reports a ‘continual 
turnover of staff trained by the Competent Authority leaving within three years to take up a 
consultancy post’. This it attributes to increased demand for scientific expertise due to the 
expansion of regulation (biocides and chemicals) leading to ‘a major growth in consultancies… 
paying at least 50% more in starting salaries with potential to rise much higher’. One (Central 
zone) Member State reports it is ‘very difficult’.233 
Finally, Member States were asked ‘[i]f resources (experts, knowledge/e.g. access to 
databases/, etc.) are not available in house, how easy is it to buy those resources from outside? 
One (Central zone) reports it is ‘very easy’. Two report it is ‘quite easy’ of whom Sweden 
comments that this occurs rarely. Three report it is ‘quite difficult’. Of these, one (Southern 
zone) attributes the difficulties to ‘[i]nternal bureaucratic procedure’ and states that ‘[a]t EU 
level expertise is limited due to high workloads in each member state’. The Netherlands 
comments that ‘few partners can meet the quality standards of Ctgb… [which] include 
preventing conflicts of interest’ and that some potential partners are not able to deal with 
fluctuations in demand. The Ctgb quality standards suggest best practice and further research 
aimed at understanding the effectiveness of these standards, in practice, at promoting 
independence in the Dutch experience may be worthwhile. Three report it is ‘very difficult’, 
with two attributing the difficulties to limited resources. 
1.5 Summary and recommendations 
In terms of CA relationships with government, most Member States strengthen CA 
independence through formal requirements of independence both for CAs themselves and 
appointment as head and by making appointments fixed term. They are weaker with respect 
to the status of those responsible for making appointments. However, most enjoy substantive 
independence in terms of having sole responsibility for authorisation decisions.  
As discussed in sections I, II.3 and VII.1.1, more important than formal independence from 
government is that regulators operate fair and reasonable evaluation and decision-making 
procedures and are seen to do so by all interested parties. Given that only one stakeholder 
responded to the stakeholder survey, we have limited information on the extent to which 
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evaluation and authorisation procedures are seen as fair and reasonable. It is therefore very 
difficult to make general recommendations on the basis of the above findings. Data are lacking 
and conditions and difficulties are highly specific to individual Member States. Furthermore, 
change requires resources. These are, for better or worse, austere times and Member States 
may already face resource-related pressures. Generic advice may be offered, in terms of 
recommending introduction of fixed term appointments and enhanced protection from 
dismissal for commissioners/agency heads. However, where regulation is regarded as fair, 
such changes may not ultimately be necessary and where regulation is regarded as unfair, 
increasing formal independence may not target the cause of the problem. More detailed 
research into national conditions and challenges and the reasons behind may therefore be a 
wise additional step to take before making more concrete recommendations. 
Recommendations 
It is recommended that further qualitative research is conducted. This research should 
target two specific enquiries. First, it should seek to understand how the zonal evaluation 
and national authorisation procedures of the CAs are perceived by all stakeholders, 
including applicants and the general public, and the extent (if at all) to which these 
procedures are viewed as fair and reasonable. Secondly, it should move beyond study of 
formal independence to investigate the existence (if any), in practice, of governmental 
influence on CA decision-making, for example through review of CA decisions and in-depth 
examination of interaction between CAs and government during decision-making. Such 
research may provide a stronger basis on which to make substantive recommendations. 
The Regulation places no obligation on Member States to report their progress on the 
implementation of its provisions.234 While acknowledging the difficulty of amending 
legislation, given the lack of information about CAs and the operation of the zonal system, 
the introduction of such a reporting requirement on Member States could provide valuable 
information and constitute a step towards filling this knowledge gap. The EU institutions 
are encouraged to consider such an amendment. In the interests of transparency, any such 
reports should be made publicly available. 
 
With respect to CAs’ relationship with industry, the picture is one of relative ease in moving 
between regulator and industry, although restrictions on personal/financial interests in the 
industry are stronger. Ultimately, Member State models for governing the relationship 
between regulator and industry/government differ and not all (potential) measures to 
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maximise independence from industry/government are taken in all Member States. Such 
measures may be important for guarding against the risk of regulatory capture by maintaining 
an arm’s-length relationship with industry as much as possible. 
In terms of countering governmental influence the zonal system may assume greater 
importance. Majone has argued that isolated national regulators, though committed to 
fulfilling statutory objectives, may still be too weak to withstand external political pressure. 
However, he argues, participation in a transnational network of regulators with similar 
objectives and problems may incentivise regulators to resist political pressures in order to 
maintain their reputation amongst other regulators and protect their ability to co-operate 
(Majone, 1996, p.273).235 Direct interaction with each other, bypassing ministerial departments, 
may also grant national regulators power vis-à-vis their national governments, increasing their 
autonomy (Groenleer, 2011, p.556). If the zonal system can evolve into such a system, this could 
enhance the independence of CAs and consequently perhaps, the reliability of decisions. This 
may, therefore, represent another reason for supporting and strengthening the zonal system. 
It is worth raising the possibility that, for similar reasons, the zonal system may also help 
counter pressure from the regulated industry and indeed green CSOs. However, where such 
actors also operate at a zonal or EU level, networks of CAs at these levels may remain 
vulnerable to, for example, industry influence or capture,236 albeit likely expensive for 
industry. Nonetheless, the question of the potential for such networks to strengthen 
independence from industry would be worth further research. 
Recommendations 
Regulatory (particularly cultural) capture has been identified as a risk to CAs. However, 
further empirical research would be required to determine the extent (if at all) to which 
any CAs are, in practice, influenced or captured by industry. Such research should involve, 
inter alia, qualitative review of registration reports and decisions against information 
submitted by applicants and modes of interaction between CAs and industry to understand 
the nature and proximity of the relationship. Recent literature (for example, (Carpenter 
and Moss, 2014b)) proposes robust methodologies to conduct such research. Greater 
understanding would provide a stronger evidence base on which to make 
recommendations. However, pending such research, the following recommendations are 
made. 
Member States are encouraged to review their national provisions regarding potential for 
commissioners/agency heads to have held positions in industry prior to their appointment 
to CAs and to accept employment in industry post-appointment. In order to reduce the risk 
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236 I am grateful to Dr Dieter Pesendorfer for this observation. 
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of regulatory capture, Member States are encouraged, furthermore, to consider 
strengthening restrictions with respect to both. 
Member States are also encouraged share best practice. For example, Member States may 
benefit from learning about France’s experience with its charter on relations with interest 
groups (section VII.1.2) and the Netherlands’ experience with its quality standards (section 
VII.1.4). If successful, Member States may wish to implement similar measures. 
Involvement of public interest groups (PIGs) in regulatory decision-making was discussed 
in section II.1.2 as a mechanism for reducing the risk of regulatory capture. Again, further 
research would be required into, for example, their appropriateness, mechanisms for their 
support (including funding) and to identify potential candidates. PIGs could operate on a 
national level and, if the PIG itself transcends national boundaries, on a zonal or EU level 
too. 
Research into the potential for the zonal system to act as a counterweight to external 
pressure was beyond the scope of this study. Further research may therefore be necessary 
to investigate this question. If this potential is real, Member States and the Commission 
should provide support at zonal and inter-zonal level for developing the networks required 
to ensure individual CAs can take full advantage of the zonal system as a means to maintain 
and enhance their independence. 
 
With respect to organisational autonomy, most lose some formal autonomy through being 
largely government-funded. On the other hand, most retain control over budgetary spending 
and internal organisation while being not entirely autonomous with respect to personnel 
policy. That government, in some, still has some say over salaries could be regarded as a 
possible restriction of independence. This is indeed cited by Member States as a problem for 
recruitment. 
With respect to resources, overall, most respondent CAs regard themselves as possessing or 
having access to sufficient financial, operational, expert and technical resources to carry out 
their functions with respect to PPP authorisation. This is partly corroborated by the overall 
findings of DG SANTE’s audit,237 which found that the ‘evaluator staff in all MSs were suitably 
qualified and trained, and are therefore capable of conducting evaluations to a high standard’ 
(DG SANTE, 2017, p.4). This is a positive finding for the smooth functioning of zonal 
authorisation procedures. However, there are still several Member States which experience 
resource-related challenges, some of whom report multiple challenges. The trend looks less 
healthy when it comes to recruitment and retention of staff, and access to/availability of 
external resources, where there is evidence of more wide-spread difficulties. No Member State 
directly mentions having to compete with the PPP industry itself for expert staff, although one 
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does mention competition with industry or private consultancies generally. Some Member 
States indicate their commitment to training experts in-house, which may reduce the 
magnitude of the problem. However, these difficulties could place some CAs at a 
disadvantage, in some areas of expertise, vis-à-vis industry with the associated risks of 
information asymmetry and regulatory capture.238 
Recommendations 
Member States are encouraged to review the means by which CAs are funded and to 
consider introducing fees covering the costs of evaluation and authorisation, pursuant to 
Article 74(1) PPPR. However, while securing CA funding through fees levied on industry 
may promote independence from government, dependence on such fees may reduce 
independence from industry. A straightforward recommendation with regard to the 
benefits to CA independence of retaining such fees is therefore not possible. The further 
research, recommended above, into CA independence in practice from government and 
industry should generate greater understanding of the relative prevalence or risk of 
government influence or industry capture. Appropriate funding structures could be 
designed or adjusted in response to the identified risks. 
While pressures on government budgets are acknowledged, given the need for expertise 
both to ensure the quality of evaluation and decision-making and to counter information 
asymmetry, Member States may wish to consider the following options. Firstly, review and, 
if appropriate reduction of, the application of constraints on civil service remuneration in 
order to promote recruitment and retention of the necessary expert staff. Secondly, the 
development or enhancement of in-house training programmes in order to cultivate 
sources of expertise other than from within industry, as a further means to counter 
asymmetric information and industry influence or capture. 
 
2. Transparency 
As stated in section V.I, the questions on transparency sought to assess three dimensions of 
this concept. Firstly, clarity with respect to the authorisation rules, procedures and 
requirements, in other words, the ‘rules of the game’; secondly, access to, and publication of, 
information; and thirdly the strength of any consultation processes conducted during 
evaluation and authorisation procedures. 
2.1 Rules of the game 
One question sought directly to assess clarity as to the rules of the game and asked Member 
States ‘[h]ow much information regarding the zonal authorisation procedure is publicly 
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available (for example on the competent authority website) in the national language(s)?’ It 
specified that this information includes ‘guidance addressed to applicants on how to apply, 
the required documents, information about the authorisation procedure and how decisions are 
made’. Although the question referred to information ‘addressed to applicants’, it is important 
that all potential interested parties (e.g. NGOs, farmers, concerned individuals, researchers 
etc.) should be able to understand how authorisation decision-making works. As discussed in 
section III.3, this is important for building confidence and understanding amongst both 
applicant and other interested parties in the regulator (OECD, 2013, p.52). Eight Member States 
report that ‘comprehensive information is available’. Of these, the Netherlands notes that 
‘manuals on risk assessment and registration procedure are made available to applicants and 
other stakeholders’ on the website, indicating a very high level of transparency in this respect. 
Sweden comments that in ‘certain cases clarifications might be needed from the authority’. 
One Southern zone Member State reports that applicants still like confirmation from the CA, 
‘especially due to ever changing EU guidance’. Three report that ‘most information is available 
but contact with the competent authority is necessary to gain full information’. One (Southern 
zone) Member State reports no information is publicly available.  
The Stakeholder reports finding it ‘very difficult’ to access information on zonal authorisation 
procedures from CAs of zRMSs (e.g. application and information requirements, information 
on how the application is evaluated etc.). It comments that some CA websites contain ‘very 
comprehensive information on application and data requirements’ naming the UK, 
Netherlands, Germany and Belgium as examples; all Central zone Member States. It also 
comments that ‘[m]ost Member States provide information upon request, but it is not always 
clear what is expected of an applicant’ indicating too that there is a great deal of variation 
between Member States in this regard. The Central zone does publish information about its 
meetings and other information, for example regarding evaluation, on publicly accessible 
pages on CIRCABC.239 
2.2 Publication and access to information 
The next three questions concerned access to, and publication of, information, specifically. As 
discussed in section III.3, Commission guidance supports publication of RRs (Commission, 
2014b, p.14). Q44 asked whether the CA publishes its decisions regarding authorisation of 
PPPs. Seven Member States report that they publish all decisions. France has also committed 
to making its authorisation decisions publicly available (ANSES, 2015, p.4). Three (all Central 
zone) report they publish most. Two report they publish some decisions. Of the latter two 
categories, four Member States comment that they do not publish decisions not to authorise. 
In light of these answers, it is possible that Member States which report publishing all decisions 
took the question to refer only to decisions to authorise, rather than reject, applications. The 
reliability of some of these answers may therefore be open to doubt. Only the Netherlands 
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elaborates on the reasoning behind not publishing rejections, indicating that this is considered 
‘commercially confidential information’. However, it does note that the Ctgb’s annual report 
presents statistics including rejections and amendments. One Southern zone Member State 
reports that a new IT platform is being developed and it expects to provide ‘more detailed 
information about PPP decisions’. 
Q45 asked about the extent to which the CA discloses/publishes the information sources on 
which its decisions are based. As discussed in section III.1, publication of the knowledge on 
which decisions are based is important for enabling democratic control of regulatory decision-
making (Jasanoff, 2006, p.21), increasing accountability and reducing corruption and the risks 
of regulatory capture (Schauer, 2011, pp.1348–1349). Two (both Central zone) Member States 
report they publish all information sources. Of these, Germany appears to understand this as 
meaning the RR, whereas the question was also getting at the data used in the evaluation, for 
example studies submitted with the application. One (Central zone) reports it publishes most. 
Three report publishing some of the information sources. Of these, the Netherlands comments 
that it publishes the guidance it uses on the Ctgb website and publishes the assessment report 
presented to the Ctgb Board in its database. Finally, ‘[u]pon request, the Ctgb discloses all other 
information available in the application dossier within the legal limits’ of the Regulation. Four 
report publishing none. Of these, two indicate that sources are still accessible on the basis of 
national legislation establishing rights of access to information. One did not answer the 
question.  
Reasons for decisions on authorisation are contained in RRs240 and made available to 
applicants and other Member States via CIRCABC.241 However, in terms of access, the zSC 
secretariats report that no Member States publish their RRs, apart from Germany and the 
Netherlands, in the Central zone. In addition, as discussed in section VI.2.5, in France, ANSES 
publishes on its website the conclusions of its evaluation and part of the RR for the purposes 
of transparency. The NZSC and CZSC secretariats highlight the potential to access RRs on 
request and the CZSC secretariat comments that PPPAMS could be used to provide 
information on authorisations to the public. The Stakeholder also notes that RRs are often 
drafted solely in the national language reducing both their accessibility to ‘non-national 
applicants’ and suitability for zonal use. However, the SZSC secretariat reports that discussion 
over publication of final RRs had started amongst all Member States. It should be remembered, 
that two Member States (UK and Czech Republic) employ reason-giving or a similar 
mechanism in order to inform applicants about the grounds for their decisions, and Germany 
provides applicants with a meeting if a refusal looks likely, as set out in section VI.2.7. The 
CZSC secretariat reports that Member States, when acting as cMSs, provide reasons for their 
decisions to the applicant and inform the other Member States of their decision via CIRCABC. 
Only two Central zone Member States make these decisions public. The NZSC secretariat also 
                                                          
240 See Article 39(1) PPPR. 
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reports that all Northern zone Member States, when acting as cMSs, provide reasons to the 
applicant for their decision. 
The Stakeholder notes that publication of RRs would improve the zonal system’s functioning, 
particularly for secondary applicants (manufacturers of generic PPPs) who may not have 
access to the original RR. It reports significant variations between Member States in terms of 
providing access to information on PPP authorisations: some RRs are online; some CAs 
provide information on request and others refuse to do so. The Stakeholder indicates a belief 
that this hinders the use of previous decisions by applicants to ‘facilitate and harmonise their 
applications’ and that significant improvements in the transparency of evaluation and 
decision-making are possible and could enhance competition. 
Q46 asked more generally whether there is a ‘clear basis in law or policy for public access to 
information held by the competent authority, including a clear statement of the limitations to 
that access (for example, due to commercial confidentiality)’. Only two respond ‘no’, while ten 
Member States respond ‘yes’. Each of the ten refers to national legislation on public access to 
information and three to the Regulation. In addition, the Netherlands refers to its national 
tribunal decision following an Article 267 TFEU referral to the CJEU242 which ruled that public 
access to part of the information held by the Ctgb ‘is regulated by an exclusive system of public 
access comprised of Article 63 [Regulation (EC) No] 1107/2009 and Directive 2003/4’.243 It was 
the only Member State to refer to the CJEU decision.244  
2.3 Public participation and access to information 
The next six questions (47-52) concerned consultation and the accessibility of information 
deriving from consultation. Q47 asked whom, in addition to the applicant, the CA consults 
during authorisation decision-making (including comparative assessment). Altogether, five 
Member States report conducting any consultation of actors outside the CA.245 Four Member 
States selected ‘other actors involved in plant protection’. One selected ‘farmers and other 
users’. Three selected ‘other government departments’. Six consulted no one. Of these, the 
Netherlands notes an exception for ‘[d]ecisions concern[ing] the first authorisation of a 
product based on [an] approved active substance not earlier used in the Netherlands’. Sweden 
notes an exception in ‘cases of principle nature, for example if a new type of condition for use 
is introduced’. Neither specifies whom it consults. No Member States consult wider industry, 
NGOs/CSOs or the general public. It was assumed in this question that all CAs would 
communicate with applicants. However, the Stakeholder comments that only sometimes is 
there good communication between applicant and zRMS; other Member States are ‘very 
inaccessible, especially during the evaluation, which makes it unnecessarily difficult to solve 
upcoming problems’. It also makes the more general comment that zonal evaluation 
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244 Discussed in section III.2. 
245 One Member State referred to consultation with other CAs in the same zone. This is assumed and so 
not included here. 
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procedures ‘range from reasonably transparent to not transparent at all, depending on the 
Zonal RMS responsible for the evaluation’. 
One (Central zone) Member State reports that it only consults other actors involved in plant 
protection, farmers and other users and other government departments when ‘sufficient 
information on the product and alternatives in practice incl. all advantages and disadvantages 
of both is not available to the agency’. Sweden reports that consultation procedures are set up 
on a case-by-case basis, usually written. The Netherlands comments that consultations on 
decisions last four weeks and submissions during the consultation must be addressed in the 
final decision. No Member States report publishing any consultation submissions apart from 
the Netherlands, which states ‘[w]hen applicable, in the final decision a summary of the 
reaction of each stakeholder is given’ and Sweden, which reports publication of some 
decisions, decided on a case-by-case basis. Two refer to the availability of submissions on 
request. There is information to suggest that the French CA, ANSES, generally attempts to 
improve the openness and transparency of its expert assessments by opening them up to 
society. It expects, thereby to improve the reliability and quality of decisions and 
understanding of decisions by all stakeholders.246 It is not stated, however, whether this is 
being implemented with respect to PPP evaluations and authorisations. 
The Stakeholder reports ‘regular contact with CAs’ at both national and zonal levels on matters 
other than with respect to a specific application/comparative assessment. These matters 
included largely procedural and scientific issues, such as ‘dossier formatting, workflow, 
procedures, and developments in the interpretation and implementation of provisions of the 
PPPR’ or other dossier requirements and interpretation of application requirements. It also 
reports participation in annual open zSC meetings in the Central and Southern zones in which 
similar matters are discussed. 
Of the five Member States which conducted consultations, only three report they were 
required by law to formally respond to submissions. Two of these report that responses are 
incorporated in the final decision/registration report and so are publicly available. Three 
report the CA is required by law to take submissions into account in its decision-making and 
two report that, though not legally required, in practice it does. In addition, the Netherlands 
reports that it is also required to do so for any consultation it conducts. The Stakeholder reports 
a belief that most Member States ‘listen to and take into consideration’ their comments. 
It was clear from the zSC survey that increased participation in zonal evaluation and 
comparative assessment would not be welcomed by the Member States. Different reasons were 
provided. Firstly, zSC secretariats highlight the scientific nature of the evaluation exercise, the 
lack of scientific expertise amongst the wider public and risks of non-scientific opinions 
becoming involved, pressure from NGOs and the triggering of social alarm. Secondly, the 
SZSC secretariat predicts that commercial competitors could pose as members of the public in 
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2018. 
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order to ‘foil applications’. Thirdly, the SZSC secretariat warns the Uniform Principles could 
be displaced by public opinion as the basis for authorisation. Fourthly, the CZSC secretariat 
questions the wisdom of making the application publicly available during the application 
procedure, although it does not provide a reason for this other than data protection. Finally, 
according to the SZSC secretariat, any gains in transparency and the ability to ‘say that all 
concerns raised were addressed’ would be outweighed by the drawbacks. With respect, 
specifically, to comparative assessment, the SZSC secretariat feels that wider consultation 
would only ‘trigger discussions on the effectiveness of alternative methods and whether these 
are enough, without any efficacy trials (following [EPPO] standards) to back those claims’. The 
CZSC secretariat feels wider participation was more appropriate during development of the 
legislation and guidance documents and indeed, the NZSC secretariat reports consulting 
stakeholders ‘on general issue such as [guidance documents] etc.’. 
Many of these concerns are legitimate and zSC secretariat scepticism of participation is 
unsurprising given the additional burden it would impose on CA resources. However, one or 
two observations may be made. Different types of relevant expertise exist (Wynne, 1992a), and 
are distributed across society (Steele, 2001). Integration of some of these may benefit the 
evaluation and decision-making process. Secondly, risk assessment, including comparative 
assessment, is inherently value-based (Wynne, 1992c, p.116; Royal Society, 1992).247 
Furthermore, given the under-developed nature of comparative assessment, careful input of 
wider expertise may facilitate its development. Finally, concerns regarding displacement of 
the Uniform Principles and the onerousness more generally of consultation procedures could 
be met, to some extent, by the design of the procedure. Wider participation need not mean 
throwing open every decision to the entire world. Different mechanisms exist which enable 
participation by more limited groups comprising stakeholders and representatives of wider 
societal interests, for example, PIGs (discussed in sections II.2 and VII.2.5), consensus 
conferences (Einsiedel, Jelsøe and Breck, 2001) or citizen juries (Smith and Wales, 2000; see also 
Fiorino, 1990) and which may be adapted to the procedures established by the Regulation. 
These may represent a step towards enhancing transparency, especially if publicly reported 
on. Criteria could be developed to select suitable decisions for wider involvement. It could, 
further, be provided that inputs thus gathered should be taken into account, rather than 
regarded as determinative, in order to preserve CA discretion. 
The Stakeholder reports opportunities for consultation with most Member States with respect 
to comparative assessment. However, as no other stakeholders responded to the survey, it is 
impossible to gauge the level of involvement of other actors. In addition, the Stakeholder notes 
that experience with comparative assessment is still limited but the indications are that 
Member States balance the information provided by applicants against that from other sources. 
2.4 Accountability 
The final five questions concerned the accountability of the CA to the government and 
legislature and the scrutiny of decisions. As discussed in sections II and III, accountability is 
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linked to both independence and transparency. Two questions asked what the formal 
obligations of accountability of the CA vis-à-vis the government and legislature were, 
respectively, in terms of producing annual reports. Annual reports, due to their high visibility, 
can be an important mechanism for improving the transparency and accountability of 
regulators. They can set out the regulator’s operations and progress against its objectives 
allowing oversight institutions to hold them accountable (OECD, 2016, pp.29, 44). Three report 
no such obligations vis-à-vis the legislature. The Netherlands reports an obligation to present 
‘an annual report for information only’ to both government and the legislature but that once 
every five years the responsible minister audits the CA’s business performance and adherence 
to legal standards. Two report an obligation to present ‘an annual report for approval’ to the 
government. Germany commented that the BVL, as an independent higher federal authority 
under the jurisdiction of the Federal Ministry of Health, reports to the Ministry, though it is 
independent regarding PPP authorisation decisions. However, overall obligations of 
accountability are strong: ten CAs report being fully accountable to either the government, the 
legislature or both. Belgium adds that the CA is ‘accountable to the responsible minister via 
an administrative contract’. Finally, five Member States report being required to make any 
annual report produced public.  
The last two questions concerned scrutiny of decisions. Review and scrutiny of decisions, 
internally, externally or both, may aid reliable decision-making. One Member State reports that 
all authorisation decisions are audited or reviewed. Seven report that a sample is 
reviewed/audited. Four refer to an internal audit, often according to an annual plan of audits, 
one noting that this was not regular. One (Central zone) Member State describes an extensive 
system of internal peer review of all the work of trainee staff, samples of evaluations, 
contentious decisions, all refused authorisations alongside an equal number of authorisations 
and all authorisation documentation before release. This same Member State and two others 
also report external reviews of decisions, one involving peer review of a ‘random sample of 
applications’ by an expert committee and, in the Netherlands, an audit of authorisation 
decisions by a commission of experts every five years. The two providing most detail suggest 
the review/audit emphasises scientific quality. Four Member States report no system of 
audit/review. The majority, however, report systems for scrutiny of decisions, although these 
vary in nature and frequency. 
Finally, an appeals mechanism may enhance accountability. Article 36(3) fourth paragraph 
PPPR requires Member States to provide the ability to challenge a decision refusing 
authorisation ‘before national courts or other instances of appeal’. Q57 asked who, other than 
a court, can overturn the CA’s decision where it had exclusive competence. Eight selected 
‘nobody’. Two (both Central zone) Member States selected the ‘government, with 
qualifications. Of these, the Netherlands indicates that this would be possible only where the 
Ctgb is guilty of ‘serious task neglect’. One (Southern zone) Member State selected the 
‘government, unconditionally’. Belgium reports that the responsible minister could do so. One 
Member State reports an appeal period of 15 days following issuance of the decision on the 
application but it is unclear as to whom the appeal would be. 
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2.5 Summary and recommendations 
Regarding clarity with respect to the rules of the game – the requirements and operation of the 
evaluation and decision-making procedures – it appears that while some Member States 
provide comprehensive and clear information, many do not. The lack of clarity in this regard 
may cause confusion among applicants and may undermine understanding of the overall 
authorisation procedure amongst wider interested parties important for transparency 
generally. 
Recommendation 
Member States are encouraged to review the amount of information available online 
about their evaluation and authorisation procedures from the perspective both of 
applicants and other stakeholders/general publics. It may also be helpful to review other 
CA websites with high levels of information as examples of good practice. The UK CA 
website, for example, contains substantial information. In order to enhance transparency 
with respect to these procedures, Member States are encouraged to provide clear and 
comprehensive information at least in their native language and ideally, eventually, in 
English. 
 
With respect to access to information, different CAs operate at different levels of transparency. 
Transparency levels with respect to publication of authorisation decisions are higher overall, 
but lower with respect to the publication of the information sources on which decisions are 
based. Very few publish RRs, which should contain reasons for authorisation decisions. On the 
whole, even if most CAs do not publish comprehensive information of their own accord, in 
most respondent Member States, there exist avenues by which to access it. That said, as Bayer 
and experience of EU level litigation over access to documents suggest (Lee, 2014a, pp.198–
199), even with rights established in legislation, access in practice may not be easy or 
straightforward. Transparency, of itself, does not guarantee the reliability of decisions. 
However, the absence of access to information deprives interested parties of the ability to make 
that judgment. Furthermore, as discussed in section III.2, transparency requires more than 
publication alone; the information itself must be clear and intelligible (at least). Concerns raised 
about the quality of some RRs248 suggest that their publication may foster only limited 
improvements in transparency. 
Recommendations 
Member States are encouraged to increase the publication, ideally online, of information 
on PPPs within the limits of the law, especially the following: 
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 Authorisation decisions 
 Registration reports 
 The information sources on which evaluation and authorisation are based. Ideally, 
this should include the conclusions of the zRMS’s evaluation 
 Any submissions (and responses thereto, if relevant) made during any consultation 
process 
To this end, Member States are encouraged to step up discussions amongst themselves 
regarding the publication of registration reports and other information. These discussions 
may need to happen alongside the development of measures, for example guidelines or 
training, designed to improve the quality of registration reports in order to support this 
measure to enhance transparency. 
It is acknowledged that CA resources are limited. However, where possible, publication of 
the above information in English249 is encouraged for its potential to enhance access to 
information for a larger audience and to improve the quality of future applications. 
Increased public availability of such information would facilitate conduct of the research 
recommended in section VII.1.5. 
Stronger measures to improve access to information may be desirable. The Commission is 
therefore encouraged to consider the possibility of amending the Regulation to introduce 
a requirement that registration reports (at least) are made publicly available. 
 
The limited consultation activities are unsurprising given the absence of an obligation in the 
Regulation on Member States to consult stakeholders (including general publics) during zonal 
evaluation.250 The Stakeholder comments that consultation with third parties/general publics 
during evaluation would be ‘unworkable’ due to the complexity of zonal evaluations, for 
example having to consult across all other countries in the zone and the inevitable language 
barriers. It also comments that any such consultation ‘would completely paralyse the 
evaluation system’. 
Nonetheless, as discussed in section III.3, public participation can enhance the transparency of 
evaluation and decision-making procedures, for example by improving understanding of their 
operation. The absence of a space for such participation may therefore reduce levels of 
transparency in CAs. More generally, from the point of view of transparency to citizens, a 
general deficiency of the zonal evaluation system is how far removed it is from citizens. There 
is no provision for wider participation in the evaluation procedure, despite the contribution it 
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250 NB. Article 12(1) PPPR requires EFSA to make draft assessment reports on active substances 
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could make, discussed in section III.3. But even if there were, in practice it would be extremely 
difficult for citizens of one Member State to contribute to a risk assessment performed in a 
different Member State, particularly perhaps where different languages are spoken in the 
relevant Member States. It should also be noted that given the limited information about the 
zonal system available online, it is likely that very few are even aware of its existence. 
In addition, there is no provision for consultation during national authorisation decision-
making. But again, even if there were, by the time a cMS comes to take the national 
authorisation decision, it is too late for citizens or CSOs to scrutinise or influence the evaluation 
or contribute much to the information on which the decision will be based. More importantly 
for this report, in terms of transparency, the information (i.e. the zRMS conclusions) on which 
national authorisation decisions will be based will have been generated through a process 
which is largely closed to and distant from most citizens. As discussed in section III.3, 
democratic control of decision-making based on scientific knowledge requires some 
opportunity for citizens themselves to evaluate the knowledge used as justification for the 
decision (Jasanoff, 2006, p.21). It was noted further, in section III.1, that potential to enhance 
the quality of decisions has been attributed to wider participation in both policy formation and 
regulatory decision-making (Steele, 2001; Ferretti, 2007). This potential is therefore lost in the 
absence of participatory opportunities. Again, there is a trade-off: consultation takes time and 
its implementation could therefore undermine the already compromised efficiency of CA 
decision-making procedures. As it is, however, the absence of an opportunity for consultation 
may reduce transparency to citizens and other stakeholders. It may therefore be worth re-
visiting the balance struck between efficiency and transparency by the Regulation.  
PIGs were discussed in sections II.2 and VII.1 for their potential to guard against regulatory 
capture. However, they may also function as a mechanism for enhancing transparency through 
involvement and representation of the relevant interest(s) in regulatory processes (Lodge and 
Stirton, 2001) and may additionally contribute valuable expertise. Such involvement of 
national PIGs could improve the transparency of cMS decision-making. Furthermore, 
formalised involvement of transnational PIG(s) in zonal evaluation processes could represent 
a means by which to open up such processes while avoiding the messiness and difficulty, 
discussed above, of wider public participation. Space prevents a fuller discussion of these 
potential benefits and PIG involvement may face obstacles with respect to preserving the 
confidentiality of applicants’ data (discussed in section III.2), but the question is worthy of 
further investigation. 
In terms of transparency to applicants, the position is different. The availability of pre-
submission meetings and the communication which occurs between CAs and applicants, 
described in section VI.2, suggests greater involvement and therefore transparency, although, 
as the Stakeholder noted, this may not occur with every CA. Greater transparency to wider 
industry is also suggested by the ‘regular contact’ with CAs at national and zonal level outside 
specific applications reported by the Stakeholder (above). All such contact between industry 
and CAs is clearly valued for improving the operation of the zonal system and contributing to 
its efficiency. However, such collaboration may reduce the relational distance between 
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regulator and industry, potentially increasing the risk of cultural capture and thereby 
compromising CA independence, as discussed in section II.2. There may therefore be a tension 
between transparency to, and independence from, industry, as well as between efficiency and 
independence from industry.  
Measures for reducing the risk of capture were also discussed in section II.2 and included 
increased transparency generally through publication of information and greater involvement 
of interested parties for example through public participation (Gönenç, Maher and Nicoletti, 
2000, p.44; Majone, 1996, p.26; Mitnick, 1980, p.66). However, as the above results and analysis 
suggest, publication of information by CAs is patchy and there are limited opportunities for 
wider participation in evaluation and decision-making. It seems unlikely then, that CAs are 
taking advantage of the potential of such measures to counter risks of capture. In light of these 
findings, it may be hard for zRMSs to achieve a fully ‘transparent assessment’ of applications 
for authorisation, pursuant to Article 36(1) PPPR. To the extent that, as discussed in section I, 
confidence in the reliability of decisions is gained through a belief that regulators take all views 
into account, the absence of a means by which views may be expressed may undermine trust 
in the CAs and in the reliability of their decisions, at least amongst those more likely to be 
excluded. That said, the Stakeholder itself comments that the reliability of the zonal 
authorisation system is hard to assess, noting disagreement between applicants and zRMSs 
over evaluations, lack of transparency and opportunities for applicants to comment and 
comments being ‘insufficiently taken into consideration’.  
Recommendations 
Although there is no legislative requirement, Member States are encouraged to consider 
ways to open up their national authorisation decision-making procedures to wider 
participation. Member States could experiment, for example, with providing opportunities 
to comment on dRRs during the commenting phase of zonal evaluation (described in 
section VI) and/or on draft authorisation decisions. Further upstream, wider participation 
in the definition of national data requirements could improve the transparency of CA 
decision-making. If opening up such elements of decision-making to stakeholders and the 
wider public generally is regarded as time-consuming and unmanageable, participation by 
a limited number of select PIGs could still improve transparency as well as contributing 
valuable expertise. 
Again, although there is no legislative requirement to ensure participation during zonal 
evaluation procedures, zonal steering committees are encouraged to consider ways to 
enhance the openness of these procedures. While it may be difficult to reach citizens across 
the entire zone, a starting point may be to identify PIGs or individuals (for example, users, 
CSOs, university experts) within the zone who can contribute different knowledge and 
perspectives to the drafting of, for example, zonal guidance documents. Given that the 
zonal system is still in its early stages, opening up evaluation and decision-making 
procedures themselves should be considered in the longer-term and may need to be 
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implemented gradually and sensitively in order not to over-burden CAs. For example, a 
willing and capable zRMS could pilot a programme whereby a PIG participates in the 
evaluation of an application, following which the zRMS shares its experience with other 
Member States. 
Stronger measures for improving transparency of the zonal authorisation procedure would 
come from the EU institutions themselves. Commission support for Member States wishing 
to open up their decision-making procedures could include administrative support and 
expertise, for example in identifying appropriate PIGs or other actors and designing 
appropriate participatory procedures and online platforms (such as CIRCABC) to facilitate 
wider participation and sharing of results and experiences between Member States. 
Longer-term, the Commission is encouraged to draw up guidelines (or similar, non-
legislative instruments) for increasing the openness of zonal evaluation and authorisation 
procedures with particular regard to providing opportunities for wider participation.  
The strongest measure for improving transparency through participation would be a 
legislative requirement. Again, in the longer-term, the European Parliament, Council and 
Commission are encouraged to review the provisions of the Regulation in light of the 
findings of this report and overall EU policy commitments to public consultation and 
participation (discussed in section III.3) and to consider the possibility of introducing a 
specific provision governing participation during the zonal evaluation and national 
decision-making procedures, including comparative assessment.251  
Given the complex structure of the zonal system and limited resources of CAs, further 
research is recommended to identify and elaborate potential and feasible participatory 
mechanisms, including PIGs, consensus conferences, citizen juries etc. appropriate to the 
zonal system and capacity of CAs. 
 
The picture which emerges in most respondents is that of different strengths of accountability 
existing simultaneously. While most CAs are fully accountable to a political authority, which 
may compromise independence, in few can authorisation decisions be overturned by 
government or other body, apart from a court. In this respect, independence is protected. The 
extensive system of review described by two Member States could be considered examples of 
good practice. Due to the nature of the data available, it is not possible to determine how 
widespread such systems are throughout the non-respondent Member States, but the adoption 
of such practices could enhance the quality and perhaps reliability of decisions. To the extent 
that accountability is supported by transparency, it suffers here due to the low levels of 
transparency, discussed in the rest of this section. 
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Recommendation 
Member States who do not already do so are encouraged to produce annual reports as a 
step towards enhancing the transparency of their operations and thereby also their 
accountability. Such reports would need to contain information about the CA’s operations 
and progress against its objectives of a sufficient quality and intelligibility to enable proper 
scrutiny by the relevant oversight institutions and the public. 
Member States are also encouraged to establish internal and/or external procedures for 
scrutinising their decisions, for example annual audits of a sample of decisions, where these 
are not already in operation. There are already examples of good practice and Member 
States are encouraged to use already established zonal networks to share such practices. 
 
3. Precaution 
3.1 Discussion 
Member States were asked two questions on the precautionary principle. Firstly, they were 
asked to ‘indicate the standard of proof the evidence must meet in order for the PPP to be 
authorised’ ‘taking into account all the evidence of the safety of the PPP and the restrictions 
that may be placed on its use’. The question and available answers were designed in light of 
the Court’s decision in Sweden v Commission (Paraquat),252 discussed in section IV.1. The 
following answers were available:  
‘a) The evidence must provide certainty that the PPP will meet the requirements in 
Articles 29(1)(e) and 4(3)(b)-(e);  
b) The evidence must show beyond a reasonable doubt that the PPP will meet the 
requirements in Articles 29(1)(e) and 4(3)(b)-(e);  
c) The evidence must show, on the balance of probabilities, that the PPP will meet the 
requirements in Articles 29(1)(e) and 4(3)(b)-(e); and  
d) Other.’  
Six selected a) and five selected b), each representing a mix of Member States from all three 
zones, with Germany declining to select an answer. 
It is interesting that so many indicated that they require certainty as to the safety of a PPP in 
order to authorise it. Scientific certainty is impossible to achieve, no less so here, given 
persistent conditions of ignorance surrounding the potential harm arising from interactions 
between pesticides and the environment (Pretty, 2005). As such, as discussed in section IV.1, 
regulation may not seek zero risk, again on the basis that this is impossible to prove. However, 
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the responses perhaps indicate six Member States pursuing a very high level of safety, beyond 
that endorsed by EU law in this area, through the application of a strong interpretation of the 
precautionary principle which pursues certainty of safety. As discussed in section IV.1, 
Member States are arguably entitled to seek certainty of safety in terms of reducing known (as 
opposed to hypothetical) risks to zero253 (Lee, 2008, p.46) but may not pursue certainty of safety 
overall, as this is impossible to achieve, as indeed, one Member State noted in a comment. The 
meaning of ‘certainty’ may be open to different interpretations, including among the 
respondent Member States. It is also not possible to detect, on the basis of the available data, 
how the reported requirement for ‘certainty’ might be reflected in national authorisation 
decisions. A more in-depth and detailed study of the divergences between Member State 
application of the precautionary principle in practice was beyond the scope of the present 
research. 
Sweden, in particular, demonstrates a nuanced understanding of the question of scientific 
uncertainty noting the need for political judgment. It comments that: 
‘In practice, the risk assessment methodology is based on statistical probabilities. 
The inherent uncertainties are not propagated in the step-wise procedure and 
therefore not expressed numerically in the final calculated risk ratio used for 
decision-making. Moreover, there are further uncertainties in [sic] that are not 
accounted for in the calculations. The interpretation of standard of proof is 
therefore ultimately a policy level issue, rather than a scientific.’ 
In comments, three Member States note that they rely on the Uniform Principles here, one of 
whom selected answer a) and one (Sweden) answer b).254 One (Central zone) Member State 
indicates that it uses the standard, established in Sweden v Commission (Paraquat), for 
‘compliance with the requirements for approval of an active substance [which] must be shown 
beyond a reasonable doubt’,255 as it considers this ‘an appropriate reference point for PPP 
authorisation’. The fact, though, that six Member States indicate their standard of proof is 
‘beyond a reasonable doubt’ perhaps indicates wider adherence to this decision, which, as 
discussed in section VI.1, may be in doubt. Again, however, the data do not allow conclusions 
to be drawn about how the requirement for ‘beyond a reasonable doubt’ may actually be 
reflected in national authorisation decisions. 
The second question asked whether Member States produce and follow any internal guidance 
in applying the precautionary principle. Three Member States indicate that they apply the 
precautionary principle on a case-by-case basis. The other nine indicate they employ external 
guidance, with two specifying the Uniform Principles, three EFSA guidance, five Commission 
guidance and two Northern zone guidance. In the Central zone, the CZSC secretariat provides 
support to Member States by acting as a contact point for questions or forum for discussion 
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and by distributing agreements and conclusions. The NZSC secretariat reports that it provides 
no specific guidance on the precautionary principle. 
Although the Stakeholder does not believe that the precautionary principle is applied 
consistently across Member States, it reports that ‘most competent authorities’ apply it 
correctly in the sense that ‘most apply the Uniform Principles, and therefore comply with the 
requirements of the PPPR’. It does believe, however, referring to politically contentious 
decisions, that some Member States reject applications in cases of ‘clear and unequivocal’ 
compliance with the Uniform Principles, inappropriately using the precautionary principle as 
a justification. 
3.2 Summary and recommendations 
There may be some inconsistent interpretation and application of the precautionary principle. 
Member States appear to interpret and apply the precautionary principle with differing levels 
of ambition, perhaps suggesting at least two different standards of proof in operation in the 
EU for the grant of a PPP authorisation. This is perhaps not surprising given that the law 
relating to the interpretation and application of the precautionary principle is not entirely 
clear.256 While the Uniform Principles exist to ensure that evaluation and authorisation 
decisions implement the requirements of the Regulation, by ‘all the Member States at a high 
level of protection of human and animal health and the environment’,257 the fact that two 
different Member States appear to derive different standards of proof from them may indicate 
still the potential for inconsistent interpretation and application here. Six Member States report 
they apply the standard of proof indicated by the Court in Sweden v Commission (Paraquat) in 
the context of active substance approval. However, given the uncertainty of the law in this 
area, it may not be entirely clear what the correct approach should be in the context of PPP 
authorisations. Finally, Member States appear to refer to multiple different sources of guidance 
which may further indicate a diversity of approaches. 
Recommendations 
The above analysis suggests inconsistent application of the precautionary principle within 
the EU in the context of PPP evaluation and authorisation. However, to understand truly 
the divergences between Member State application of the precautionary principle in 
practice, a systematic, qualitative and comparative review of authorisation decisions would 
be required. Such research would provide a stronger evidence base on which to pursue 
efforts to harmonise interpretation and application of the precautionary principle, 
including the following two recommendations. 
Member States are encouraged to collaborate at zonal and inter-zonal level to decide upon 
a harmonised interpretation and method of application of the precautionary principle in 
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the context of PPP evaluation and authorisation. In the interests of enhancing co-
ordination and efficiency within the zones, as well as transparency, Member States should 
set these out in guidance and publish that guidance. 
Perhaps more importantly, given that EU law relating to the precautionary principle may 
be unclear and therefore causing inconsistent application, the Commission is encouraged 
to develop (and publish) guidance to clarify, perhaps on the basis of such research as 
suggested above, how the precautionary principle should be interpreted and applied in the 
context of PPP evaluations and authorisations.  
Both Member States and the Commission are encouraged, in drawing up such guidance, 
to consult with wider stakeholders and/or relevant PIGs with the aim of enhancing both 
the transparency and quality of the guidance. 
 
4. Sustainability 
4.1 Discussion 
Member States were asked five questions on sustainability. One Member State appears to have 
misinterpreted these questions as relating to the substitution principle. These answers are 
therefore excluded as unreliable and the responses of the remaining 11 are presented.  
Firstly, Member States were asked whether they take the principle of sustainability into 
account in their decision-making regarding the authorisation of PPPs (Q11). Seven Member 
States indicate that they do so ‘with every application’ and one indicates that it does so ‘with 
most applications’. Sweden selected ‘never’. It comments, in response to Q12 which asks about 
the basis on which Member States decide whether or not to take this principle into account, 
that ‘[t]he concept “Principle of sustainability” cannot be found in the Regulation’. I agree, as 
discussed in section IV.2.258 One Member State comments that it is taken into account on the 
basis of internal expert discussions. The Netherlands comments that the ability to take 
sustainability into account is limited, noting that the Regulation ‘does not provide the 
possibility to take into account socio-economic effects and to weight [sic] the environmental 
risks and benefits of the measures and plant protection products used in a crop system’. It 
notes further that it is running pilots to develop integrated pest management (IPM) systems, 
including ‘[a]uthorisation of applications fitting in an IPM system and the development of the 
needed risk assessment methodology’. The aim is to create a ‘framework to stimulate a 
sustainable agricultural practice’. Results will be shared with the Commission, EFSA and other 
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Member States. Two Member States did not answer Q11, including Germany which notes, in 
comments, that it applies the Uniform Principles and Commission guidance.  
ZSC secretariats were also asked whether Member States in their zones take sustainability into 
account during evaluation. The NZSC secretariat reports that it is not aware of any Member 
States who do. All three referred to the SUD as the regime relevant to sustainability and 
pesticides. Two zSC secretariats comment that sustainable use of pesticides was outside the 
scope of the zonal system or beyond its remit to provide any guidance on sustainability. The 
CZSC secretariat feels that sustainability is taken into account in the assessment of efficacy 
‘when reflecting the resistance situation in a certain [good agricultural practice]’, following the 
Uniform Principles. The SZSC secretariat feels that ‘sustainable use’ imposes no limits on 
authorisations. The responses reflect the nebulous nature of sustainability259 and therefore the 
difficulty of assessing the extent to which Member State have regard to it during evaluation. 
Indeed, the SZSC secretariat queries what is meant by ‘sustainability’ and states that it is a 
national issue. 
Neither Q11 nor Q12 were designed to gather an understanding, specifically, of the interaction 
of the Sustainable Use Directive with national zonal authorisation procedures. However, either 
in comments to Q11 or in response to Q12, three Member States refer to their National Action 
Plans (NAP)260 and/or the EU’s SUD itself. The Netherlands expresses its opinion regarding 
the difficulties of implementing sustainability within the framework of the Regulation, noting 
that ‘[o]nly the resilience of the agricultural system is guaranteed by the assessment of non-
target arthropods and plant and risk mitigation measures as is laid down in the uniform 
principles and the guidance documents’, ‘[t]he methodology to account for sustainability in 
the assessment is largely missing…’. In the context of an interpretation of sustainability as risk 
reduction, Belgium highlights the potential to review authorisations261 and its monitoring 
programme of active substances in water and its power to modify or withdraw applications 
on the basis of the results. The comments of zSC secretariats discussed above imply that the 
SUD and PPPR are regarded as operating separately. 
Despite the lack of provision for considering NAPs during authorisation decision-making, 
Recital 29 PPPR provides that Member States may impose ‘appropriate conditions’ on the use 
of PPPs having regard to the objectives of their NAPs. Q15 asks Member States how often they 
do this in order to gain an impression of the potential influence of the primary national 
instrument for achieving the sustainable use of pesticides in authorisation decision-making. 
While one Member State selected ‘never’, two selected ‘in some authorisations’ and five 
selected ‘in every authorisation’. There were no zone-specific trends. Sweden notes, in 
practice, this occurs in few cases. The Netherlands refers to the influence of, inter alia, its NAP 
on agricultural practice, which is taken into account in risk assessments of PPPs, demonstrating 
a means by which efforts to achieve sustainable use of pesticides surface during PPP 
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authorisation decision-making. Germany comments that in all authorisations it ‘imposes 
labelling requirements and use restrictions according to the specific circumstances in 
Germany’, although it does not refer directly to the objectives of its NAP. One Southern zone 
Member State reports that it does not impose such conditions as they are seen as causing a 
‘lack of harmonisation between authorisation procedures in the different MSs’. 
Q13 asked Member States to indicate their interpretation of sustainability. The available 
answers were as follows, with answers a), b) and c) constituting interpretations of 
sustainability which could be found in the 2009 regulatory regime as a whole: a) reducing the 
risks of using PPPs; b) optimising the use of PPPs, i.e. increasing efficiency of use to maintain 
or improve the benefits of using PPPs while reducing their risks; c) reducing dependence on 
PPPs; and d) considering the social, economic and environmental implications, including for 
future generations, of authorising or not authorising the PPP. Two Member States decline to 
answer this question. Sweden specifies e) ‘a combination of the above’ and in a comment 
differentiates between the approach taken with individual applications and the overall policy 
behind risk assessment. The former requires maintaining a high level of protection and 
reducing the risk, pursuant to the Regulation. The latter requires a ‘balance between the 
benefits of using PPPs and the level of protection… [as] expressed in the protection goals for 
the risk assessment’. Most selected a) and/or b), as shown in figure 1. Two Member States 
(both Central zone) select both a) and b), two select a) and d) and one selects a), b) and c). 
 
Figure 1: Interpretations of sustainability 
It is significant that two Member States take social, economic and environmental implications, 
including for future generations, into account. As discussed in section IV.2, this interpretation 
of sustainability is not expressed in the SUD, nor in the Regulation. As the Netherlands 
forcefully argues: 
At the moment only the reduction of risk is possible within the framework of the 
Regulation. To realise a viable sustainable agricultural practice…the 
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interpretation of sustainability applied in…decision-making should also include 
social, economic and environmental implications, including implications for 
future generations. 
Q14 asked whether Member States follow any internal or external guidance when applying 
the principle of sustainability in order to apply it consistently. Two respondents report that 
they follow external guidance, three report they follow both internal and external guidance 
and four report they follow no guidance.262 
The Stakeholder is of the opinion that all Member States take the principle of sustainability 
into account and apply it consistently. It understands the principle to be incorporated into the 
Uniform Principles and therefore CAs take the principle into account when they apply the 
Uniform Principles. 
4.2 Summary and recommendations 
Although, again, the data are patchy, two tentative observations may be put forward. The first, 
as with the precautionary principle, has to do with consistency in interpretation and 
application of the ‘principle of sustainability’ both between and within Member States. Not 
every Member State takes sustainability into account in its authorisation decision-making and 
those that do, do not necessarily do so with every application and may not necessarily rely on 
guidance to ensure consistency in application. Moreover, responses from zSC secretariats 
suggest a belief that Member States are not required by the Regulation to take sustainability 
into account. In addition, Member States employ different interpretations of sustainability, 
potentially indicating varying levels of ambition in terms of the objectives they seek to achieve 
in implementing sustainability. These variations in practice may ultimately indicate an 
inconsistent basis for, and potential unpredictability in, decision-making across Member 
States, at least with respect to sustainability. In this respect, the Netherlands’ comments that 
no methodology for taking sustainability into account during assessment exists, is pertinent. 
Without a methodology or clear guidance, potential for inconsistency is perhaps not 
surprising. However, the available data do not allow conclusions to be drawn regarding the 
extent to which these differing interpretations of sustainability or Member State decisions not 
to consider sustainability are reflected in national decision-making. As with the precautionary 
principle, a more in-depth study of national authorisation decisions would be required to 
understand their effect, if any. 
Secondly, although the Regulation neither requires nor empowers Member States to consider 
their NAPs, the SUD or sustainability generally, when deciding whether or not to authorise a 
PPP, it appears that some Member States do so in practice. Furthermore, while Member States 
are entitled to have regard to the objectives of their NAPs when imposing ‘appropriate 
conditions’ on the use of PPPs, not all do so or do so all the time. This may suggest further 
inconsistencies in Member State decision-making practices in terms of the level of regard to 
sustainability during authorisation procedures. 
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Recommendations 
As with the precautionary principle, further empirical research is recommended to 
developed a greater understanding of the role sustainability (including its various 
interpretations) plays in PPP evaluation and authorisation. Such research should again 
involve a systematic, qualitative and comparative review of national authorisation 
decisions and would inform efforts to clarify the interpretation of sustainability and its role 
(if any) in decision-making, including the following recommendations. 
The Commission is encouraged to develop and publish guidance clarifying whether 
Member States are required to take sustainability into account during evaluation and 
authorisation procedures. If Member States are so required, the Commission is further 
encouraged to clarify how sustainability is to be interpreted and applied in order to ensure 
consistent and predictable decision-making. 
The Netherlands reported that it was working towards a framework for sustainable 
agriculture and that results of its experiments would be shared. The Commission, EFSA and 
other Member States are encouraged to review and consider seriously any findings or 
recommendations the Netherlands makes. 
Member States are also encouraged to collaborate at zonal and inter-zonal level to decide 
upon a harmonised interpretation and method of application of sustainability in the 
context of PPP authorisation. In the interests of enhancing co-ordination and efficiency 
within the zones, as well as transparency, Member States should set these out in guidance 
and publish that guidance. 
Both Member States and the Commission are encouraged, in drawing up such guidance, 
to consult with wider stakeholders including relevant public interest groups with the aim 
of enhancing both the transparency and quality of the guidance. 
 
5. Substitution 
5.1 Discussion 
Member States were asked three questions on substitution and comparative assessment. 
Article 50(4) PPPR requires Member States to perform a comparative assessment of PPPs 
containing a candidate for substitution ‘regularly and at the latest at renewal or amendment’ 
of its authorisation (in addition to the requirement for comparative assessment during initial 
evaluation of an application263). Q16 asked how often CAs perform such a comparative 
assessment. One Member State’s answer was unclear and is therefore not reported here. Of the 
remaining responses, ten Member States indicate comparative assessment is conducted at 
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renewal and amendment, two of which also comment that it is also conducted for new 
authorisations. One Member State indicates comparative assessment is conducted at first 
authorisation and renewal. Member States may review an application at any time, in 
accordance with the provisions of Article 44 PPPR. This may lead to the withdrawal or 
amendment of an authorisation. The timing of amendments can therefore be unpredictable. 
However, without prejudice to Article 44, authorisations are granted for a maximum of one 
year ‘from the date of expiry of the approval of the active substance’ in the PPP ‘and thereafter 
for as long as the active substances… are approved’.264 Active substances are approved as 
candidates for substitution for a maximum of seven years.265 This means that unless an 
authorisation is amended pursuant to Article 44, comparative assessments in the respondent 
Member States may be performed every seven or eight years, at most. 
Q17 asked Member States to indicate the PPPs on which they conduct comparative 
assessments. All respondents selected ‘PPPs containing active substances classified as 
candidates for substitution pursuant to Article 24(1) PPPR’, as required by Article 50(1) PPPR. 
Only two Member States indicate a more ambitious substitution programme. Sweden 
indicates that it performs optional comparative assessments under Article 50(2) PPPR. 
Belgium referred to Article 29(1)(d) PPPR which provides that to be authorised the technical 
formulation of a PPP must be ‘such that user exposure or other risks are limited as much as 
possible without compromising the functioning of the product’. It notes that it performs a kind 
of comparative assessment ‘between formulation types containing the same active substance 
but for which efficacy/selectivity or effects on health or environment may differ due to co-
formulants’. Commission guidance also recognises the presence of the concept of comparative 
assessment in this provision (Commission, 2014a, p.3). 
Finally, Q18 asked whether Member States follow any internal or external guidance in order 
to deliver consistent results. All respondents indicate that they follow either external or both 
internal and external guidance with three referring to EU and EPPO guidance. The 
Netherlands reports use of its own manuals for comparative assessment which contain inter 
alia ‘European guidance on comparative assessment and national guidance on assessment of 
practical and economic disadvantages’. One (Southern zone) Member State reports that it 
followed internal guidance which ‘specifies national options on issues left as optional in the 
EU Guidance’. Sweden reports no guidance for comparative assessment under Article 50(2), 
which is therefore conducted on a case-by-case basis. The CZSC secretariat notes that Member 
States still have only limited experience with comparative assessment and the NZSC 
secretariat reports that it is beyond its remit to provide guidance on it. 
The Stakeholder feels that some CAs are correctly implementing comparative assessment but 
does not know whether it is implemented consistently across CAs. It is, however, sceptical 
about the usefulness of comparative assessment for achieving the sustainable use of pesticides 
and risk reduction particularly, partly due to the high levels of safety PPPs must meet for 
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authorisation anyway. It indicates that industry, generally, holds this view. It doubts 
comparative assessment could be better implemented and regards it as ‘mainly a political 
gesture to demonstrate the desire to reduce the use of pesticides’ by which ‘already under-
resourced Competent Authorities are unnecessarily burdened’. The CZSC secretariat echoes 
these concerns, doubting its ability to enhance safety, reporting that comparative assessment 
had not yet led to the withdrawal of products and attributing to it a risk of increased resistance 
to the remaining active substances. 
5.2 Summary and recommendations 
The respondent Member States appear to exhibit greater consistency, with all or most 
conducting comparative assessment on the same occasions, on the same PPPs and following 
guidance to ensure consistency. The greater consistency here is perhaps not surprising given 
the greater clarity of the relevant provisions in the Regulation, despite the unsettled nature of 
the substitution principle in the literature, as discussed in section IV.3. At the same time, few 
respondent Member States implement a more ambitious interpretation of the substitution 
principle by, for example, exercising the power in Article 50(2) PPPR. However, it is perhaps 
wise to remember that this principle is still a relatively new addition to the regulatory toolbox 
and to view substitution therefore as a process of continuous development, rather than a single 
decision (Hansson, Molander and Rudén, 2011, p.456), evolving as guidance, assessment 
models etc. develop (Commission, 2014a, p.8). 
 
Recommendations 
In order to encourage a more ambitious application of the substitution principle, the 
Commission is advised to develop or commission and publish guidance for conducting 
optional comparative assessment under Article 50(2) PPPR. 
Substitution and comparative assessment are still novel and may have unintended 
consequences. Further research is therefore recommended to investigate the effects of 
these new provisions and whether substitution is in fact reducing risks from PPPs. 
Furthermore, given the novelty of these provisions, it may be wise to allow for a few more 
years of experience before embarking on such research. 
Hanssen et al. have made recommendations for promoting substitution. These include 
increasing the availability of data about toxicity, chemical composition and technical 
functionality; developing green chemistry and providing helpdesk functions, for example 
technical help from experts (Hansson, Molander and Rudén, 2011, pp.457–458). The 
Commission and/or Member States may wish to consider investigating and developing one 
or more of these initiatives. 
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VIII – Conclusion and recommendations 
1. Conclusion  
The scope of this research was broad. It generated new data in an area which is generally not 
well understood and about which there is little knowledge. Given this starting point, the need 
to break new ground and the breadth of the research questions, this report should be regarded 
as a first step towards understanding the various matters covered. However, many questions 
remain unanswered and, as implementation of the Regulation progresses and the zonal system 
evolves, new questions will arise. More, and more focused, research will be necessary to 
understand the current situation as well as new developments, perhaps once more experience 
has been gained with the zonal system, zonal evaluation and comparative assessment. The 
conclusions of this research are summarised here. Section VIII.2 summarises the 
recommendations. 
While this research has not identified any deficiencies which are likely significantly to 
undermine the reliability of CA decisions-making, there are large parts of the zonal procedure 
and CA decision-making which could be improved. Overall, the dimension currently capable 
of the greatest and most immediate improvement relates to the transparency of CAs, 
particularly in terms of access to information. In the medium to longer term, it may be 
appropriate to review the Regulation and relevant guidance and policy with a view to 
establishing opportunities for wider participation in decision-making primarily for the 
contribution such activities can make to transparency and to countering the risk of regulatory 
capture. In addition, given the discussions above266 regarding the diversity of interpretations 
and their context-dependency, consistency in interpretation and application of the 
precautionary principle and sustainability among Member States, and the ambition with 
which substitution is implemented, could also be improved, for example through clear 
guidance. Finally, as ever, greater resources – financial, technical, expert, personnel and greater 
remuneration in order to attract qualified staff may reduce information asymmetry, improve 
decision-making, both in terms of its quality and speed and boost the operation of the zonal 
system overall. 
However, it should be remembered that there are tensions between the various values which 
the regulation and decision-making should support. Restricting the movement of regulator 
heads between industry and CAs may improve independence but could simultaneously 
hinder recruitment of those with the necessary expertise. Consultation may improve 
transparency but at the same time reduce the efficiency of evaluation and authorisation 
procedures and further burden CAs. Increased accountability to government for example, 
depending on how it is implemented, may reduce independence. As such, steps to improve 
one area need to be carefully researched and designed in order to avoid undermining progress 
in another area. 
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1.1 Authorisation procedure and zonal system 
Zonal evaluation and national decision-making procedures are characterised by diversity. For 
example, Member States differ in terms of the institutional structure of their CAs, the type and 
extent of communications with applicants during evaluation and decision-making and the 
nature of the expert advice (binding or consultative) provided to decision-makers. Overall, 
very few trends within the zones may be identified. The zonal system is valued by Member 
States for the benefits it delivers, for example harmonisation, work-sharing and resolution of 
disagreements between CAs. However, it still faces significant challenges, especially in terms 
of improving harmonisation, sharing work fairly within the zones and further strengthening 
trust between the Member States. It is a new and complex system which warrants further 
research and continued monitoring in order to understand better its development and 
operation. 
1.2 Independence  
There are varying levels of formal independence of respondent CAs from government. 
However, most respondent CAs have sole responsibility for their decisions. Lack of formal 
independence does not necessarily mean unreliable or unfair regulation. 
There are also varying levels of independence from industry. However, few of the respondent 
Member States report restrictions on recruiting CA heads from industry or on employment in 
industry after their appointment. This may risk undermining their independence from 
industry. Increased transparency and/or PIGs may provide mechanisms by which to counter 
regulatory capture. 
Most respondent CAs lose some formal autonomy due to their being funded by government. 
In addition, government control over salaries reduces autonomy further and restricts CA 
ability to recruit the required staff. However, most respondent CAs regard themselves as 
possessing sufficient resources (personnel, technical, financial) to fulfil their obligations under 
the Regulation. 
Due to the lack of data concerning stakeholder and public views with respect to the fairness 
and reasonableness of CA decision-making, the extent to which it is trusted and how far the 
independence of individual CAs (or lack thereof) is regarded as a problem, it not possible to 
determine whether strengthening the formal independence of CAs would improve the quality 
of its decision-making. 
1.3 Transparency 
Levels of transparency among CAs are low, overall. This is so firstly, in terms of the availability 
of information about evaluation and authorisation procedures and secondly, in terms of access 
to the information on which decisions are based. Both of these are necessary to enable 
interested parties to gain an understanding of the procedural and informational basis of PPP 
authorisations. 
Public participation in decision-making is important for improving transparency. Currently, 
the Regulation does not require or provide for such participation during evaluation and 
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authorisation procedures and comparative assessment. Furthermore, the zonal system itself 
acts as a barrier to participation due to the level at which zonal evaluation procedures are 
conducted; a level which is far removed from most citizens. Given this legal framework, it is 
not surprising that consultation activities in Member States are extremely limited, if conducted 
at all. 
CAs are subject to differing levels of accountability to national governments and legislatures. 
Some Member States operate robust systems of peer review or auditing of decisions which 
should operate to improve the overall reliability of their decision-making. Increasing 
transparency could also improve accountability. 
1.4 Precaution, sustainability and substitution 
There is evidence of inconsistent interpretation and application of the precautionary principle 
and sustainability amongst Member States. Member States exhibit greater consistency in 
conducting comparative assessment but overall, levels of ambition are low. Comparative 
assessment is still a relatively new exercise but eventually ambition could be improved. 
2. Recommendations 
2.1 Authorisation procedure and zonal system 
Further, longer-term (external) qualitative and quantitative empirical research is 
recommended to understand better the operation of the zonal system, the challenges each zone 
faces, how these may be overcome and the potential for improving evaluation and the overall 
authorisation process. Such research could identify further examples of best practice with a 
view to promoting sharing and policy learning among Member States. For example, it was 
unclear whether all Member States assign project managers to manage applications. Further 
research could investigate Member State experience with the use of project managers and 
whether, for example, they reduce the occurrence of delays.  
Member States are encouraged to continue communicating and working together in their 
zones and to step-up activities designed to improve harmonisation of, for example, methods 
and models for evaluation and to achieve fairer work-sharing with the aim of strengthening 
trust between each other. Chairs of zSCs/zSC secretariats are encouraged to take particular 
responsibility for co-ordinating and pushing forward these activities. The Southern zone, 
particularly, could consider introducing guidelines or other measures both governing the 
timing of RR publication and to improve efficacy assessment within the zone. 
Information about, and understanding of, the zonal system more generally could be improved 
in order to provide an evidence base for possible future action and support. The Commission 
is therefore advised to continue monitoring the zonal system, including stakeholder 
experiences of the zones, in order to keep track of its progress. The Commission and zSCs are 
also encouraged to consider whether it would be feasible and valuable for zSCs to report (for 
example, annually) to the Commission on progress in their zones. The Commission is 
encouraged to provide support, for example financial and administrative, for the production 
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of such reports to ensure their quality. In the interests of transparency, any such reports should 
be made publicly available. 
2.2 Independence 
It is recommended that further qualitative research is conducted. This research should target 
two specific enquiries. First, it should seek to understand how the zonal evaluation and 
national authorisation procedures of the CAs are perceived by all stakeholders, including 
applicants and the general public, and the extent (if at all) to which these procedures are 
viewed as fair and reasonable. Secondly, it should move beyond study of formal independence 
to investigate the existence (if any), in practice, of governmental influence on CA decision-
making, for example through review of CA decisions and in-depth examination of interaction 
between CAs and government during decision-making. Such research may provide a stronger 
basis on which to make substantive recommendations. 
The Regulation places no obligation on Member States to report their progress on the 
implementation of its provisions.267 While acknowledging the difficulty of amending 
legislation, given the lack of information about CAs and the operation of the zonal system, the 
introduction of such a reporting requirement on Member States could provide valuable 
information and constitute a step towards filling this knowledge gap. The EU institutions are 
encouraged to consider such an amendment. In the interests of transparency, any such reports 
should be made publicly available. 
Regulatory (particularly cultural) capture has been identified as a risk to CAs. However, 
further empirical research would be required to determine the extent (if at all) to which any 
CAs are, in practice, influenced or captured by industry. Such research should involve, inter 
alia, qualitative review of registration reports and decisions against information submitted by 
applicants and modes of interaction between CAs and industry to understand the nature and 
proximity of the relationship. Recent literature (for example, (Carpenter and Moss, 2014b)) 
proposes robust methodologies to conduct such research. Greater understanding would 
provide a stronger evidence base on which to make recommendations. However, pending such 
research, the following recommendations are made. 
Member States are encouraged to review their national provisions regarding potential for 
commissioners/agency heads to have held positions in industry prior to their appointment to 
CAs and to accept employment in industry post-appointment. In order to reduce the risk of 
regulatory capture, Member States are encouraged, furthermore, to consider strengthening 
restrictions with respect to both. 
Member States are also encouraged share best practice. For example, Member States may 
benefit from learning about France’s experience with its charter on relations with interest 
                                                          
267 Such reporting requirements exist elsewhere. For example, Member States are required to report on 
implementation to the Commission every three years, under Article 31(4) European Parliament and 
Council Directive 2001/18/EC on the deliberate release into the environment of genetically modified 
organisms [2001] OJ L106/1. 
Regulation (EC) 1107/2009 on the Placing of Plant Protection Products on the Market 
PE 615.668 III - 116 
groups (section VII.1.2) and the Netherlands’ experience with its quality standards (section 
VII.1.4). If successful, Member States may wish to implement similar measures. 
Involvement of public interest groups (PIGs) in regulatory decision-making was discussed in 
section II.1.2 as a mechanism for reducing the risk of regulatory capture. Again, further 
research would be required into, for example, their appropriateness, mechanisms for their 
support (including funding) and to identify potential candidates. PIGs could operate on a 
national level and, if the PIG itself transcends national boundaries, on a zonal or EU level too. 
Research into the potential for the zonal system to act as a counterweight to external pressure 
was beyond the scope of this study. Further research may therefore be necessary to investigate 
this question. If this potential is real, Member States and the Commission should provide 
support at zonal and inter-zonal level for developing the networks required to ensure 
individual CAs can take full advantage of the zonal system as a means to maintain and enhance 
their independence. 
Member States are encouraged to review the means by which CAs are funded and to consider 
introducing fees covering the costs of evaluation and authorisation, pursuant to Article 74(1) 
PPPR. However, while securing CA funding through fees levied on industry may promote 
independence from government, dependence on such fees may reduce independence from 
industry. A straightforward recommendation with regard to the benefits to CA independence 
of retaining such fees is therefore not possible. The further research, recommended above, into 
CA independence in practice from government and industry should generate greater 
understanding of the relative prevalence or risk of government influence or industry capture. 
Appropriate funding structures could be designed or adjusted in response to the identified 
risks. 
While pressures on government budgets are acknowledged, given the need for expertise both 
to ensure the quality of evaluation and decision-making and to counter information 
asymmetry, Member States may wish to consider the following options. Firstly, review and, 
if appropriate reduction of, the application of constraints on civil service remuneration in order 
to promote recruitment and retention of the necessary expert staff. Secondly, the development 
or enhancement of in-house training programmes in order to cultivate sources of expertise 
other than from within industry, as a further means to counter asymmetric information and 
industry influence or capture. 
2.3 Transparency 
Member States are encouraged to review the amount of information available online about 
their evaluation and authorisation procedures from the perspective both of applicants and 
other stakeholders/general publics. It may also be helpful to review other CA websites with 
high levels of information as examples of good practice. The UK CA website, for example, 
contains substantial information. In order to enhance transparency with respect to these 
procedures, Member States are encouraged to provide clear and comprehensive information 
at least in their native language and ideally, eventually, in English. 
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Member States are encouraged to increase the publication, ideally online, of information on 
PPPs within the limits of the law, especially the following: 
 Authorisation decisions 
 Registration reports 
 The information sources on which evaluation and authorisation are based. Ideally, this 
should include the conclusions of the zRMS’s evaluation 
 Any submissions (and responses thereto, if relevant) made during any consultation 
process 
To this end, Member States are encouraged to step up discussions amongst themselves 
regarding the publication of registration reports and other information. These discussions may 
need to happen alongside the development of measures, for example guidelines or training, 
designed to improve the quality of registration reports in order to support this measure to 
enhance transparency. 
It is acknowledged that CA resources are limited. However, where possible, publication of the 
above information in English268 is encouraged for its potential to enhance access to information 
for a larger audience and to improve the quality of future applications. Increased public 
availability of such information would facilitate conduct of the research recommended in 
sections VII.1.5/VIII.2.2. 
Stronger measures to improve access to information may be desirable. The Commission is 
therefore encouraged to consider the possibility of amending the Regulation to introduce a 
requirement that registration reports (at least) are made publicly available. 
Although there is no legislative requirement, Member States are encouraged to consider ways 
to open up their national authorisation decision-making procedures to wider participation. 
Member States could experiment, for example, with providing opportunities to comment on 
dRRs during the commenting phase of zonal evaluation (described in section VI) and/or on 
draft authorisation decisions. Further upstream, wider participation in the definition of 
national data requirements could improve the transparency of CA decision-making. If opening 
up such elements of decision-making to stakeholders and the wider public generally is 
regarded as time-consuming and unmanageable, participation by a limited number of select 
PIGs could still improve transparency as well as contributing valuable expertise. 
Again, although there is no legislative requirement to ensure participation during zonal 
evaluation procedures, zonal steering committees are encouraged to consider ways to 
enhance the openness of these procedures. While it may be difficult to reach citizens across the 
entire zone, a starting point may be to identify PIGs or individuals (for example, users, CSOs, 
university experts) within the zone who can contribute different knowledge and perspectives 
to the drafting of, for example, zonal guidance documents. Given that the zonal system is still 
in its early stages, opening up evaluation and decision-making procedures themselves should 
                                                          
268 Or another widely used EU language. The impact of the UK’s departure from the EU may be a factor 
in choice of appropriate language. 
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be considered in the longer-term and may need to be implemented gradually and sensitively 
in order not to over-burden CAs. For example, a willing and capable zRMS could pilot a 
programme whereby a PIG participates in the evaluation of an application, following which 
the zRMS shares its experience with other Member States. 
Stronger measures for improving transparency of the zonal authorisation procedure would 
come from the EU institutions themselves. Commission support for Member States wishing 
to open up their decision-making procedures could include administrative support and 
expertise, for example in identifying appropriate PIGs or other actors and designing 
appropriate participatory procedures and online platforms (such as CIRCABC) to facilitate 
wider participation and sharing of results and experiences between Member States. Longer-
term, the Commission is encouraged to draw up guidelines (or similar, non-legislative 
instruments) for increasing the openness of zonal evaluation and authorisation procedures 
with particular regard to providing opportunities for wider participation.  
The strongest measure for improving transparency through participation would be a 
legislative requirement. Again, in the longer-term, the European Parliament, Council and 
Commission are encouraged to review the provisions of the Regulation in light of the findings 
of this report and overall EU policy commitments to public consultation and participation 
(discussed in section III.3) and to consider the possibility of introducing a specific provision 
governing participation during the zonal evaluation and national decision-making 
procedures, including comparative assessment.269  
Given the complex structure of the zonal system and limited resources of CAs, further research 
is recommended to identify and elaborate potential and feasible participatory mechanisms, 
including PIGs, consensus conferences, citizen juries etc. appropriate to the zonal system and 
capacity of CAs. 
Member States who do not already do so are encouraged to produce annual reports as a step 
towards enhancing the transparency of their operations and thereby also their accountability. 
Such reports would need to contain information about the CA’s operations and progress 
against its objectives of a sufficient quality and intelligibility to enable proper scrutiny by the 
relevant oversight institutions and the public. 
Member States are also encouraged to establish internal and/or external procedures for 
scrutinising their decisions, for example annual audits of a sample of decisions, where these 
are not already in operation. There are already examples of good practice and Member States 
are encouraged to use already established zonal networks to share such practices. 
2.4 Precaution, sustainability and substitution 
The above analysis suggests inconsistent application of the precautionary principle within the 
EU in the context of PPP evaluation and authorisation. However, to understand truly the 
divergences between Member State application of the precautionary principle in practice, a 
                                                          
269 The benefits of wider participation in comparative assessment were discussed in section IV.3. 
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systematic, qualitative and comparative review of authorisation decisions would be required. 
Such research would provide a stronger evidence base on which to pursue efforts to harmonise 
interpretation and application of the precautionary principle, including the following two 
recommendations. 
Member States are encouraged to collaborate at zonal and inter-zonal level to decide upon a 
harmonised interpretation and method of application of the precautionary principle in the 
context of PPP evaluation and authorisation. In the interests of enhancing co-ordination and 
efficiency within the zones, as well as transparency, Member States should set these out in 
guidance and publish that guidance. 
Perhaps more importantly, given that EU law relating to the precautionary principle may be 
unclear and therefore causing inconsistent application, the Commission is encouraged to 
develop (and publish) guidance to clarify, perhaps on the basis of such research as suggested 
above, how the precautionary principle should be interpreted and applied in the context of 
PPP evaluations and authorisations.  
Both Member States and the Commission are encouraged, in drawing up such guidance, to 
consult with wider stakeholders and/or relevant PIGs with the aim of enhancing both the 
transparency and quality of the guidance. 
As with the precautionary principle, further empirical research is recommended to developed 
a greater understanding of the role sustainability (including its various interpretations) plays 
in PPP evaluation and authorisation. Such research should again involve a systematic, 
qualitative and comparative review of national authorisation decisions and would inform 
efforts to clarify the interpretation of sustainability and its role (if any) in decision-making, 
including the following recommendations. 
The Commission is encouraged to develop and publish guidance clarifying whether Member 
States are required to take sustainability into account during evaluation and authorisation 
procedures. If Member States are so required, the Commission is further encouraged to clarify 
how sustainability is to be interpreted and applied in order to ensure consistent and 
predictable decision-making. 
The Netherlands reported that it was working towards a framework for sustainable agriculture 
and that results of its experiments would be shared. The Commission, EFSA and other 
Member States are encouraged to review and consider seriously any findings or 
recommendations the Netherlands makes. 
Member States are also encouraged to collaborate at zonal and inter-zonal level to decide upon 
a harmonised interpretation and method of application of sustainability in the context of PPP 
authorisation. In the interests of enhancing co-ordination and efficiency within the zones, as 
well as transparency, Member States should set these out in guidance and publish that 
guidance. 
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Both Member States and the Commission are encouraged, in drawing up such guidance, to 
consult with wider stakeholders including relevant public interest groups with the aim of 
enhancing both the transparency and quality of the guidance. 
In order to encourage a more ambitious application of the substitution principle, the 
Commission is advised to develop or commission and publish guidance for conducting 
optional comparative assessment under Article 50(2) PPPR. 
Substitution and comparative assessment are still novel and may have unintended 
consequences. Further research is therefore recommended to investigate the effects of these 
new provisions and whether substitution is in fact reducing risks from PPPs. Furthermore, 
given the novelty of these provisions, it may be wise to allow for a few more years of experience 
before embarking on such research. 
Hanssen et al. have made recommendations for promoting substitution. These include 
increasing the availability of data about toxicity, chemical composition and technical 
functionality; developing green chemistry and providing helpdesk functions, for example 
technical help from experts (Hansson, Molander and Rudén, 2011, pp.457–458). The 
Commission and/or Member States may wish to consider investigating and developing one 
or more of these initiatives.  
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